SECURING COMMON PROPERTY
REGIMES IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

Synthesis of 41 Case Studies on Common
Property Regimes from Africa, Asia, Europe
and Latin America.

• PREFACE
• EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• INTRODUCTION
• ACCESS TO RESOURCES VIA COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES
• TENURE SECURITY UNDER COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES
• THREATS TO COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES
  - Markets
  - Demographic Factors
  - Legal and Governance
    Frameworks
  - Conflicts and Conflict
    Management
• EXAMPLES OF REFORM AND INNOVATION
• CONCLUSIONS
• REFERENCES
• ANNEX A: BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF CASE STUDIES
• ANNEX B: CASE STUDY FRAMEWORK
• ABBREVIATIONS
• Other Useful Resources on Common Property

CONCLUSIONS

This paper began by asking two broad sets of questions. The first set of questions concerned the nature and effectiveness of land and resource rights at the community level. It focused on the role of local level institutions in securing group rights. The second set of questions focused on the interplay of these rights with macro-level institutions, especially with formal laws and policies. The main thematic areas that emerged from the case studies included the question of how rights to the commons are acquired by groups and individuals; the problem of how to define tenure security, especially from the rights holders' perspective; the nature and sources of threats to common property, including conflicts; and the kinds of innovations that show promise in providing some measure of security for common property rights in a rapidly changing context. This concluding section recaps the key lessons learnt, most of which were summarized in each of the subsections.

Clearly, a broad range of actors at multiple levels have been identified across the 41 case studies. These generally include poor men and women, community leaders, both customary and non-customary, investors and state/government actors. While the incentives of each of these actors were not always explicitly mentioned in each of the individual case studies, they are implicitly embedded. The first section of this paper which focuses on why property rights matter, summarizes a set of incentives for community actors and why they would want continued access to the commons and some security of access via common property arrangements. Many rural men and women rely on diverse products from the commons for subsistence, including during lean times. Few others rely on products from the commons to generate incomes beyond subsistence. For many rural men and women, continued and secure access to these benefits is imperative. Securing the collective arrangements on which this access is based is indeed a logical pathway to sustained use and management.

However, these preferences are not uniform or static, and where communities are faced with changing external and internal circumstances they too change. For example, enhanced markets for commons products differentiate wealthier and poorer individuals, as the former are better equipped to deal with the market and its risks. Similarly, choices on new technologies can set apart men's and women's preferences, with women often preferring technologies that enhance their roles in provisioning for family subsistence. Finally, where outside investors have an interest in the products and services of the commons, it is often village leaders and representatives who negotiate on behalf of the community. They often end up maximizing their own interests as against that of the community they represent.

The incentives of governments with regard to securing common property rights are mixed. Most governments continue to have a strong incentive to generate revenues through promoting investment in extractive industries, such as mining and plantation forestry, or non-consumptive use such as conservation and tourism. Common property is frequently a casualty, as governments are pressured to provide these resources, including a system of property rights (usually private, individual) that investors deem sufficient to guarantee the security of their investments. In several cases, however, community organizing has successfully thwarted top down, external allocation of the commons. There is also a recent trend towards decentralized forms of governance and the provision of both formal and non formal recognition of community rights, including explicit laws that recognize community rights and/or co-management arrangements. Despite this often well-intended attempt at decentralization and/or devolution, ambiguities in cross-sectoral legislation and in the roles of responsibilities of local and customary authorities have resulted in further insecurity for the commons management that are outlined below.

The above attempt at distilling the incentives of different actors is at best superficial. A refined analysis of actors and their incentives requires a more systematic methodology that exceeds the methodology that was used to generate this set of case studies. However, the following concluding paragraphs provide an indication of how different actors used formal and informal institutions, including community organizing, and the implications of these actions to access and security of tenure of the commons.

The case study findings reinforce the well-recognized observation that access to common property plays an important role in reducing the vulnerability of poor rural households, and often functions as a safety net against extreme poverty. Access to the commons is particularly crucial for pastoralist communities for whom food security is primarily, if not wholly, dependent on access to pastures and water sources by their herds. Beyond the demonstrable links between common property and livelihoods, there are ripple effects in which secure access to the commons increase other important linkages that foster human development and capacities.

There are various ways in which access to the commons is created and sustained, including through community membership and identity, collective organizing, and state action. In addition to its role in developing and implementing laws and policies, other kinds of state action can also support common property regimes, including its role in endorsing projects for community-based natural resource management and adapting the working relations with local institutions.

Customary systems remain an important source of legitimacy for access to the commons. Group membership, particularly based on lineage, plays a significant role in providing and managing access to the commons, although in some cases it is also possible for non-group members to negotiate access to resources managed as commons through customary institutions. Customary systems, however, remain vulnerable where they are not recognized by the state, particularly when governments take actions or establish policies that undermine the authority of customary institutions.

The case studies described fewer instances where state legislation is the main source of legitimacy for common property rights, when compared to the examples given of customary systems playing this role. In cases where no legal framework yet exists, a common refrain among case study authors is for such laws to be developed, so that the state recognizes collective rights and there is a framework in place to support common property regimes. In some cases, new laws have been passed in recent years that provide a basis for recognizing group rights to land and resources; implementation of these, however, is still limited. Greater involvement by communities that manage resources as common property in both the development and implementation of laws would be an important step toward stronger legal and governance frameworks with respect to common property regimes.

The cases highlight three key tenure security concerns on the part of common property users: affordability, familiarity, and utility not only in documenting rights but also in developing systems for managing the commons effectively and sustainably. This last concern, in particular, highlights the practical need for linking secure access to land and resources with opportunities to use them for livelihood needs, in ways that balance current and future consumption.

The expansion of agriculture is creating new opportunities for rural households to earn cash income, but also poses the risk that common lands may be individualized, with poorer or marginalized groups (e.g., pastoralists or indigenous forest communities) being excluded. The cases illustrate that there are viable ways to negotiate arrangements that can support mixed production systems, and manage or prevent conflicts among different groups of resource users.

While both large-scale commercialization and small-scale agriculture are contributing to individualization of the commons, the case studies exhibit much greater concern about the impacts of the former. In most of the cases, when resources from the commons are captured by external investors, local residents are not enjoying any benefits. There is often a power imbalance between communities and outside investors, which makes it more challenging - though not impossible - for community groups to establish grounds for negotiating shared rights to the commons.

State actions and policies may contribute to nationalization or privatization of the commons in a variety of ways. States may assume or claim direct control over the commons, such as through the establishment of protected areas. Policies and legal reforms may encourage private land rights either directly, by opening up community lands to the market, or indirectly, by supporting investments in sectors (e.g., commercial ranching) that tend to be based on individual property rights. As discussed earlier, state actions and policies may also undermine customary institutions that manage the commons, or generate overlapping claims to the commons (land and other resources) that make it more difficult for groups to establish secure rights.

These examples suggest that customary systems are able to adapt to new types of conflict, particularly if facilitation or assistance is made available to support this adaptation. In cases where horizontal conflicts emerge between different user groups, steps can be taken to strengthen the capacity of local institutions that manage the commons also to manage and prevent disputes. In cases where there is a vertical conflict, i.e., one where there is a power imbalance between the parties in conflict, support to community organizing and collective action can help to even the playing field, increasing the ability of community groups to negotiate more secure access to the commons, which is the issue most often at the heart of such disputes.

The cases suggest that collective action is proving an effective and robust approach to addressing many of the challenges that common property regimes face. Still, there is wider recognition that new legislation and policy reform are needed as well, in order to support commons property systems and ensure that the rights of both groups and individuals within those groups are secure. Many cases note that draft laws or policies are being developed, and recommend these as key actions to be taken. In fewer of the cases, such laws and policies already exist, and attention must now be given to implementing them.

The seemingly uphill challenge of developing and implementing laws and policies that support common property reflects, at least in part, the need to increase the visibility and voice of rural peoples who depend on the commons for their livelihoods. So long as communities that manage resources as common property are left out of decision-making, their rights to these resources will be at risk, and the tenure systems through which they manage resources will be threatened. Increasing not just participation in, but also leverage over the processes and institutions that determine land tenure and natural resource management policies should be an important element of efforts to strengthen common property regimes.