SECURING COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

SECURING COMMON PROPERTY
REGIMES IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

Synthesis of 41 Case Studies on Common
Property Regimes from Africa, Asia, Europe
and Latin America.

FRANÇAIS

ESPAÑOL

THREATS TO COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES:

»CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

In many of the cases, changes that are occurring - both internally and externally - affect the way that land and other resources are managed as common property. When disputes over the commons emerge, often the poor and marginalized are left no or little access to vital resources - such as grazing areas, water, wood or fruits - and left more vulnerable.

Many case study authors indicate that recent changes and emerging trends are the most important reasons for an increase in conflicts, and the decreasing ability by most communities to solve and manage conflicts. As conflict itself generates more insecurity, disputes threaten to create a vicious circle in which pressure on the common property regime itself increases. For this reason, mechanisms for addressing conflict, often through facilitation by external organizations, emerge as a necessary ingredient of strong common property regimes.

Conflicts and their Contributing Factors

The case studies identify a number of factors that contribute to conflict over the commons. As earlier examples have shown, the potential for conflict increases when local authorities, traditionally responsible for overseeing natural resource management, lose power and influence, a trend seen in many customary systems of common property. Other factors, including changes in the socio-economic environment or in state policies, may combine with weakening customary institutions to increase the likelihood of conflict over resources from the commons.

The development of urban markets in developing countries, and increasing links between these markets and rural areas, is generating higher demand for products derived from natural resources, and greater pressure on the commons. In India 's Orissa state, forest resources have historically been used to fuel (primarily urban) development. The majority of timber that is felled in the state is destined for consumption in urban areas; bamboo is also harvested to supply the growing paper industry. This exploitation not only left many communities facing shortages of basic necessities - e.g., fuelwood, fodder and supplementary sources of food - it also increased the value of having access to common forest areas. This in turn has created tensions between villages and increased the potential for conflict between communities (Singh 2002).

In a number of cases, scarcity of resources (degradation, migration) is identified as one of the reasons for increased conflict. Among Afar pastoralists in Ethiopia , population increases have limited options for preventing unauthorized use, resulting in more disputes. Armed conflict has grown increasingly common as means for excluding access to commons; alternatively, the Afar are faced with degradation from de facto open access. Resource scarcity is a product of many factors, including the establishment of protected areas and construction of dams (Unruh 2005).

Conflicts often exist where different production systems interface. Several case studies noted conflicts between mobile pastoralists and sedentary farmers in arid and semi-arid parts of Africa . Examples from Ethiopia , Mali and Niger describe how nomadic and sedentary systems may co-exist, as well as come into conflict. Increasing crop cultivation and in-migration by cultivators can make it problematic for pastoralists to get to river and water holes. Sedentary groups also may start engaging in pastoral activities and raise livestock, thus entering in direct competition with pastoral herders.

The likelihood of conflict also increases where there is tension between modern and traditional resource management systems. Many modern rules are incompatible with the lived customary rules, and provide opportunity for outsiders/non-claimants to gain and thus undermine their authority. After independence, the Malian state claimed a tenure monopoly in the country with statutory law takes precedence over customary practice. As a result it became difficult to apply and enforce rules governing the commons, and to manage the contradiction between authoritative texts and development logic, particularly when conservation is equated with stopping any form of resource use (Hamadoun 2005).

Government policy and other actions that lead to displacement and involuntary resettlement contribute to conflicts over common property. These can occur when government does not recognize the interests of common property users in a given territory, and either target the area for large-scale development projects or resettling migrant farmers. In one case from Mali , dam construction disrupts the social peace and creates potential for conflict. Although the newly created waters create opportunities for some, others lose out through the displacements created (Hamadoun 2005).

As mentioned earlier, in India the state owns forest lands that, in practice, are treated as common property. This gap between state ownership on paper and group use and (in many cases) collective management in practice can lead to conflict, particularly where the state is not active or effective in managing the resources.

The people of many villages across the Angul district have been facing a threat due to high powered electric lines passing through their forests leading to felling of trees (35 feet wide) across their forests to reduce the loss of power due to earthing. The forests revenue and the forest lands in most villages have been protected and regenerated by the communities for the last 20-30 years but the permissions are sought from the district administration and the forest department; the compensation goes to the government exchequer; the amount for compensatory afforestation and the trees harvested are grabbed by the forest department. The communities protecting the forests are neither asked permission nor compensated for the efforts they have put in. The result has been further degradation of the forests... More critically, the government has even denied compensation to the communities for the loss of plantations due to the construction of canals, where the district administration had given permission to the village institution to take up plantation and process of leasing the land to the community was in progress (Singh 2002).

Attempts by governments to attract foreign investment through exploitation of natural resources - often in areas where they are treated as common property by local residents - may contribute to conflict. In Peru , mining concessions are given out, often without the consent of the villages that at best can ask for a compensation for the land. Legally, communities are not able to oppose the granting of concessions. Concessions given for petroleum exploitation in West Africa, as well as game reserves and timber concessions in many countries (e.g., Mozambique), are given out by governments; despite the fact that communities' access to resources is limited, or they are cut-off entirely from resources, sacred sites, or neighbouring villages with whom they exchange goods.

In southern Cameroon , assets and access to land and natural resources is determined both by local elders/lineage heads as well as traditional chiefs. However, an absence of effective organizational or leadership structure in some cases, such as in the Adamaoua region of Cameroon , has contributed to conflicts between individuals and groups. In this region, 63 percent of cattle-owners use common land for grazing; only three percent have individual rights to grazing land. While farmers' groups ( Groupes d'Initiative Commune ) exist, there is no comparable organizational structure for the management of community pastures. As a result, conflicts emerge, both between individuals within communities and across different herder groups (Deffo 2005).

This situation is compounded by the recent privatization of common grazing areas. In the 1970s, the government, with support from the World Bank, created public ranches designed to boost production. Initial demonstration ranches were subsequently privatized and, through this process, dignitaries, traders and other more powerful individuals were able to appropriate large parcels of prime pasture land that had previously been under community control. Today, these pastures are fenced off with barbed wire, limiting herders' mobility. Intensified competition for the remaining pastureland has contributed to the destruction of social ties on which access to the commons was historically based. In turn, this has minimized the community nature of pasture lands and increased pressures that lead to land degradation (Deffo 2005).

Karamajong elders in Uganda have also recognized a decline in their authority, which reflected (and perhaps reinforced) a lack of cooperation among pastoral groups. The imperative of conflict resolution encouraged local leaders to establish new rules between groups involved in armed conflict, and to revitalize communication by holding smaller peace meetings at the neighbourhood level (Unruh 2005).

Mechanisms for Conflict Management via Common Property Regimes

Conflict mediation and management are closely linked to the ability to enforce rules and guarantee rights as their functioning depends not only on their power, but more importantly on their legitimacy in the eyes of resource users. Many enforcement mechanisms simultaneously work as conflict management mechanisms: if the decisions by the relevant institutions are respected, many conflicts do not break out.

Other cases also show that the legitimacy of arbitration mechanisms can be built up through dialogue. Hybrids of customary and modern rules have also formed, deriving power from their inclusiveness, i.e., a legitimacy based on the process used, rather than the institution itself. One of the cases from Uganda describes this, referring to the role of Community Land Associations (CLAs) in managing conflicts:

In the two case studies of conflicts, the individual violators of the CLA's presumed boundaries, felt as if they were powerless against the CLA. In discussions with district level key informants, the leaders cited " rules are rules ." Not only does the drive for conservation of the forest seem to be the rule, those in conflict felt they had few means to negotiate. However, according to BUCODO, for one of the two conflict sites visited, the CLA had engaged in dialogue and consequently reduced the requested riparian buffer (and increased the land allowed to the farmer) (Obaikol et. al. 2005).

There have been positive experiences in increasing the capacity of existing systems and institutions. Support for these efforts has come from various sources: local institutions, governments, NGOs or international organizations. Under Nepal 's forest leasehold initiative, rich or upper caste community members do not have access to common forest lands. In some cases, however, they encroached on the land of leasehold groups. Group members responded by providing incentives to the encroachers to stay out of these lands, an approach implemented in partnership with NGO facilitators. These strategies include the construction of pathways for people and animals, new ponds, forest crops and grass seeds to plant on their own land, and have led to a decrease in tension and conflicts (Shrestha 2005). In other cases from Ethiopia and Niger , international organizations have played a catalytic role in strengthening or developing institutions for conflict management, through projects in conflict areas (Bachir et. al. 2005, Unruh 2005).

In the Ouèssè community in Benin , migrant farmer and pastoralist groups are accustomed to negotiating access to and use of resources with local customary leaders; however, without direct links between the groups, conflict over lands - used as pasture by herders and for cultivation by farmers - has been difficult to manage. In one case, an external project played a mediating role by setting up a joint committee with representatives from different groups to decide on access and use rules.

Contrary to the situation in Savè area, a project for the Management of Natural Resources which was active in the Commune of Ouèssè to support the initiatives of the hunters in Kemon through a communicative intervention. The project was able to fulfill a role as mediator because it applied the appui-conseil (support and advice) approach instead of the coercive manner in which the government had worked during the communist regime and had fought the transhumant herders.

The a ppui-conseil framework is based on participatory processes and the support of the stakeholders to help them sustain the actions in which they already are engaged. The principal objective of the appui-conseil is to provide a methodological guide for implementing various actions with villagers to improve pastoral resources management in the village Kemon and its territory. The concrete objective of the appui-conseil was to establish a better social relationship between the different stakeholders, a condition which would enable a sustainable management of land and associated pastoral resources (vegetation and water) (Dangbégnon 2005).

In recent years, the Ethiopian government has begun efforts to reduce conflict over CPRs among different pastoralist groups. In the eastern part of the country, the government has worked with traditional leaders to organize peace and development conferences and peace committees. In 2003, the government undertook a large-scale study of the roots and impact of conflicts in pastoral areas; its findings, though, have not yet been made public, limiting its usefulness as applied to conflict management (Aredo, 2005b).

While these examples suggest a positive role from outside institutions, strong organizations may also be able to resolve disputes on their own, as in the case of Japan 's Land Improvement District (LID) councils.

When a general conflict does arise between upper-stream and down-stream areas, during the time of water scarcity for example, the irrigators inform the LID, which resolves the conflict through meetings. Despite the fact that the government has substantially subsidized LID, the government is neither used nor welcomed to resolve an internal problem. The LID has greatly contributed to reducing the disputes and increasing "fairness" in distributing irrigation water (Sarker 2005).

In this case, the Japanese state's function is not to take action in resolving disputes, but the state's broader support to LID's plays a role in ensuring that common property institutions have the resources and capacity needed to resolve conflicts effectively.

Summary

There are numerous, inter-connected factors at work in generating conflicts around common property. The declining authority of customary institutions may lead to conflicts over shared resources, particularly where the state system offers no effective counterpart for managing tenure relations. Commercialization and individualization of land may increase tensions among different user groups, and bring different production systems into conflict. Government policies and actions, such as non-recognition of user groups and group rights, can exacerbate conflict situations.

For common property systems to effectively manage conflicts over shared resources there must be effective ways to enforce rules and provide all community members with access to dispute-resolution mechanisms. Building the capacity of tenure institutions to provide these elements has been a necessary step among the cases in which common property regimes are adapting to manage conflicts. Support to negotiation processes that recognize the different users who have interest in common property, and that seek to increase the negotiating leverage of weaker or marginalized groups, is emerging as an important part of this capacity-building, whether coming from the state, NGOs, international organizations or customary leaders.

Land, Dignity and Development