

CARP 2008 & Beyond: An Agrarian Reform Situationer

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I. Introduction

The biggest issue and concern confronting agrarian reform implementation in the country today is the impending “expiration” of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) by 2008.

By virtue of Republic Act 8532, which amended RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the Agrarian Reform Fund (ARF) was replenished with an additional PhP 50 billion and extended up to 2008.

RA 8532 is expected to expire by 2008. Prompting speculations and opinions that Congress may not likely give CARP another extension.

At the same time, all indications from the President Arroyo are showing that it will not strongly support the extension of CARP funding.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), from being the “centerpiece” program of the Aquino Administration, has been relegated to the sidelines under the Macapagal-Arroyo Administration.

During her 2001 SONA, President Macapagal-Arroyo reduced the yearly target for land acquisition and distribution of (LAD) private agricultural land (PALs) to just 100,000 hectares, which led to some of the lowest accomplishments in LAD in a year since 1987.

Then, under the current Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) of the Arroyo administration, CARP or agrarian reform, which usually had one whole chapter devoted to it, had been simply lumped with the other so-called asset reform programs¹ of government, namely “urban land and asset reform” and “ancestral domain reform,” under one section (“*Asset Reform*”) in the chapter on “*Responding to Basic Needs of the Poor*” of the MTPDP.

To lump CARP and agrarian reform under just one section under the MTPDP mainly indicates the Arroyo administration’s total abandonment of the Constitutional mandate that we attain “industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform.”

¹ Strictly speaking, however, the government does not have an urban land reform program nor an ancestral domain reform program. What we have is a government housing program and a law (the Indigenous People’s Rights Act) that sets the mechanism for the “recognition” of the rights of the indigenous people over their ancestral domains. Under IPRA, “ownership” by IPs over certain of ancestral domains are merely recognized by the state through the issuance Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claims/Titles.

II. Current Status of CARP Implementation

According to official data from the DAR, as of December 2005, its total CARP-LAD accomplishment was already at 3,639,868 hectares or an accomplishment rate of 85%. This placed the remaining DAR CARP-LAD balance at only 650,585 hectares.

Table No.1: CARP-LAD Accomplishments
as of December 2005

	Working Scope	Accomp.	%	Balance
DAR	4,290,453^{1/}	3,639,868	85	650,585^{2/}
PALs	2,996,105	2,032,535	68	963,570²
<i>OLT</i>	579,520	536,128	93	43,392
<i>GFI</i>	229,796	159,269	69	70,527
<i>VOS</i>	396,684	527,544	133	(130,860)
<i>CA</i>	1,505,363	256,341	17	1,249,022
<i>VLT</i>	284,742	553,253	194	(268,511)
Non-PALs	1,294,348	1,607,333	124	(312,985)
<i>Settlements</i>	566,332	682,711	121	(116,379)
<i>Landed Estates</i>	70,173	80,613	115	(10,440)
<i>GOL/KKK</i>	657,843	844,009	128	(186,166)
DENR	3,771,411	2,937,067	78	900,932^{3/}
<i>Public A&D Lands</i>	2,502,000	1,601,068	64	900,932
<i>ISF/CBFM Areas</i>	1,269,411	1,335,999	105	
Total CARP	8,199,768	6,576,935	80	1,551,517

Source: for DAR data DAR-Planning Division; for DENR data from DAR document entitled, "Sustaining the Gains of CARP: CARP Beyond 2008," presented last 17 July 2006 at U.P. Balay Internasyonal

1_/ Including the ARMM provinces of Basilan and Lanao Sur which are still part of the DAR's scope.

2_/ Straight deduction of accomplishment from the scope which deducts the excess accomplishment on PALs and non-PALs.

3_/ DENR already exceeded its scope by 66,588 hectares on the issuance of CSC/CBFM agreement in the forestry areas. Total balance refers to the issuance of patents for Public A&D Lands.

In terms of leasehold implementation, 1,604,364 hectares have been placed under leasehold benefiting 1,157,309 ARBs.

In terms of ARBs development, support service delivery to ARBs have been limited to those whose lands have been identified as part of Agrarian Reform Communities (ARCs). As of December 2005, the DAR has launched a total of 1,704 ARCs covering only 884,432 ARBs or just 41.5% of total DAR-ARBs, which currently stands at 2,129,654 ARBs.

However, not all ARCs have received substantial support services. According to the DAR itself, only 990 ARCs (just 58% of ARCs) covering only 581,386 ARBs (just 27% of the total ARBs) have received overseas development assistance (ODA) and thus most of the support services.

CARP-DENR data also indicated that, as of December 2005, the DENR has already distributed 2.9 million hectares of lands out of its scope of 3.8 million hectares or an accomplishment rate of 78%. Although it has already surpassed its target/scope for ISF/CBFM lands it, however, has only distributed 64% or just 1.6 million hectares of its target for Public A&D lands. The DENR still has to distribute some 900,932 hectares more of Public A&D lands.

² This will be correct if the assumption is that the excess accomplishments for VLT and VOS were areas taken from areas originally classified under CA. However, the 650,585 hectare total LAD balance for DAR would still be wrong.

III. Major Issues and Concerns

A. "Failure of Planning": DAR has been setting targets based on un-validated and skewed computation of its LAD balance

The DAR data for its LAD balance has been computed based on a "straight deduction" method, wherein annual accomplishments, including excess accomplishments (versus scope) per land type/mode of acquisition, are summed up then subtracted from the overall.

Thus, if the accumulated annual accomplishment of the DAR for LAD from 1972 to 2005 is 3,639,868 has. and this is subtracted from the official DAR LAD Working Scope of 4,290,453 has., then we get a DAR LAD balance of 650,585 hectares. Based on this computation, the DAR would have an accomplishment rate of 84.8%.

However, 2003 DAR LAD data (see Table No. 3) from the Office of the Secretary (then headed by Secretary Ponce) showed that in 2003 the balance for PALs was still 1,523,856 hectares even though the "official"/straight deduction figure for DAR's total balance for that year was only 878,146 hectares.

Apparently, the DAR, since 1997, has been recording excess accomplishments on its non-PAL working scope/target of 1,294,348 has. and has merely subtracted the said excess accomplishments from the overall working scope without making the appropriate adjustments to the overall scope. The DAR's explanation for this is quite administrative in that the DAR could not simply adjust the total CARP working scope without the approval of the PARC.

As of 2005, the DAR has already exceeded its original scope for non-PALs by 312,985 hectares. Apparently, these are "newly discovered" lands which were not part of the original DAR LAD scope.

However, the 2003 LAD balance data also shows that even if the scope for non-PALs have already been exceeded, some 147,833 has. of non-PALs have remained undistributed (most probably part of the original DAR LAD scope that the DAR have failed to cover).

To further illustrate this error in the DAR's computation for its program balance, the DAR's official total LAD balance as of December 2005 (see Table No. 1) is 650,585 has. but official DAR data also indicates that, as of December 2005, the DAR's total accomplishment for PALs is only 2,032,535 hectares. Subtracting this from the overall DAR scope for PALs (which is 2,996,105 has.) we would get a balance of 963,570 has. for PAL alone, which would be greater than the claimed overall DAR LAD balance of 650,585 hectares.

If the DAR does not correct its method for computing its LAD balance, we may have a situation wherein "official" overall DAR LAD balance data indicating zero balance while a significant amount of PALs remain undistributed.

This major error in computing the DAR's LAD balance also significantly skewed the DAR's planning and targets setting towards the completion of CARP's LAD component. That is, if President Arroyo's 2002 SONA pronouncement of limiting the DAR's target for LAD to just 100,000 has. per year already jeopardized the completion of CARP's LAD component by 2008.

Apparently, the DAR has already taken note of the error is currently undertaking a validation of its scope and accomplishment data. The said validation is expected to be completed by September this year.

Table No. 2: DAR-LAD Balances, by Land Type
as of December 2003

Land Type/Mode of Acquisition	Working Scope (hectares) ³	Total Accompl. ⁴	Balance (straight deduction)	Balance (excess accomp. treated as zero) ⁵
National Summary	4,290,453	3,412,307	878,146	1,671,689
Private Agricultural Lands	2,996,105	1,870,912	1,125,193	1,523,856
OLT	579,520	529,544	49,976	54,856
GFI	229,796	150,509	79,287	117,392
VOS	396,684	474,722	(78,038)	42,990
CA	1,505,363	226,107	1,279,256	1,279,999
VLT	284,742	490,030	(205,288)	28,619
Non-PAL	1,294,348	1,541,395	(247,047)	147,833
Settlements	566,332	661,766	(95,434)	37,330
Landed Estates	70,173	79,776	(9,603)	15,599
GOL/KKK	657,843	799,853	(142,010)	94,904

Source: DAR-OSEC

B. With current targets and actual accomplishments, CARP-LAD will still be unfinished even after 2010.

Using DAR's "straight deduction" computation for its LAD balance (which stood at 878,146 has. at the end of 2003) and PGMA's 100,000 has. per year target, CARP-LAD would still be unfinished by 2010 (see Table No. 4) with still some 178,146 has. left for distribution. Even with the DAR's MTPDP targets, it will only be able to distribute a total of 770,160 has. from 2004 to 2008 still leaving a balance of 107,986 has. after 2008.

Table No. 3: MTPDP/SONA LAD Targets & Balances (straight deduction)
in hectares

	Balance as of Dec 2003 (straight deduction)	DAR LAD Targets								Balance after 2010 (straight deduction)
		2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total	
SONA Targets⁶	878,146	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	700,000	178,146
DAR/MTPDP Targets⁷	878,146	110,046 ⁸	126,368 ⁹	130,000	244,000	276,746	-	-	770,160	107,986

Source: DAR-Planning Division

³ As approved by PARC.

⁴ Subject to validation pending conduct of inventory of CARP Scope.

⁵ Regional balances figures are sums of provincial balances per land type. Excess accomplishments are treated as zero balance.

⁶ Set during President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's 2002 SONA. Actual targets were 100,000 has. of PAL and another 100,000 has. of public lands.

⁷ Source: DAR-Planning Division

⁸ actual accomplishment

⁹ actual accomplishment

Using the DAR's "excess accomplishment treated as zero" computation for its LAD balance (which stood at 1,671,689 has. at the end of 2003), the situation would clearly be far more worse (see Table No. 5). If the DAR sticks with PGMA's 100,000 has. of PAL per year, CARP-LAD would be only be completed by 2020.

With its MTPDP target, the DAR would have some 901,529 has. (which would mostly be PALs) of unmoved lands after 2008.

Based on the DAR's 2005 LAD accomplishment/balance data of 963,570 hectares and its current rate of PAL accomplishments in the last five years, which is at around 77,140 has. per year, CARP-LAD may only be completed after 2017.

**Table No. 4: MTPDP/SONA LAD Targets & Balances
(excess accomplishment treated as zero)
in hectares**

	Balance as of Dec 2003 (excess accompl. treated as zero)	DAR LAD Targets								Balance after 2010 (excess accompl. treated as zero) ¹⁰	
		2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Total		
SONA Targets¹¹	1,671,689	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	700,000	971,689
DAR/ MTPDP Targets	1,671,689	110,046 ¹²	126,368 ¹³	130,000	244,000	276,746	-	-	-	770,160	901,529

Source: DAR-Planning Division

C. Abuse of VLT scheme and over targeting/coverage of non-PALs place great doubt on CARP accomplishments.

Table No. 3 above shows that the DAR, as of 2003, has already surpassed its working scope for non-PALs by as much as 247,047 has. or 19%. However, said kind of lands have continued to be covered and distributed up to the present.

Chart No. 1 below indicates that almost half (44%) of lands that the DAR has distributed (incl. Lanao Sir and Basilan) are non-PALs (i.e. Settlements, Landed Estates and GOL/KKK Lands). Chart No. 1 also shows that Government-Owned Lands/KKK Lands accounts for almost one-fourth (24%) of the total lands distributed.

A growing concern over the DAR's practice of over-covering non-PALs to compensate for failure to move PALs as the said practice may lead to eventual non-coverage of pending PALs (with the skewed DAR computation for CARP's balance, non-PAL areas, in effect, may be used to "cover up" or replace un-moved PAL targets). Also, there have also been cases of the DAR aggressively covering under CARP non-PALs/public lands that are also already within the ancestral domains of


¹⁰ With assumption that all targets and accomplishments will not count "excess accomplishments" per land type.
¹¹ Set during President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's 2002 SONA. Actual targets were 100,000 has. of PAL and another 100,000 has. of public lands.
¹² Actual accomplishment
¹³ Actual accomplishment

indigenous peoples (IPs) while PALs in the lowlands have remained undistributed.

Also notable is that of the total areas distributed under CARP only 7% were acquired and distributed through Compulsory Acquisition (CA).

Chart No. 1: DAR-LAD Accomplishments

As of December 2005, in percentages



Source: DAR-Planning Division

Of the PALs distributed, the main modes used for acquiring and distributing these lands were through Voluntary Land Transfer (27%), Voluntary Offer to Sell (26%) and Operation Land Transfer (26%). While lands acquired under CA accounted for only 8% of the total PALs distributed.

Lands covered under OLT are rice lands which are backlogs from President Marcos' Land Reform Program (Presidential Decree 27).

However, lands covered through VLT/Direct Payment Scheme (553,253 has.) are highly questionable as there have been reports of VLT contracts/arrangements being executed for mere compliance with the requirements of CARP but in actual practice are not implemented. There are also reports of VLT contracts being executed with relatives of the landowners.¹⁴


Under the VLT scheme, farmer beneficiaries (FBs) directly buys the land under CARP coverage from the landowner with the DAR merely overseeing the negotiations to ensure that the contract does not place the FBs in the short end of the deal.

Also, there should have been deadline for application for such a scheme (same with the VOS scheme) and yet the DAR continues to target and report major accomplishments under VOS and VLT up to the present.

¹⁴ Borrás, Saturnino M. Jr., *Questioning the Official CARP Land Redistribution Accomplishment Report and Working Scope*, February 2005.

Chart No. 2: DAR LAD_PAL Accomplishments

As of December 2005, in percentages



Source: DAR-Planning Division

D. Limited reach of DAR support services delivery to ARBs also limited impact of CARP.

The DAR's strategy for support services delivery have primarily been concentrated and made through the Agrarian Reform Communities (ARCs). The ARC strategy was adopted by the DAR during the Ramos Administration as a means of concentrating the very limited resources for support services to a number of ARCs, which are clusters of contiguous land-reformed barangays. The objective was to generate maximum impact for the limited funds available for support services by concentrating them on a few areas rather than spreading-out the said funds too thinly to all agrarian reform beneficiaries.

As of December 2005, only 1,704 ARCs, covering 884,432 ARBs or just 41.5% of total ARBs¹⁵, have been organized. However, not all ARCs have received substantial support services. According to the DAR itself, only 990 ARCs (just 58% of ARCs) covering only 581,386 ARBs (just 27% of the total ARBs) have received overseas development assistance (ODA) and thus most of the support services.

Also notable is that only 142,218 ARBs or just 6.69% of the total ARBs have received credit assistance from CARP. Counting the leaseholders, credit assistance from CARP only reached 4.33%¹⁶ of total FBs.

However, those who did receive credit assistance from the different DAR/CARP credit programs only received an average of PhP 14,727.25 per ARB.¹⁷

In general, only PhP 7 billion of credit has been extended to ARBs (see Table No. 6) by direct DAR/CARP credit programs and other financial institutions since the implementation of the CARP or an average of just PhP 392 million a year. At the average, each ARB (excluding leaseholders) received or had access to credit amounting to only PhP 3,317 over a span of 18 years.

¹⁵ As of December 2005, there are 2,125,375 ARBs, excluding the 1,157,309 leaseholders (data includes ARMM).

¹⁶ 142,218 ARBs (incl. ARMM) who has received credit assistance divided by 3,282,684 FBs (2,125,375 ARBs + 1,157,309 leaseholders)

¹⁷ Total credit assistance provided by DAR to ARBs/PhP 2,094,480,000 divided by 142,218 ARBs = PhP 14,727.25

Table No. 5: Amount of Credit Extended to ARBs
in million pesos

Credit Institution/Program	Amount of Credit Extended to ARBs
DAR-LBP	176.64
DAR-TLRC	7.27
DAR-KMI	80.77
DAR-QUEDANCOR	104.49
DAR-CAP-PBD (W1) ¹⁸	160.76
DAR-CAP-PBD (W2) ¹⁹	123.15
DAR-CAP-PBD (Program Mgt.) ²⁰	4.01
DAR-LCAP ²¹	1,437.39
Direct DAR-CARP Credit Support Sub-total	2,094.48
LBP (1994-May 31, 2006)	4,563.36 ²²
DBP	373.827
QUEDANCOR (1992-2002)	19.078 ²³
BSP (Agri-Agra Law)	no available segregated data for agri & agra lending
Total	7,050.745

Sources: DAR, LBP, DBP, Quedancor & BSP

While the non-ARC ARBs virtually received no support services, each of the 884,432 ARBs in the 1,704 ARCs received an average of PhP 48,172²⁴ in support services. On the other hand, each ARC received an average of PhP 25,002,957²⁵ in support services.

Although there have been promising developments in these ARCs, particularly those that received “quality support services” (ex. ARCs covered by the ARISP project have registered among its ARBs a 20% increase in income), the lack of support service delivery (such as basic credit assistance) to non-ARC ARBs may have led to the abandonment, selling or mortgaging of awarded lands.

¹⁸ on-going DAR credit program

¹⁹ on-going DAR credit program

²⁰ on-going DAR credit program

²¹ on-going credit programs

²² PhP4.74B (total LBP credit exposure to ARBs) – PhP176.64 million (DAR-LBP:5:70:25)

²³ PhP 123,568,000 (total Quedancor exposure to ARBs) – PhP 104,490,000 (DAR-Quedancor)

²⁴ PhP 42,605,040,000 total support services funds for CARP divided by 884,432 ARBs.

²⁵ PhP 42,605,040,000 total support services funds for CARP divided by 1,704 ARCs.

IV. Post 2008 Prospects/Scenarios for CARP

With the expiration of RA 8532 in 2008, the status of CARP beyond 2008 has become quiet unclear. This has, subsequently, led to several speculations on the possible “scenarios” for CARP after 2008.

One clear, and very possible scenario, is that RA 8532 expires by 2008 with no new legislation extending the existence of the Agrarian Reform Fund (ARF) [i.e. funding for CARP] which, subsequently, results in the “end” of the program.

Another would be the passage of legislation extending and replenishing the ARF but said funds being only limited for support services (i.e. no funding for LAD).

In line with this, the DAR and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) conducted a study on possible post-LAD scenarios²⁶.

The study presents four possible post-2008 scenarios (see diagram below)²⁷:

1. **Business as Usual** – Under this scenario, it is assumed that LAD would still be incomplete by 2008 and that CARP-LAD would still be incomplete after 2018.
2. **Hercules** – This scenario assumed that a decrease in funds coupled with an increase in expectations would put heavier burden on DAR and other implementing agencies in struggling with the overhang of LAD cases and in adequately providing relevant and appropriate support services.
3. **Sprint to the Line** – This scenario assumed that an infusion of funds, along with organizational improvements would allow the overhang of LTI and AJD cases to be cleared. LAD would be subsequently finished by 2008. Support service provision would, however, be relegated to a strategic priority until the LAD process is finished. The post-2008 strategy would remain unclear considering that a greater number of ARBs not reached or covered by ARCs or ARZs will remain unsupported with either technical and infrastructure support.
4. **Clean Break** – Under this scenario, it was assumed that by 2008 the overhang of complicated LTI/AJD cases have been jettisoned in favor of a new paradigm of comprehensive/integrated support services that focus on economic, entrepreneurship and community needs, sufficient and regular funds would be available for rural development, including ARBs and other rural dwellers.

The study has proposed for 4-5 year “extension” with intensified fund generation for CARP to complete LAD activities by 2012. The study’s recommendation is somewhat a modified “sprint to the line” scenario (with the “deadline” for LAD completion extended) with the implementation of support measures to ensure the sustainability of awarded lands.

²⁶ However, the study is actually more of a post-2008 scenario study as its “Clean Break” scenario considers the jettisoning of “difficult LTI/AJD cases” (i.e. LAD is not completely finished and, thus, is not a post-LAD scenario).

²⁷ Texts that follows and the said diagram were taken from the DAR-GTZ document entitled, “Study on Post-LAD Scenarios,” by Atty. Ricardo S. Arlanza, et. al., April 2006

DAR-GTZ CARP Post-2008 Scenario Study

<p>Business as Usual</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ LAD still incomplete in 2008 ▪ CARL/CARP still incomplete in 2018 ▪ Acute under-funding and over-burdening of Department and Bureaus ▪ Rural dissatisfaction 	<p>Sprint to the Line</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Injection of funds, along w/ organizational improvements allow overhang of LTI and AJD to be cleared ▪ AD finished by 2008 ▪ Support service provision marginalized ▪ Post 2008 strategy unclear
<p>Hercules</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Over-burdening of traditional Departments with quantity and new quality of support services to be provided ▪ Crisis of confidence ▪ Demoralized bureaucracy and angry rural population 	<p>Clean Break</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overhang of difficult LTI/AJD cases is jettisoned in favor of new paradigm of support services (economic, entrepreneurial & community oriented) ▪ Helps foster economic stability and food security in rural areas as an effective response to globalization ▪ <i>Shift from agrarian to rural development</i> ▪ <i>Alternative of income generation and employment</i> ▪ <i>PRDCC to replace PARC</i>

Source: Draft DAR-GTZ CARP Post-2008 Scenario Study

V. Framework of Action for CARP 2008 & Beyond

Below is the advocacy and campaign framework developed and adopted by AR Now! to ensure continued CARP implementation by 2008 and beyond.

The campaign framework basically has four (4) major components:

- a. **Fast-Tracking LAD/Scope Validation** – This will involve (1) the conduct of accomplishment/remaining scope validation activities in key provinces, (2) identification of uncovered CARP areas, (3) organizing and assisting (assistance may include para-legal trainings and legal assistance) ARBs in said areas, and (4) establishment of mechanisms for fast tracking LAD. The primary objective of this component is to secure as many hectares of land under the program by 2008 (as a precaution in the likelihood of a non-LAD scenario after 2008) and to establish that a significant amount of CARPable lands have remained undistributed and, thus, the need to continue implementing CARP until such remaining balances are covered.
- b. **Budget Advocacy** - This will entail (1) analysis of CARP budget, (2) formulation of proposals for efficient use of CARP funds, (3) developing innovative means of raising funds for CARP (e.g. debt-for-AR swap, etc.), and (4) lobbying for government (i.e. Congress and DBM) budget support for CARP. The main objective of this component is to ensure that there is substantial appropriation (by Congress through a law) and adequate (actual) funding for CARP by 2008 and beyond, or at least until the completion of its LAD targets.
- c. **Protecting the Gains of CARP/AR Defense** - This will involve the blocking, review or repeal of non-distributive CARP schemes (i.e. SDO, JVC, VLT, leaseback arrangements, etc.), FAC bills, policies on exemptions and conversions, EP/CLOA cancellations, anti-CARP cha-cha proposals, etc. This will involve interventions at the executive, legislative and even judicial levels. The objective here is to engage government to push for policies and programs that will further secure the gains under CARP (e.g. National Land Use Act, indefeasibility of EPs and CLOAs, etc.) and, at the same time, block policies and programs aimed at weakening

them.

- d. Proving AR as a Viable Development & Anti-Poverty Program/AR Promotion** - This will include media & cyber advocacy, documentation and public projection of CARP success stories, and holding of forums highlighting the importance and role of AR for national industrialization and development. The aim is to create favorable public opinion in support of CARP.

VI. Recommendations

The following are AR Now!'s recommendations to ensure the fast tracked implementation and completion of CARP-LAD by or beyond 2008:

1. Fast track LAD

- The accuracy of the DAR's data (i.e. scope, accomplishment, balance, etc.) must first be established. DAR's CARP scope validation initiative should be prioritized and completed as soon as possible.
- Indicators of success must be changed to include actual and peaceful possession of awarded lands and economic (i.e. income, productivity, poverty, etc.) indicators among others.
- Veer away from non-distributive and highly questionable schemes of distribution under CARP (i.e. SDOs & VLTs). At the same time, a review/verification of SDO, VLT and leasehold agreements/contracts must be undertaken to determine effectiveness and compliance.
- Focus on PALs and not on Public Lands (specially those already covered by Ancestral Domains).
- Peasant groups and AR advocates should launch a coordinated campaign for fast tracking acquisition and distribution of the remaining undistributed lands coverable under CARP.
- Government to fast track LAD by setting DAR's annual LAD target from 2007 to 2010 to at least 300,000 has. of PALs through Compulsory Acquisition. (Initial cash payment to landowners can be advanced by LBP while cost for land surveys is estimated at only PhP 694.5 million²⁸ for every 300,000 hectares.)
- Government to fast track the recovery of ill-gotten wealths. According to the PCGG, there are still some PhP 220 billion worth of ill-gotten wealth expected to be recovered. This is more than the DAR's estimate of PhP 120 billion additional funds needed to acquire and distribute the remaining LAD balance (that is based on the direct deduction balance of 650,000 has. and excluding the payment for maturing bonds issued to landowners).
- Government to improve on the land amortization collection for CARP and use the collected funds to finance CARP.
- Reorganize the DAR bureaucracy to deploy more personnel in top backlog areas (i.e. Negros Occidental, Leyte, Camarines Sur, Masbate, Nueva Ecija, and Isabela) and to free up funds that would have been used for personnel services for LAD.
- Set up an "Agrarian Reform Battalion" that will assist DAR in disarming resisting landowners and install ARBs in CARP "hot spots" such as Bondoc Peninsula, Negros and Davao.
- Upon completion of the DAR's CARP scope validation, results of the said process should be presented to CSOs at the provincial level for on-ground validation and joint planning for coverage and distribution of the identified areas.

²⁸ Estimate for cost of land survey (based on actual DAR budget for land surveys) at PhP 2,315 per hectare multiplied by 300,000 has.

2. Democratizing support services delivery

- Democratize support services delivery to ARBs. Delivery of “basic” support services, such as credit, should be immediately provided to the most number of ARBs or, at least, every new ARB should receive a package of support services upon issuance of CLOA and installation.
- Innovative approaches (e.g. debt-for-agrarian reform swaps) for generating funds for CARP should also be explored.
- DA credit and other support services delivery schemes/programs to also target and cover ARBs.
- Other government agencies involved in rural development (i.e. NIA, DPWH, DTI, DENR, etc.) should also include ARBs among their main clientele.
- “Encourage” commercial banks to extend credit to ARBs through LBP and other rural lending institutions.

3. Passage of critical bills

- Passage of the bill seeking the extension of CARP implementation beyond 2008 and ensuring funding support for support service delivery to ARBs.
- Immediate enactment of the NLUA.

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