SECURING COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

SECURING COMMON PROPERTY
REGIMES IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

Synthesis of 41 Case Studies on Common
Property Regimes from Africa, Asia, Europe
and Latin America.

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THREATS TO COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES:

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Numerous cases discussed an increasing trend of extracting resources from the commons for commercial purposes. This includes both expansion of smallholder agricultural into the commons, which is pushing an individualization of land and resources, and large-scale exploitation of the commons, such as through extractive industries and plantation agriculture. These two trends were the ones most frequently cited as threats to common property regimes.

Agricultural Expansion and Individualization of the Commons

Rural areas are increasingly connected to regional and national markets, and while domestic use of common-pool resources still plays a significant role in supporting rural livelihoods, at least nine cases also identify an increasing reliance on cash income and an expansion of opportunities to earn income through commercial use of the commons, including through small-scale agriculture (see cases from Benin and Niger, Bachir et. al. 2005 and Dangbégnon 2005). While this trend may provide rural households with new chances to improve their livelihoods by drawing on resources from the commons, it may also lead to disputes among different user groups or between the poorer and the better off families within a given community.

Increasing commercialization of commodities derived from common areas often increases the value of the resource and encourages privatization. In some cases, producing for the market may challenge or disrupt customary institutions that are the basis for the management of common property. This is seen in the case from the Muzarabani district of Zimbabwe, where the value of masawu trees is increasing and leading to an increase in private claims to trees. Common lands adjacent to individual farms are being claimed, by clearing and fencing land around the area (Chidakwai 2006).

Ultimately, land use priorities may shift, especially if resources managed as common property are not accurately valued. In Benin , the introduction of cashew nuts (a cash crop) led to demands by farmers to individualize the commons. This undermined existing agreements between farmers and herders for joint and sequential resource use. Herders no longer had access to migration corridors across cultivated lands in their regular transhumance, which increased the potential for disputes between pastoralists and farmers. Negotiated agreements between the two groups, facilitated by local customary institutions, were in some cases able to manage these disputes (Dangbégnon 2006).

In some cases, new tenure arrangements are emerging with the spread of agriculture, to support mixed production systems, e.g., agro-forestry or agro-pastoralism. These systems do not necessarily emerge as a "natural" outcome of changing production systems, though. The case from Benin illustrates that negotiation among different groups may be needed for the initial tenure regime to evolve and support "hybrid" production systems effectively.

Whether such an outcome may be possible is related to the scale of production associated with a given agricultural product, particularly cash crops. In the area near Akok community in Southern Cameroon , the introduction of improved palm oil varieties over the past 15 years has created large plantations, generally owned by urban investors. This process includes purchases of land that had been treated as common property by local users. As a result, the institutional rules governing common land and resource management have been disrupted more by the commercial palm oil sector than by other cash crops, such as cocoa, the production of which can be managed on a smaller scale (Mala 2006).

Local-level commercialization may in some cases create new incentives for joint management of the commons, such as in the case of Nepal's leasehold forests where user groups of poor households are restoring degraded forests, replanting timber and growing herbal plants for sale in local markets (Shrestha 2005). Still, this is a process that appears to have more costs than benefits for common property and those that are dependent on it. Environmental costs, including long-term resource depletion and degradation, may emerge through more intensive commercial use of the commons, as one case from India illustrates:

Laitsohpliah village . . . used to be known as a major supplier of fuelwood at the local market of Sohra (the local name of Cherrapunjee). On every local market day a truck load of fuelwood would be sold.
The situation today is different. Uncontrolled felling and commercialization of timber has brought about large-scale depletion of the protected forest. The village council did not anticipate the crisis and local user groups are facing the consequences of this depletion. The trees in the forest are insufficient to meet their livelihood needs, which are compounded by a lack of alternative employment opportunities. A forest-based dependent village is today faced with critical livelihood problems. People are now are unable to keep the children in school, leading to high dropout rates. Young and adult members of the village migrate from the village in search of employment. Some individuals started to mine the land to extract stones, sands and coal to sustain their livelihoods ( Kumar and Nongkynrih 2005).

Changes in the purpose of resource and broader economic change are, in some cases, also contributing to decline in customary controls and regulations. Social regulations are more relevant for households that rely on resources from the commons for subsistence and may become irrelevant in the context of broader economic change. The case from Kumaun in northern India describes how increased participation in the market economy is threatening the continued functioning of local, customary institutions for voluntary work ( shamdran ). Villagers are now expecting compensation for communal work and there is now less reciprocity and a greater reliance on direct state intervention. As a consequence, irrigation and water catchments are declining for lack of maintenance (Aggarwal 2005).

Endogenous processes of privatization and informal but permanent boundary demarcation may often mark the encroachment of individuals into community spaces. In the Himachal Himalayas of India there is a tendency towards privatization of common grazing lands in the villages. Here, open lands are increasingly being bounded by stonewalls and iron poles by users. For a large number of users, this is a preemptive strategy against anticipated future land pressures due to an increasing population (Gupta 2006).

Commercialization and External Investment

Commercialization is also taking place on a larger scale, as presented in numerous cases where outside investments are competing with local residents for access to the commons, particularly in capital-intensive sectors such as mining, logging or plantation agriculture. (Kosovksy 2005; Burneo 2005). In at least 15 of the case studies, outside investments are competing with local residents for access to the commons. These include capital-intensive investments in commercial sectors such as mining, logging, and ranching and plantation agriculture. Often where commercialization is instigated by outside investment in resource exploitation, the largest share of benefits is enjoyed by outside investors, although there may be some trickle-down benefits to local residents depending on the case.

Without access to large-scale capital, investment opportunities for local residents in these sectors are limited; this creates economic leverage for outside investors when negotiating agreements with local CPR users. Elite capture within communities may be associated with increased commercialization. In Indonesia , where village heads were responsible for distribution of benefits received from investors, natural resource benefits are not shared equally within communities. Better-off migrants who live in areas where common property regimes are present may benefit more greatly than members of indigenous communities.

Outside investment is most often associated with greater access to state institutions, policy- and decision-making processes, as well as outright corruption and abuse of power. Non-compliance with regulations and partial (or non-existent) implementation of laws may contribute to both elite capture of benefits from commercial use of the commons, as well as environmental degradation. The cases from Indonesia , Kenya and Peru 's Amazon region illustrate these challenges (Guzman 2005, Karangathi 2005, Santosa et. al. 2005).

Commercialization of collectively managed forest resources, in particular, may not benefit women. In the Indonesian example women play important roles in agriculture and forest management, but timber and logging industries tend to be male-dominated. Capital-intensive commercialization in the forestry sector therefore shifts benefits out of women's hands and into men's. (1)

Improving the security of tenure over common property resources may therefore contribute to poverty reduction, by limiting encroachment and strengthening local residents' bargaining position vis-à-vis outside interests, as well as tenure security within communities as a means of preventing elite capture. Access to other resources besides land (e.g., water along with grazing land) should also be ensured in areas where these are complementary in local production.

(1) This point was raised by Carol Colfer, CIFOR-Indonesia, during the Internet Discussion Forum on the case studies. See Appendices for summary of this discussion session on the theme of CPRs and Poverty Reduction.

Land, Dignity and Development