ARnet Regional Report Southeast Asia 1998

Regional Report: SoutheastAsia
How Much Land Does a Person Need?
Regional Report and Overview on Agrarian Reform in SoutheastAsia
Regional Node: Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC), Philippines
Rome, February 1998

Paper Prepared by:
Mr. Antonio B. Quizon,Mr. Roel R. Ravanera, and Mr. Nathaniel Don E. Marquez (ANGOC)
based on reports from:
- Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) - Cambodia
- Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria/Indonesian
- Consortium for Agrarian Reform (CAR) - Indonesia
- People's Campaign for Agrarian Reform (AR NOW!) - Philippines
- Thai NGO WCARRD - Thailand


INTRODUCTION
If the size of some private estates is any indication then the answer must be: a lot -- in some cases, more than any one person can cultivate in a lifetime.

Gone are the days when land was held in common, belonging to everyone and to no one. Parcels of it were "assigned" to individual members of the village, apportioned according to their needs. It was not, however, to be disposed of for profit or for any other purpose.

To this pristine state of affairs did the colonialist barge in, trained his sights to the farthest reaches and let his eyes do the grabbing: everything he saw he declared his. From then on, land, though traditionally valued, acquired a whole new meaning for people: ownership conferred not just wealth but power, and the rampage began.

Hence, after centuries of unbridled accumulation -- made possible by the machinations of state and corporation -- we have the spectacle of millions of landless and dispossessed people amidst a handful of landowners controlling estates or haciendas the size of small countries.

Nowhere is this situation more pronounced than in Asia, home to more than half of the estimated 1.1 billion poor people in the world. Though many countries in the region either stand on the brink of full industrialization or have taken the plunge to it, Asia is still a predominantly agricultural area. Majority of the population is found in the rural areas, living off the land, frequently as farmhands and sharecroppers. Only a miniscule number of those employed in agriculture are landowners while millions labor on land that is not their own. This condition is believed to be the cause of the almost endemic poverty in the countryside, and study after study has confirmed this.

Thus Asian growth rates, which, prior to the currency contagion, made slow-growing countries green with envy, are like a kite. Buoyed up by favorable winds, it reaches dizzying heights but constantly feels a tugging from below, which, in this case, is the crushing weight of rural poverty. Unless something is done to lift up the impoverished many, Asian economies will be pulled down, or hit a plateau. The World Bank itself recognizes this and declared as far back as the '70s that redistributive land reform is indispensable to reducing poverty in the rural areas.

Governments acceded and launched their respective agrarian reform programs, with varying degrees of success. However, in all four countries studied here, agrarian reform was never considered a development imperative by their respective governments. Although they have all passed laws purporting to promote agrarian reform the implementation of such has been fraught with problems.

Indonesia is easily the most reluctant reformer of the four. Agrarian reform is an unpopular cause in this country, associated as it is with the communists and the repudiated populism of the Sukarno regime. In fact, under the New Order regime of Suharto there was an attempt to expunge the very idea of land reform from the constitution. The government had a change of heart only when the need to sustain economic growth made it imperative to privatize land. Even then, it was not landless farmers who benefited from this policy change but largely local and foreign investors. The government was not redistributing land as much as using it as a carrot to entice private capital investment in the country. In Cambodia, where most of the people are theoretically landholders, even if there are already huge discrepancies in the size of landholdings, the process of land titling has been long and tedious and has therefore discouraged people from investing on, selling, and otherwise making productive use of land which may not eventually be titled to them. As a result, many farms are left fallow and unproductive. Filipino farmers, meanwhile, have a bit more to contend with. After getting through the bureaucratic maze that hampers the land transfer process they find to their dismay that the title issued by the government -- proof of ownership -- can easily be repudiated by a belligerent landlord. The government seems to take no offence at the insult and often tends to bend over backwards if not for the tireless efforts of farmers and non-government organizations. Thailand, on the other hand, seems to think that the development of its agricultural sector lies not so much in land redistribution as in increasing productivity through a system of incentives and capital investment.

The case studies included here offer clear proof of government's lack of commitment to implementing an equitable redistribution of land. For instance, the Banongan case demonstrated that when it comes to a choice between the supposed beneficiaries of agrarian reform (i.e. the landless) and big business the latter's interests frequently win out. In the village of Banongan, the villagers' prior claim on the land was denied in favor of a commercial firm. Even legitimate environmental concerns have clashed with peasants' aspirations because the government either had no knowledge of the farming communities' existence or simply did not care. Witness the threatened dislocation of peasants in Sumber Kelampok and Sagara villages to make way for a national park and a forest reserve, respectively. Farmers who had been cultivating the land for decades were summarily declared poachers or squatters and thrown out, with no regard for their legitimate aspirations. In the Philippines, the government's lack of political will to enforce an already watered down law has been shown up in the two cases cited here. Landlords thumbed their noses at a government order transferring ownership of the land to farmer beneficiaries and all the government could do was wring its hands in despair. Private armies struck terror in the hearts of local government officials and the military but the government took no offence at the insult. In contrast, the dispossessed farmers remained undaunted and it was solely on their initiative, helped along by non-government organizations and other supporters, that government was forced to intervene. If the farmers had not sustained the momentum of protest the government would've slunk away, wishing perhaps that the problem would eventually solve itself.

The protests have had varying degrees of success: Banongan farmers spent 10 years in prison for refusing to accept an unjust settlement, Sumber Kelampok villagers content themselves with being allowed to keep their homes, Sagara peasants successfully lobbied the government to apportion part of the forest reserve for their own use, and in the Philippines the farmers in Carruf and Quisumbing estates have been able to reclaim the land taken from them.

Meanwhile in Cambodia, where government trumpets the absence of a land problem, two factors have actually kept land disputes from erupting like they have elsewhere in Asia: one, a lower population density which has made it possible for most Cambodians to own land; two, the fact that customary laws and traditions are still upheld in land disputes. However, the rush (usually by businessmen and military officials) to accumulate land which started in the '70s has given rise to an incipient landlessness problem. The internal migration, which has been observed in recent years, owes to the fact that many Cambodian families can no longer support themselves on the land they currently own and so are seeking bigger land elsewhere. The only thing reportedly keeping the trickle from becoming a flood is the still-precarious peace and order situation in the country.

Non-government organizations (NGOs) have sought to fill the void left by government inaction through a whole range of actions, ranging from on-the- ground field work, organizing, protests, policy work, even active resistance -- if not necessarily by NGOs, then by the people and communities themselves. The main strength of NGOs seems to lie in their collective experience and practice of participatory approaches. NGOs have given "participation" its various institutional forms -- community and sectoral organizing and creation of self-help groups, public campaigns, constituency-building activities, networking, participatory research and monitoring, and community planning. As such, people's organizations (POs) are probably the most direct expression of people's participation.

Conscientization or awareness building educates the communities on social realities, and enables their target groups to understand their problems, know their rights and undertake group action to address these problems. Community Organizing (CO) develops and trains the communities to pressure resource holders to accede to the demands and concerns of the poor. Capacity building, community goal setting, value-formation, and building on the traditional and religious beliefs of communities are all integral parts of forming viable POs.

Asian NGOs have organized themselves into networks and federations. As strong and unified groups, they are able to engage government to accelerate the process of such reforms pertaining to natural resource access. This implies making sure that all reforms -- agrarian, urban land, and aquatic resources -- are implemented speedily and effectively. These groups also inquire into the legal basis of community claims to land and other resources based on customary rights and laws. Some extend legal services to communities deprived of their land rights.

However, it should be noted that in many Asian countries, NGO action is still effectively curtailed by an inhospitable policy environment. In countries where voluntary action is tolerated, NGOs often risk being co-opted by government and rendered ineffective. With land reform considered as a sensitive, political issue, NGOs and community-based organizations have to be "creative" in their intervention and relations with governments.

On this note, the "knowledge network" should support existing initiatives and programs of the regional and national focal points, as well as those of the grassroots organizations. A number of case studies have demonstrated valuable lessons that can be shared to various civil society organizations and policymakers. As such, the "knowledge network" can strengthen the cause of agrarian reform thru three strategic interventions: a) documentation of grassroots initiatives which can be used in policy formulation, b) capacity building based on the specific needs of NGOs and grassroots organizations, and c) resource mobilization to quickly respond to urgent funding needs of communities such as mass mobilizations and policy dialogues.

In the end, however, the future of agrarian reform in these four countries will depend on those who have the most to gain from its success - the landless farmers.

There is an old Asian proverb that says, everything else will pass away but the land will remain. She may disappear under concrete, rejoin the sea, or sleep after years of abuse. But she is as immutable as the sky, and as enduring as a people's desire for a more equitable world.

CONTEXT

Asia is home to more than half of the estimated 1.1 billion poor people in the world. About two-thirds of Asia's poor live in rural communities where poverty is at its worst since access to social and institutional services and ownership of productive resources are skewed in favor of urban residents.

As most of this region's economies depend on agriculture, the development of these countries is closely linked to the development of their agricultural sector, which in turn hinges on relations governing land use and ownership.

In pre-colonial Asia, land was apportioned by the village headman to individual members of the village according to need. Land ownership, however, did not imply rights of disposition for whatever purpose; private holdings were handed down through generations to be worked by the clans for their livelihood. There was also communally owned land, usually found in the periphery of the village, which was cultivated by a designated group.

Chroniclers of such pre-colonial setups note that the communities were self-sufficient economic units producing almost everything they needed. These societies also had a highly developed sense of equity and set up rigorous measures to ensure that no one had too much nor too little. Sir Charles Metcalf, in describing pre-British Bengal, for instance, wrote: "The villa/village communities are little republics, having nearly everything they want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts."

Alas, we all know that these self-sufficient communities have long since disintegrated, crushed underfoot in the capitalist stampede for colonies. With the demise of these societies, the concept of land as a common resource could no longer be sustained. An elite class arose from the rash of land accumulation which followed. This group of people succeeded in gaining economic and political control which in turn enabled them to appropriate more and more land. Hence, after centuries of unbridled accumulation -- made possible by the machinations of state and corporation -- we have the spectacle of millions of landless and dispossessed people amidst a handful of landowners controlling estates or haciendas the size of small countries.

Nowhere is this situation more pronounced than in Asia. Though many countries in the region either stand on the brink of full industrialization or have taken the plunge to it, Asia is still a predominantly agricultural area. Majority of the population is found in the rural areas, living off the land,

Table 1. Land Use in 1988 ('000 hectares)

Country	Total Land Area	Agricultural Land	Permanent Pasture	Forest and Woodland	Other Land
Cambodia	17652	3056 (17)	580 (3)	13372 (76)	644 (4)
Indonesia	181157	21220 (12)	11800 (6)	113433 (63)	34704 (19)
Philippines	29817	7970 (27)	1220 (4)	10750 (36)	9877 (33)
Thailand	51089	20150 (39)	760 (2)	14165 (28)	16014 (31)
Note: % of each category of land to the total land area is shown in (). Source: FAO Report - Selected Indicators of Food & Agriculture Development in Asia- Pacific Region, 1979-89, RAPA Publications-15, 1990, Bangkok.

Table 2. Agriculture Population in 1988 ('000)

Country	Total Population (TP)	Agricultural Population (AP)	Percentage of AP to TP
Cambodia	7858	5572	70.9%
Indonesia	175109	80829	46.2%
Philippines	59509	28254	47.5%
Thailand	54160	33529	61.9%
Source: Same as Table 1.

frequently as farmhands and sharecroppers. Only a miniscule number of those employed in agriculture are landowners while millions labor on land that is not their own. This condition is believed to be the cause of the almost endemic poverty in the countryside, and study after study have confirmed it.

Breaking ground

In 1974 the World Bank declared that redistributive land reform "can go a long way towards solving the problem of rural poverty and without which it would be difficult to see much headway being made to reduce poverty in the rural areas" (World Bank, 1974:11). The Bank then made it a policy not to support projects in developing countries that do not incorporate land reform.

Five years later, in July 1979, 145 governments signed up to a Declaration and Program of Action at the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) held in Rome. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the conference organizer, aimed to get governments to adopt policies promoting growth equity and participation.

Paragraph 8 of the Declaration states that the sustained improvement of rural areas requires a fuller and more equitable access to land, water and other natural resources, and a more equitable sharing of economic and political power (FAO, 1979). Agrarian reform was declared to be the foundation of rural development and social and political stability.

Dwindling interest

In the mid-1980s, however, there occurred a shift "in operational ideologies of major Western countries and international institutions."1 Policies in the United States and Great Britain, which emphasized economic growth and trade liberalization, were adopted all over the world. Such internal policies had a major influence on international institutions such as the World Bank, which these countries dominated. Agrarian reform took a backseat as governments facilitated the consolidation of lands by corporations for export crop production. In any case, agrarian reform never really inspired global interest; it was from the start a "Southern agenda".

Hence, it came as no surprise that by 1987, landlessness became a widespread phenomenon alongside increasing disparities in the size of landholdings.

Interest revived

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in agrarian reform, owing partly to its being taken up in many global meetings. Moreover, there is much documentary evidence, gathered from countries that have implemented land reform, that redistributive land reform coupled with support services is effective in alleviating poverty.

The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 took it one step further, promoting sustainability alongside development objectives of growth, equity and participation.

In 1995 IFAD took the lead in organizing the Brussels Conference on Poverty and Hunger, with a special focus on rural hunger. The conference came up with a unique solution: creation of a POPULAR COALITION, with agrarian reform as a major action area. The other action initiatives agreed on are: establishment of a coalition for the empowerment of the poor; establishment of knowledge networks; development develop of strategies to create public awareness and political will; an emergency prevention program for regions prone to emergencies and for vulnerable households; and holding of a convention to combat desertification, particularly in Africa.

In November 1996, the FAO convened a meeting of global leaders during the World Food Summit (WFS). This event provided an opportunity to underscore the importance of ensuring food security, through agrarian reform, for rural households and other vulnerable sectors in the rural areas. The WFS Plan of Action drew up seven commitments towards ending hunger and poverty at the turn of the century. It is worth noting the second commitment, which states:

We will implement policies aimed at eradicating poverty and inequality and improving physical and economic access by all, at all times, to sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe food and its effective utilization. The underlying objectives are: to pursue poverty eradication, among both urban and rural poor, and sustainable food security for all as a policy priority and to promote, through sound national policies, secure and gainful employment and equitable and equal access to productive resources such as land, water, and credit, so as to maximize the incomes of the poor.

Table 3. International Events that highlighted agrarian reform in the development scene

Year	Name of Event
1976	World Food Conference
1979	World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
1992	Earth Summit and Biodiversity Convention
1993	International Conference on Nutrition
1995	World Bank Conference on Hunger
1995	IFAD Brussels Conference on Poverty and Hunger
1996	World Food Summit

LAND REFORM: A TALE OF FOUR COUNTRIES

While the region is basically agrarian, production relations varies across countries due to differences in their history and socio-economic and political conditions. At the same time, there are certain similarities found in most, if not all four countries (i.e., Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand).

Land, for the four countries, has always been a controversial issue. Instead of being a life-giver, land has been continually fought over and brought death instead. A human rights organization reports that 891 human rights violations committed in Indonesia from July 1994 to September 1996 were brought on by landgrabbing and land disputes. Agrarian reform in the Philippines, on the other hand, has been hamstrung by landlord resistance, threats and intimidation. In Thailand protests by communities evicted them from their homes have become commonplace.

Meanwhile, access to land in Cambodia is largely determined by politics and the party in power. In the Philippines, it is the lawmakers who seem to hold sway. Among their latest contributions to the agrarian reform law are exemptions from it: prawn farms, fishponds and aquaculture areas; private lands leased to foreign investors up to 75 years; and the whole island of Mindanao for 25 years.

All four countries have surrendered their economies to the growth-at-all cost paradigm of development, and when it sprang its trap the result has been massive conversion of agricultural lands for various commercial purposes such as industrial estates, resort and golf courses, among others. In the Northeast of Thailand for example, eucalyptus plantations have destroyed village commons, lowered water tables and led to the eviction of local people. In the Philippines, reclassification of land as well as conversion of agricultural land into other uses has led to many conflicts between landowners, potential beneficiaries, and local government units. To date, the government has received a total of 1,813 applications for conversion covering 56,966 hectares.

Industrialization has resulted in drastic changes in land-use patterns and the concentration of land in the hands of a minority, including transnational corporations (TNCs). These "stockholders" also hinder the sustainable use of natural resources. Local people's organizations engaged in agroforestry constantly run up against companies engaged in the illegal lumber trade; communities working to preserve and replant their mangrove forests are turned back by operators of aquaculture farms; fisherfolk disciplining their ranks against overfishing and the use of destructive fishing methods watch helplessly as trawlers and dynamiters sweep the bottoms clean.

Cambodia: Beginnings of a Land Crisis

Throughout Cambodia's history, land has theoretically belonged to the state. In practice, the land belonged to the tiller. Hence, it has been said that Cambodia does not have a "land problem". Population has remained low; hence there was no need to compete for land. People were free to cultivate as much land as they liked, wherever they liked. No land registration was necessary. Mere possession, and acknowledgement of such by the community, was all the proof one needed to claim ownership. Peasants paid tax on their harvest, rather than on land, and women had as much right as the men to own land.

The concept of individual land ownership was introduced in Cambodia during the period of French colonisation. In 1953 Cambodia gained its independence, but the practice was retained. At the same time, customs governing land ownership (e.g. possession meant ownership) were still followed. Starting from 1953, however, wealthy urban dwellers began to accumulate land on the outskirts of towns and in rich rice-growing areas. They also lent out money to farmers at usurious rates. This trend persisted such that by the late 1960s, many farmers had become heavily indebted and eventually lost their land. Low farmgate prices in 1967 further exacerbated the problem.

Prince Sihanouk sought to ease the debt burden on farmers by encouraging the formation of credit cooperatives. Unfortunately, these were largely ineffective. Government officials and army officers appropriated land that had been cleared through the efforts of local people. Customary laws governing land ownership were thrown aside. Peasants fled to the mountains and joined up with rebel groups, presaging the peasant uprising of the '60s and '70s which the Khmer Rouge took advantage of. The peasant movement aimed to set up an equitable land holding system, cancel unjust debts and help peasants solve the agrarian problem.

When the US-backed army seized power in 1970, the system of private land ownership remained untouched. The royal family's estates were confiscated, and then appropriated by corrupt military men. When the Khmer Rouge took over the country in 1975, Cambodians were first uprooted from urban to rural areas and then from one rural area to another. Everything became common property except for the clothes that people wore. In 1979 the Vietnamese-backed regime upheld collective property rights and divided the people into collective work groups called krom samaki (or solidarity groups). The level of collectivisation varied among these groups. At the first level labor was collectively performed and produce was divided equally among the members.

At the second level the major means of production was collectively owned. Land was divided into plots allocated on a per family basis according to the number of family members. At the third level, all means of production were privately owned. Khmers alleged that under this arrangement Vietnamese nationals living in Cambodia enjoyed special privileges and a superior status. In 1989, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which had been "State of Cambodia", adopted a liberalisation process and the krom samaki system was officially abandoned; Cambodians were given the right to own, use and inherit land.

However, the government prohibited the appropriation of fallow for the purpose of selling or renting it out to other people. No one can use agricultural land and forested areas without the permission of designated authorities. Though the krom samaki was abolished, families could continue farming the same land assigned to them under the defunct system.

However, the process of reclaiming land cultivated under the krom samaki, and how much land could be reclaimed, varied from place to place. And in the absence of clear laws (e.g. regulating agricultural land and common property lands and governing who can legitimately buy or sell land) or even a system of checks and balances land disputes were bound to come up, and they did, with increasing frequency. Moreover, the judicial system was ineffectual, leaving the people no recourse when their rights were violated. The transitional period following the signing of the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 up to the general elections in 1993 was a particularly dark time. State officials took advantage of the confusion and sold almost all properties, including land, villas and factories. Foreign investors took part in land speculation and earned quick money. A year later, most Cambodians remember the incident as the worst example of greed and political bias on the part of the central authority (Land Tenure in Cambodia, an UNCHR Report, 1992).

Meanwhile rural to urban migration increased phenomenally from 1989 till 1994, the majority of Internally Displaced Persons, or IDPs ending up Phnom Penh. Land became a scarce commodity. Families divided up the land to such an extent that most holdings became economically unproductive to invest. No law was in place to distribute new land to needy families. A "land crisis" began to rear its head.

Two broad groups of landless people can now be found in Cambodia. One group consists of those who have no land but whose skills enable them to find employment elsewhere. The other group is composed of people who have neither skill nor capital to engage in non-farm work and therefore end up working on other people's land, receive low wages, are unemployed for a large part of the year and so tend to migrate to neighboring towns in search of jobs. These are the poorest and most disadvantaged families in any community, and their deprivation is continuous. The problem may not be as serious for the first group but it is expected to get more so in future.

Though no reliable data is available, it is estimated that some 20 percent of families in the country are landless and highly vulnerable. Women also head a number of them. They do not receive any form of social protection from the government and do not expect to gain access to land in the near future.
Indonesia: Competing Claims

Land has always been a hotly contested item in Indonesia because of competing claims from several interest groups, among them farmers, industries, timber enterprises, housing enterprises, dam construction projects, government departments, industry, housing, agriculture, forestry, public construction, and transport and energy.

Indonesia's major land disputes fall under the following classifications:

• Land disputes arising from state appropriation of land for such purposes as mining or forest protection. A well known example is the dispute between the Amungme, an indigenous group in Irian Jaya, and PT Freeport, a mining company, over the former's ancestral land. In East Kalimantan, the Dayak Bentian are protesting the appropriation of their land by PT. Kahold Utama, operator of an industrial timber plantation. A variation on this has occurred in Java: Perhutani has forced the farmers in Sagara, West Java to vacate an area declared as a production forest.

• Land disputes resulting from the "green revolution", a rice self-sufficiency program which has given few people control over much of the land, thus making more and more farmers landless. In the coastlands of Java farms a single individual owns 50 hectares or more in size while over half of the farmers are landless. The construction of large dams in pursuit of the same program has also displaced farmers at Kedung Ombo in Central Java and Saguling in West Java.
  
  
• The establishment of plantations on land previously controlled by the people. Some well-known examples are the conversion of land in Penunggu (Jaluran), North Sumatra into a plantation and the dispute that occurred recently at Jenggawah, East Java. Similar conflicts have been reported: Also in Irian Jaya, Sei Lepan in North Sumatra, PIRLOK in Silau Java, Asahan regency, North Sumatra and Cimerak, West Java.
  
  
• The acquisition of land for service industries such as the construction of luxury homes, hotels and tourist facilities. In the Jakarta/Bogor/Tanggerang/Bekasi area (Jabotabek), real estate companies already control an area greater than the size of Jakarta itself. In Bali developers for the construction of tourist facilities and other infrastructure have snapped up huge swathes of agricultural land. On the coastline of Lombok, communities at Pemongkong and Gilitrwangan have been evicted to make way for tourist facilities, while in West Java alone there are at least 21 golf courses.
  
  
• Acquisition of land for what are declared to be "development programs" by the government. Land is needed to develop roads, government buildings, military facilities, etc. The land dispute at Blangguan in East Java arose from the acquisition of people's land earmarked for a naval training station. In this matter, the government directly interferes in the removal of obstacles that hinder the progress of "development".
  
  
• The annexation of land for factories both within and beyond industrial areas. These land disputes have spread in the Jabotabek area, and in other "centers of economic growth". Land agents make enormous profits by getting the people to sell their land cheaply then selling at a premium to large capitalists.
  

• The withdrawal of the people's land rights in the name of environmental conservation. For example the communities around Mount Leucer in Aceh and Pulo Panggung in Lampung have been driven out by a government ordinance establishing protected forests, wildlife preserves, and such like in these locations, reclassifying these locations for housing and the people's plantation for protected forestry, a wildlife reserve and such like on these locations.

The number and virulence of land dispute cases throughout Indonesia demonstrates the profound nature of the problem. Authorities, however, are loath to acknowledge this fact and dismiss the rising incidence of land disputes as isolated incidents brought about by lack of information. Or else they blame a third party purportedly wanting to disturb the peace. None of these explanations holds up to scrutiny.

What is clear is that majority of these land disputes are a result of the expansion of big businesses. In most cases this is facilitated by state intervention, which take the form of laws granting incentives to investors or outright eviction of whole communities. Another discernible pattern is state violation of the peoples' land rights in favor of "public interest" projects. Not a single case can be cited to show that appropriated land was fairly acquired or purchased by the government. Instead, coercion and manipulation have been the order of the day.

Philippines: Legacy of a Colonial Past

The roots of landlessness in the Philippines can directly be traced to its long 400-year history of colonization.

Prior to the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors in the 1500s, land used to be held in common by village clusters known as barangays, and land access was mainly based on user-rights, similar to systems as they still exist today among a few indigenous upland communities. The barangays engaged in subsistence agriculture, with little or no surplus for profit. There was no non-working "elite" class extracting profit form those who tilled the soil. The more advanced Muslim societies of Southern Philippines, however, were already at the threshold of class society - an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but private in use.

Much of this traditional system, however, was destroyed when the Spaniards placed all lands under the Crown, and introduced feudal systems. Conversion to the Christian faith was used as a tool for subjugation. Large tracts of land for production, known as haciendas, were parceled out among the Spanish military and clergy, while administrative districts called encomiendas were established. Even while native Filipinos were systematically deprived of their lands, systems of tribute and forced labor were introduced. Numerous peasant uprisings thus marked the 350 years of Spanish colonial history.

Land transactions

One of the key issues in Cambodia relates to the issuance of land titles to holders, streamlining the sale or purchase of land, distribution of mine cleared land to deserving people, prevention of land encroachment by influential people, and minimizing speculative investment on land. To date, not one Cambodian has a clear and marketable title to a piece of land in the country; some people, especially those living in populated areas, hold a temporary holding certificate that allows the occupant to use the land till further notice.

Nevertheless, streamlining land-related transactions is receiving much attention and is considered key to distributing land equitably to all families. Meanwhile,all land related transactions are supposed to be reported to the authorities, with the village headman keeping track of the deals. Transactions between relatives are assumed to be aboveboard. In recent years, however, an increasing number of "outsiders" have been buying up community land. In such cases, a commission has to be paid - either by the buyer or seller - to local authorities.

Land titling

The Land Title Department (LTD) was established in 1925 and remained functional till the early '70s. During the 1975-1979 conflict, however, the department was closed down. Private landownership was henceforth disallowed until 1989 when economic reforms began and the responsibility for land titling was vested with the Ministry of Agriculture under the Land Use and Mapping Organization. After 1993, the Land Title Department was de-affiliated from the Ministry of Agriculture and put under the supervision of the Council of Ministers. The current land titling procedures, though temporary and issued on ad hoc basis, are:

• For land less than one hectare, the Village Chief allows de facto (based on availability of land, present number of families and claims).
• For land not exceeding four hectares but more than one hectare, the district office issues a temporary holding certificate.
• For land area less than 10 hectares but exceeding four hectares, the provincial office (under the chair of the Governor) issues the holding certificate.
• For land 10 hectares and more, the Council of Ministers (located in Phnom Penh) receives and approves the request approves the for titling.

The procedures sound straightforward enough but so far people have found it hard to obtain clearance at the national level. This is so because policies governing land are still unclear while conflicts within the ruling coalition have left land-related issues unattended. Only the speculators and military men (conniving to appropriate land) have benefited from all the confusion.

The work of the Land Title Department in Phnom Penh is currently (since mid-1995) supported by two bilateral agencies (GTZ, Germany and Finnish Development Aid Agency) with technical advisors, equipment and training in cadastral mapping and registration. Limited progress has been made; however, one has to make allowances for the fact that the task is overwhelming and three years is not enough time (given the not-so-auspicious political situation) to complete it.

Views on Government Policy

Cambodia's unique history and development pattern have given rise to land issues and problems that differ from those in the other countries examined here. While land is theoretically abundant, its distribution has become highly uneven following the privatization of property in 1989. As families grew and no new land could be had for the growing children land was subdivided into economically unproductive units. The entry of land speculators further exacerbated the problem. Evictions have become more frequent, especially in urban areas.

While the Government is struggling to institute appropriate policies to curtail dishonest land transactions on land, it has yet no firm guidelines on distributing land to the poor. People in the rural areas are gaining access to land more "on their own" rather than as a result of any law or program. Work on streamlining land records has remained slow but is gradually picking up.

Indonesia: Reluctant Reformer

The economic crisis that marked the end of Indonesia's Old Order regime cut deeply into the government's foreign exchange reserves. In April 1996 it was down to just US$8 million. In the same year the government had to shell out some US$100 million to import rice.

The New Order leadership used this incident as a pretext for overhauling the country's economic strategy into one that gave relatively free rein to private businesses and foreign investors.

To counter the populist strategy of the Soekarno regime, the Soeharto regime established a "new" development ideology, which gave Indonesia a capitalist face.

This development model called for many changes in land policies, laws and regulation. Ifdhal Kasim and Endang Suhendar (1996) wrote very clearly about Indonesia's three land policy periods.

1967-1974: Exploitation of Natural Resources.

The effort to free the New Order regime from constrictions that were the Old Order's heritage was prompted by the belief that the old land laws are a legacy of the repudiated Indonesian communist party (PKI) and therefore a source of political conflict, if not instability. Hence, the New Order passed Law no. 7/1970 to expunge the concept of land reform from the constitution. The First Five Year Plan (Repelita I) 1969-1973 does not mention land reform at all, emphasizing instead the need to increase agricultural production.

The government's policy with regard to the utilization of natural resources ushered in new laws governing domestic and foreign investment in 1967-8. The law on foreign investments allowed foreign capital holders to use and own land. This privilege was not spelled out specifically in the agrarian laws, although section 55 article 2 states: "The right to use or build upon land is only available to legal bodies which are partially or fully funded by foreign capital, if it is deemed necessary by the laws of the overall development plan". The question is were the laws allowing foreign investment for the sake of receiving aid also part of the overall development plan?

Government policy governing the exploitation of natural resources is likewise evident in Law no. 5/1967, the basic forestry law. This law caused some controversy because it came into conflict with the 1960 Agrarian Laws, which form the foundation of agrarian policy. This law was created in order to facilitate the sale of forest products to increase capital for the New Order's development plan. That same year, Law no. 11/1967 regarding mining was passed, and in 1972 the government introduced transmigration laws.

1974-1983: Productivity sans structural planning

This period is often referred to as the oil boom era because of the sharp increase in oil prices in the international market. During this period a big part of government income came from the export of oil and gas products. Economic growth was averaging at 7.8% per year. Just when the economy was booming, however, the government had a change of heart, and called for import substitution and limitations on foreign investment. This policy change has been attributed to popular demands for a stronger domestic industrial sector and partly as a reaction to the widely resented First Planning Period policies favoring the free entry of foreign capital into Indonesia.

This period also saw the metamorphosis of the government into the country's sole development agent. With windfall profits from oil and gas receipts the government could well afford to create a "development budget" with which to fund many development projects. This new power encouraged the government to sponsor new land related legislation, Law no. 20/1961 (Revoking the Rights to Land), thus facilitating development projects with Law no. 39/1973 and Presidential Decision 39/1973.

However the implementation of Law no. 20/1961 involved a time-consuming process and government tried to extricate itself from this bind by passing new laws Permendagri 15/1975 and Permendagri 2/1976. These laws were designed to give government institutions as much leeway as possible to launch development projects with funds from oil exports. The private sector, being the government's main business clients, likewise benefited from these laws as government deregulated the economy to stimulate private sector growth. The downside was the proliferation of land problems in the early 1980s.

Another notable feature of this period was the nationwide rural development scheme known as the "green revolution". Though aimed at increasing food production for everyone's benefit, the green revolution seemed more intent on keeping food prices down to keep urban consumers happy. The green revolution did increase production and in 1984 Indonesia was declared self-sufficient. The profits, however, were not shared equally and there occurred a rift in the social structure of rural areas (Tjondronegoro 1990; Sayogyo 1993; White as quoted from Hartman 1985). Most of the profits went to large landowners whose lives did not depend on what they reaped from the land.

1983-1990's: Deregulation of Landownership

The drop in oil prices forced the government to think of other ways to maintain its growth rate. The answer lay in more infusions of private capital. To entice investors the government dangled the carrot of easy access to land.

First, the government issued Permendagri no. 12/1984 ("How to Make Land & Land Rights Available: Building and Disturbance Permits for Companies Providing Investments Capital according to Law no. 1/1967 and Law no. 6/1968). These were intended to facilitate foreign and domestic acquisition of land.

Second, it elevated Directorate General of Agriculture to the National Land Board. Third, businesses in developed countries were enticed to relocate to Indonesia through Presidential decision 53/1989, which promotes industrial activities. Fourth, the government extended usage permits from 25 to 60 years on the grounds that Indonesia did not want to be left behind in attracting foreign investors. Fifth, the government brought back the idea of "land use for public good" by issuing Presidential Decision 55/1993, which withdrew Permendagri no. 15/1975, 2/1976, and 2/1985. The sixth move the government made was to implement land registration. It was assumed that this would cut much of the red tape that slows down the processing of land permits.

In short, the policy of deregulation that characterized this period was designed to facilitate land acquisition.

No land cases were taken seriously during this time.

Period	Macro-policy	Land Affairs
1966-73	Economic stability through foreign financial capital investment	Freezing land reform, Exploitation of natural resources by way of investment, forestry, mineral, and transmigration laws, eliminating land reform court.
1973-83	Green revolution Import substitution Industrialisation	Facilitation of land acquisition for business and govenment project ( Law no. 39/1973, Presidential Decision 9/1973, Permendagri 15/1975, Permendagri 2/1976, Permendagri 2/1985). Increase agricultural productivity through Nucleus Estate Smallholder Scheme (NESS) without using land reform regulation.
1983- present	Orientation towards export industry (non-gas and oil products) Free market orientation	Attract foreign capital investment Deregulation of land permits especially for the businesse sector (Presidential Decision 53/1989, Presidential Decision 55/1993, Extended "exploitation right"to 60 years, land registration to facilitate land acquisition, orientation of land market (Pakto 23/1993 on Deregulation Package), Creation of the National Land Agency (Kepres 26/1988), Deregulation of Foreign investment (PP 20/1961).
Table Configuration of Land Policy, adapted from Endang Suhendar and Ifdhal Kasim, Tanah sebagai Komoditas, Jakarta:ELSAM, 1996),p. 75-76.

Philippines: All eyes on CARP

Poverty in the Philippines remains a largely rural phenomenon. In 1991, half the rural population lived below the poverty line, and rural poverty accounted for two-thirds of the country's total. Poverty was, and still is, attributed largely to the inequitable distribution of land and income.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6657, was passed by the legislative bodies and signed into law on June 10th 1988 by President Corazon Aquino.

Unlike previous attempts of Philippine Governments, CARL was supposed to cover all public and private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No person can retain more than one viable agricultural farm, the upper limit for retention being 5 ha for the landowner and if applicable 3 ha for each child more than fifteen years of age and actual tilling the land. Since a conflict with the 7 ha retention of PD 27 would have been created, all earlier "reformed" farms under PD 27 (7 ha) were permitted to be retained.

The law states that ancestral lands being inhabited by indigenous cultural communities will be protected and reserved for the respective communities to use it in a culturally appropriate way and would therefore not fall under the distribution. Exempted from CARP among others are all lands with a slope of more than 18%, as well as reserved lands such as national parks, forest reserves, fish sanctuaries and watersheds and lands utilized in the national and/or public interest such as for national defense and education and experimental farms, church and mosque sites, cemeteries etc. All lands classified as alienable and disposable (meaning not private, not government owned agricultural land etc.) will be within the jurisdiction of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and can be distributed by this agency. Lands with a slope higher than 18 % (usually reserved as forestland) will also be administered by the DENR, but cannot be awarded by land transfer. Use-rights stewardship contracts would be applicable in this case with a duration of 25 years under the Integrated Social Forestry (ISF) program.

Another important issue that CARL addressed was the continuation of the change of sharecropping arrangements (as provided already earlier in PD 27 and RA 3844) into leasehold agreements with a 75:25 sharing of the net revenue in favor of the lessee.

The law, especially as far as private land is concerned, was to be implemented and coordinated by the existing Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the DENR and other supporting government agencies with varying degrees of importance. To fulfill its task, DAR was equipped with extra-judicial powers, and DAR's decisions could only be upheld by the Philippine Court of Appeals and in few instances by the President her/himself.

To operationalize the law, the government initiated the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). CARP is an ambitious government-led program with a total target scope of 8.1 million hectares of private and public lands, and a coverage of up to an estimated 4-5 million rural households. It aims at a more equitable distribution and ownership of land. It attempts both to improve land tenure security for tillers, as well as provide support services. As a multi-agency effort, CARP today is at the heart of the government's social reform and poverty-eradication efforts.

CARP was to be implemented by DAR through the following the steps:

• land acquisition from government or private owners, voluntarily offered or compulsory acquired according to the law,
• valuation of lands and payment to former owners through the Landbank,
• selection of beneficiaries,
• distribution of the land, and
• issuance of land titles to the beneficiaries either individually or collectively in a cooperative
  Land acquisition and processing was to be implemented in three phases:
  • All rice and maize lands as well as public lands covered by PD 27, voluntarily offered private lands and all lands owned by the government or governmental institutions, devoted or suitable to agriculture,
  • Alienable and disposable lands, being state lands, which could be used for agriculture without causing environmental hazards and all private agricultural lands of more than 50 hectares.

• Medium and small private landholdings in two phases: (a) landholdings between 24 and 50 hectares to be processed between 1992 and 1995 and (b) from retention limit (5 hectares) up to 24 hectares in the final years from 1994 until 1998.

Immediately to be processed were lands under lease by multinational corporations. These were to be processed immediately within three years after promulgation of the law, while commercial farms for fruits, coconut, cacao, coffee etc. will be compulsory acquired 10 years after the promulgation of the law.

Another special case is corporate farms with regard to distribution of land. In principle, the land should be distributed directly to individual farmworkers, but if that would not be economically feasible, beneficiaries could form a cooperative and could receive shares amounting to the value of the land in the said cooperative farm, while being the landowners. Within the farm, homelots would have to be allocated for farmworkers.

By June 1998, ten years will have passed since the Law was first passed and implemented. Existing data shows that, although 54% of the total target area has been covered, the quality of coverage needs further examination. There is a general lack of support services for beneficiaries, and many existing beneficiaries still live under conditions of poverty. They suffer from poor infrastructure, a lack of basic social services such as education and health, high interest rates of credit where available, and a general absence of agricultural extension. Production levels of AR beneficiaries for different crops have either risen slightly, or remain the same.

Unless there are sufficient efforts to address the needs of beneficiaries, the farmers risk losing their lands again in an act of desperation.

The program also faces several problems in implementation. These include resistance by landowners, problems in coordination among the different agencies, and problems within the bureaucracy.

Certain lessons and strategies for the future have been identified-- the need to build strong people's organizations and alliances with NGO support groups; to work in collaboration with DAR, Church and media; to build capacity among AR beneficiaries to access support services by themselves; to shift towards sustainable agriculture and greater farmer control over post-harvest and marketing facilities; to promote gender equity and environmental principles into agrarian reform; to consolidate the lessons from past NGO pilots and experiments; and to build new orientations and skills among NGOs and people's organizations (POs), especially on negotiations and in linking farmers with support systems.

Yet, even more challenges lie ahead. The revised target date for completing the coverage of all land tenure improvement activities is 2004. This final phase, however, largely involves the compulsory acquisition of private lands where more landowner resistance is expected. The next six years is also expected to be three times more costly (PHP 150 billion) than the previous ten years (PHP 52 billion). As 1998 is also the time for national elections, the incoming national leadership will determine, to a large extent, the priority given to agrarian reform.

Thailand: Productivity before Reform

Fourteen agencies in four ministries of the government are empowered to run land allocation programs, subject to law and for specific purposes. In 1984 a total of 1.2 million families were settled in land allocation project areas covering some two million hectares. The beneficiaries were the landless, squatters, small holder families, hilltribe people, and war veterans. Some of the land given away were either bought by or donated to the government; others were idle or deteriorated forestland.

Despite the number of implementing agencies, however, this project has been marked by long delays in implementation.

National Agricultural Policies

Under the First Agricultural Development Plan, the emphasis was on providing the necessary physical infrastructure to facilitate agricultural development and efficient utilization and conservation of natural resources, i.e., land, water and forests. Subsequent plans paid greater attention to the distributive aspects of development.

Meanwhile, the Sixth National Plan (1986-91) concentrated on agricultural diversification. Natural resources were to be more efficiently utilized at the farm level, and monocropped farms were to shift to a multiple cropping/integrated farming system.

Assessment of past government policies on agricultural development

The growth of Thailand's agriculture sector has been largely private sector-led. Still, government interventions have also made a considerable impact on the sector.


Such interventions are here classified into four categories, and their impact examined:

Direct intervention aimed at redistributing agricultural land and promotion of land use efficiency through agrarian reform policies. Agrarian reform has made a dismal showing in the past 15 years. Only 30% of the 30 million-rai target have actually been distributed to landless farmers. As such the impact of agrarian reform on the overall agricultural situation has been insignificant.

Public investment in agricultural infrastructure and support systems. Of the total budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, over half (approximately 60%) is traditionally earmarked for irrigation development. As a result, while only 20% of arable land are irrigated, productivity (in the case of rice) in lands that are irrigated is about 1.5 times higher than in rainfed areas. Agricultural credit has also played a significant role in improving agricultural productivity in the sense that it enables farmers to keep buying HYV seeds and agrochemicals. The government has likewise intervened to promote research and development and this has paved the way for a number of technological innovations.

Modification of the economic environment through a system of incentives and deterrents, mainly in prices and trade policies. The government's price policies are aimed at: (1) maintaining a low domestic price for consumers; (2) stabilizing internal prices by preventing large fluctuations in the price of agricultural products and in farmers' incomes; (3) increasing government revenues; and (4) maintaining political stability.

The government controls prices through price support programs and agricultural products mortgage programs. At the same time, it has done away with export taxes to enhance the competitiveness of the country's agricultural products. However, the quota on exports of tapioca products and coffee remains in place and some import controls have been imposed on some products to protect domestic industries. This selective/limited deregulation policy has not been able to control fluctuations in commodity prices and farm incomes.

Improvement in the efficiency of the marketing system by providing marketing facilities in local and central markets, which are largely private, sector-operated. The government tries to enhance the farmers' bargaining power by encouraging them to form themselves into groups and cooperatives. However, agricultural cooperatives in the country provide production loans only. Only a few of them have ventured into processing and marketing. They are also inefficiently managed, but this is due mainly to government meddling in their decision-making and administration.

Case Study 2: Khvao Commune, Samrong District, Takeo Province

General information on the area/people involved

Khvao commune (Samrong district, Takeo province), approximately 56 kilometers from Phnom Penh, consists of 18 villages with a combined population of more than 23,000 people. Its residents engage in rainfed agriculture. The average landholding is about 0.80 hectares per household (average household size is 6 persons) and is sufficient to feed a family for only half a year. The people are not interested in improving the land's productivity and neither it seems is anybody else; the village receives no support from government and other external agencies. People living in this commune have been faced with numerous land-related problems in their attempt to obtain land titles. Either the village-headman was unenthusiastic or procedures were too tedious. Visits to the district and provincial land office have not been very helpful.

The main difficulties confronted by the people include:

1. Tedious and not-so-easy to understand procedures

The present generation has not had enough experience dealing with the government on issues related to land or other immovable properties. For this generation the new administrative procedures can seem quite formidable. Lack of knowledge on land laws and regulations forced most people not to seek the land title. Villagers generally shared little interest on areas related to land issues; they merely wanted to upgrade their land, are keen to acquire more land but do not know how to assure additional areas and make it a legal possession. The local NGO, SEDOC (Socio Economic Development Organization of Cambodia), prepared a training program for the local people on land issues, and helped them to understand the nuances of administration.

2. Lack of communication

There is little communication/contact between local government agencies/departments and the people on how to obtain land titles. Local officials are either unaware of the procedures formulated at the national level or simply assume that land issues do not warrant their attention.

3. Absence of extension services

The Province has few extension support services to develop agriculture. Furthermore, the lack of training in modern techniques and inputs has hampered the optimum use of land.

4. Political instability

Generalized fear and political instability have also discouraged people from seeking land titles. Said a farmer in the village: "I am not sure when another round of fighting will start. Why should I waste my time getting a land title or invest in the land? Let peace come first."

Lack of guidelines related to land

Problems arising from land laws are few because almost all people in Cambodia own some land, if of widely differing sizes. What problems there are result from the lack of procedures governing, for instance, inheritance. Fortunately, inheritance within a family is governed more by custom rather than by law. However such customs may not forever be tolerated and government officials might one day come up with a new regulation restricting the use of land.

Land sales and leases are neither covered by standard procedures. As a result, few families are prepared to invest in, sell or lease land, leaving the land fallow and unproductive.

Government response to land problems

Grappling with practical difficulties. The presence of more than six million anti-personnel land mines has kept the people from gaining access to otherwise fertile land. Clearing such mined areas poses a formidable hurdle (both financially and in terms of capacity) for the government. Besides, as soon as land is cleared it is quickly appropriated by influential people in the area, thus denying the poor opportunities to obtain land for cultivation.

Developing the land laws. The Government has been try