

KEY REPORT

Mid-Term Review –2016-2021

ILC Strategy



MTR 2016-2021 ILC Strategy

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Abbreviations

CBI	Commitment Based Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
ECADERT	Estrategia Centroamericano de Desarrollo Rural Territorial
ILC	International Land Coalition
INGO	International NGO
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MELC	Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning and Communication
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NES	National Engagement Strategy
RCU	Regional Coordination Unit
RSC	Regional Steering Committee

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KEY REPORT

Executive Summary

This report presents the mid-term review of ILCs 2016-2021 strategy. The review considers results so far, with the specific contributions of ILC to these results. It also analyses the main strategic axes NES, CBI and MELC, and the main network components and structures.

Essential Findings

The contribution analyses provide strong evidence that ILC has contributed to changes under the first half of its strategy. ILC contributed to positive changes through nine principal mechanisms (ranging from facilitating spaces and linkages to leveraging legitimacy and credibility) that match well with what is described in the ILC Roadmap.

Generally, this review concludes that the National Engagement Strategy (NES) approach is well advanced, working well, relevant, and effective.

Commitment-Based Initiatives (CBI) are highly appreciated by members as a useful strategic implementing modality to connect to each other across borders and beyond their own network. Adjustments are needed to make full use of their potential.

Not enough strategic linking is happening between NES and CBIs despite initial efforts.

Learning and communication are being linked to NES and CBI strategic axes, but less so to monitoring and evaluation. The MELC (Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning and Communication) logic is more suitable for project implementing organisations and does not adequately capture the work done by an international coalition. ILC work on capacity development is not captured by the current MELC frameworks.

The result framework is simple, broad in meaning with very few indicators. But the cost of the simplicity of having few indicators is their narrowness and difficulty to be understood and used by members.

The diversity of collaborating actors with ILC have much more to contribute than is currently the case. This is evident with regard to constituency based organizations, whose voice is difficult to hear in ILC governance, and with strategic partners whose potential is not fully tapped into NES and CBI.

The contribution analysis shows that regionalisation is working well with members expressing their appreciation for the way the network has come closer to their homes. Simultaneously, it also shows that the global identity of the network continues to play a crucial role and needs to be nurtured.

A multi-nodal or cornerstone network structure is emerging where decision-making, network representation, and capacity strengthening happen at different parts of the network, be it a CBI, a NES, an RCU or the secretariat. This creates new opportunities for the functioning of ILC as a network, and requires new ways of structuring a decentralised global support team to the network.

Strengthening ILC's transformative potential requires strategic thinking rather than good projects. Concrete interventions can be financed through ILC (both in NES and CBI) if their specific value-addition to the network is clear, but on the whole ILC should shift to a more catalytic model suitable to its network nature.

Recommendations

With regard to NES:

1. Continue and expand. Continue and expand the NES approach to other countries.
2. Sustainable financial model. Focus ILC support less on implementing activities, except for pilot testing, and more on core NES network functions. Develop a sustainable business model for NES platforms. Consider using a lead agent model for additional, implementing activities where one member takes formal responsibilities.
3. Strategic Linking. Link NES more strategically to CBIs, as well as relevant initiatives of other actors, and make the NES facilitator accountable for this.
4. Guided Flexibility. Allow flexibility in NES models for local contexts, while providing guidance on different types of NES platform for particular countries, with strategic choices that align with different possible situations.
5. Shared competencies. NES facilitators can only do a few things. NES platforms should specify which roles should be fulfilled by the NES facilitator and which by specific members.
6. Link to Existing Land Alliances and Platforms. In cases where civil society land network or alliance already exists, or even multi-stakeholder platform (for example for VGGTs), decide and clarify how to relate to these platforms.

With regard to CBI:

7. Use CBI Typology. Use the following typology for CBIs: a) Regional thematic working groups. b) Regional (or sub-regional) engagement strategies. c) Global thematic working groups.
8. Celebrate and Let Go. CBIs that have developed into large projects, programmes or entities can be celebrated and let go as CBIs. They can continue to relate with any relevant CBI or NES or as member.
9. Financing Network Activities. Focus ILC support less on implementing activities, except for pilot testing, and more on core ILC network functions, related to the nine key mechanisms.
10. Strategic Linking. Link CBIs more strategically to NES, as well as relevant initiatives of other actors.
11. Capable Focal Points. Strengthen capacities of focal points in management of multi-stakeholder platforms and network dynamics.

With regard to MELC:

12. From MELC to CCI. Renames MELC into Capacity, Communication and Impact as this does more justice to the nature of ILC.

13. Capacity in Results Framework. Include ‘improved capacities’ as explicit part of the Mobilise output result.
14. Link Capacity to Decentralised Funding. Strengthen capacities for decentralised funding and make capacity part of funding proposals.
15. Stop Using Specific Indicators. Explain concepts well and request open reporting on what was done (Connect, Mobilise, Influence) and what changed (Agendas, Practices, Policies).
16. Redefine Impact. Define ‘impact’ as ‘that part of the change that ILC can claim as its contribution’. And analyse this by reporting on 1) what was done, 2) what happened, and 3) how did what was done contribute to what happened.

With regard to diversity of actors:

17. Stronger Voice of Constituency Based Organisations. Make these organisations more visible and ensure their inputs.
18. Use Strategic Partners More Strategically. Change their role from passive observers to active co-implementers.

With regard to regionalisation and decentralisation:

19. Balance with Global Identity. Continue regionalisation and decentralisation, but maintain a clear global profile with the secretariat as a distinctive cornerstone.
20. Allow (Sub-)Regional Approaches. Regionalisation should take place at the level where there is a strategy and a group of active members who take responsibility. This could be sub-regions rather than the current regions.
21. Make the Assembly Boss Again. Strengthen decision making mechanisms at regional and sub-regional level.
22. Manage Potential Conflicts of Interest Openly. Develop clear procedures to prevent (real and perceived) conflicts of interest in relation to decisions on funding for the own organisation and the tension between members for holding each other accountable while being equal members in the network.
23. Retain a Way-out. Ensure a legal way to intervene when ILCs name is at stake or in cases of obvious malfunctioning.
24. Conditions for Decentralisation. Ensure that responsibility, authority and accountability are always combined and that sufficient capacity is present in relation to these three.
25. Decentralisation of Funding. Make further regionalisation and decentralisation dependent on decentralisation of funding.
26. Develop Funding Model for Support Structure. Explore different options for funding of the support structures and develop a sustainable model.
27. One Support Structure. Develop the secretariat and RCUs as a single member-driven support structure that serves the network in all its modalities.

28. Strengthen Cornerstones in Effective Network Management. Strengthen capacities of all cornerstones to manage network dynamics and multi-stakeholder processes, as this is different from managing implementing organisations.
29. Clarify the Secretariat's Donor Role. As long as money from donors is channelled through the secretariat, ensure that the related role as (representative of the) donor is clear to all and is implemented well.
30. Strengthen the Secretariat's Political Role. Continue and strengthen the role of the secretariat to engage with actors in political processes. This includes external actors as well as ILC members at global level.
31. Linking Strategies. Proactive linking between all different cornerstones of ILC should be facilitated by the secretariat with RCUs.

With regard to strategic thinking:

32. Support Development of Strategic Thinking. Strengthen the skillset that is required to move from project thinking to strategic thinking for all cornerstones.
33. Stronger Focus on Core Business. Develop a stronger focus on the core business of ILC in all decisions regarding financing through ILC.

1 Introduction

This report presents the mid-term review of the International Land Coalition (ILC)'s 2016-2021 strategy. The ILC is an independent global alliance of civil society and intergovernmental organisations working together to achieve secure and equitable access to and control over land for women, men and communities living in conditions of poverty and exclusion, through the promotion of people centred land governance.

The ILC membership adopted a strategy for the period 2016-2021 divided into two three-year cycles, so as to benefit from an assessment at the mid-point to guide adjustments for the second half of the strategy. MDF Training & Consultancy and Resultante were appointed to undertake the exercise. The review was intended as a learning opportunity and was designed to engage the entire membership with its main findings and recommendations. MDF conducted the review between June 2017 and March 2018.

The objectives of the mid-term review, to which this report responds, are:

1. Assess achievements towards the expected results, outcomes as well as unexpected results and impacts
2. Assess the relevance and effectiveness of the Roadmap in support of ILC's Theory of Change, particularly its main implementation axes, results framework and business model, in delivering the strategy, and recommend possible adjustments to the Roadmap
3. Identify challenges that have impeded the effectiveness of ILC and successes that should be built upon
4. Recommend actions to be taken for the second half of the strategy (2019-21)

The review was done on the basis of document review, interviews with over hundred and forty internal and external stakeholders, participation in regional assemblies in Africa, Asia and Latin America and country studies in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Guatemala, Nepal, Peru, and Tanzania.

This report starts by presenting the key mechanisms through which ILC contributes to positive changes. It then discusses seven key issues that have emerged from the analysis and which could help strengthen the key mechanisms. For each of these issues, some findings are briefly presented, followed by rather elaborate recommendations.

The findings in this report are intentionally brief. And because the report is structured around six key issues, it does not claim complete treatment of all dimensions and aspects of ILC. The first annex contains a more elaborate and complete report in which more findings and analyses are presented. The second annex presents each of the contribution analyses with their evidence in some detail.

2 What Works

The contribution analyses provide strong evidence that ILC has contributed to changes. In each country, two specific changes were selected and evidence was collected from internal and external sources for each of the contributing factors to these changes. This has shown for a number of selected changes in agenda's, practices and policies that ILC sometimes was the major contributing factor and sometimes was a secondary but necessary factor along with contributions of individual members or other organisations or external factors.

A detailed analysis of the manner in which ILC contributed to positive changes reveals the major mechanisms through which this takes place. These are mechanisms 'of' ILC. The acting subject of these mechanisms is in some cases the network as a whole, in some cases a specific cornerstone of the network and in some cases the support structure (secretariat or regional coordination units) or a governance structure (regional steering committees, council). The mechanisms are:

1. Increasing the legitimacy of the voice of civil society by facilitating joint spaces that enable joint statements and voices that represent more than single organisations do.
2. Increasing credibility of members or national platforms through the international brand. This mechanism works two ways: internally to members by increasing self-confidence of members (being part of a bigger whole) and externally to governments or other actors by increasing the profile of the organisation(s). An example of this mechanisms is when international events are held in a country or when officials are invited to attend international meetings elsewhere.
3. Direct facilitation by providing financial resources that make actions possible. Sometimes this initiates new (pilot) activities and sometimes it helps continue or expand relevant activities. The mechanism of providing linkages, guarantees or backup for raising financial resources occurs much less.
4. Facilitating spaces. By developing spaces at regional, national, and thematic levels, various actors (members and non-members) come together, which contributes to creative processes, dissemination of ideas, learning, and consensus building. This also includes the stimulus to include a wider variety of stakeholders than most organisations initially plan to. For several organisations, this entails a shift from mainly bilateral relations to multilateral relations. Part of

this mechanism is also persuasion to overcome resistance to constructive dialogue among members.

5. Linking local to global and back. This happens by facilitating members (and sometimes non-members) to tell their story at wider levels of scale, digitally or in person, and by making global information locally available. This contributes to a wider knowledge base being available to a wider audience.
6. Providing technical, strategic, organisational or institutional support that contributes to more capacity or higher quality of activities or strategies of individual or joint members or network bodies. This, in turn, contributes to stronger mutual acceptance among members (perceiving more value in others) as well as stronger credibility among other actors.
7. Direct negotiation and brokering. In some cases, ILC representatives from outside the direct situation play a direct role in negotiating with various actors, or in brokering a specific agreement. A more indirect form of this mechanism is where government officials participate in regional or global ILC events.
8. Increased credibility and leverage through international members of ILC. This mechanism relates to the specific role international ILC members can play. When they are part of a NES platform, or backup other ILC members' activities, or when they lend their voice, network and influence it has a positive effect, particularly when such international members are also donors of governments.
9. Co-implementation and co-creation. Particularly in lobby processes, ILC support staff (of secretariat or RCU) sometimes help catch political opportunities to speak the right word, make the right connection, introduce the right people. This requires being close to the national and regional networks and always being aware of their strategic direction, as well as political sensitivity at all times.

3 Flexible and Sustainable NES

Generally, this review concludes that the National Engagement Strategy is well advanced, working well, relevant, and effective, particularly in its facilitation of spaces where land related issues are discussed, and the agenda toward people-centred land governance, along the lines of the ten commitments, is driven forward through multiple ways. The strength of the approach is in facilitating the space through which the key mechanisms listed above operate.

1. Continue and Expand. Continue and expand the NES approach to other countries. This should focus even more on facilitating a space where different stakeholders engage, exchange, learn, negotiate and try out options. The key mechanisms that have been found as actual working mechanisms of ILC could be used as a basis for deciding what to emphasise as ILC.
2. Toward Sustainable Model. As a consequence of this, financial support should focus less on implementing activities, except for pilot testing. At the same time, different organisations working together towards a common goal could and should attract funding to implement activities at larger levels of scale. ILC can stimulate this by offering its brand name to be used, negotiate linkages, offer financial guarantees, and facilitate practical capacities where needed.

In order to maintain its strength as a global network (cf. the key mechanisms), and to avoid members joining in order to access funding to implement projects, it is important to stimulate a lead agent model where one NES member takes formal responsibilities for such funding. Using the lead agent model decreases financial and other risks for NES and for ILC and can help to let NES itself focus on its core business, being a network. This can in turn increase decentralised funding for the functioning of the NES platform itself, by including funding for NES core functions in the budget (as direct costs or as a percentage) and could lead to self-reliance of NES in countries with sufficient funders. In other countries the core functions of NES could continue to be funded through ILC for a longer period. When the ILC brand name (or other services of ILC) are used to access country or regional funding, there is a strong rationale to stimulate (or demand) inclusion of a financial contribution to the NES platform.

3. Strategic Linking. As part of strengthening the specific network characteristics of NES, more strategic linking to CBIs (as well as relevant initiatives of other actors) is necessary. The NES facilitator should put this high on the agenda, for example by regularly having members think through the question which CBIs (or others) can be ‘used’ to realise the strategic objectives of the NES or how this could be improved, and by having all members who participate in CBIs (or relevant initiatives of others) report back regularly.

One of the strengths of the NES is the facilitation of an open space where specific content is determined by context. Also in developing structures and modes of operation, there is some balance between offering guidance and adapt to situations and contexts. This adaptability to contexts can be further strengthened.

4. Guided Flexibility. Resist any move to unify NES processes across countries, or to develop blueprints, but offer further guidance on when to choose different options for a variety of choices. These choices differ between contexts and can change over time, due to changes in situations or maturity of the network. First ideas for such guidance on a range of choices are offered in the table in the NES chapter in Annex 1. Two major choices relate to different types of actors and the position and type of NES facilitator. These are mentioned below.
5. Shared competencies. The position and type of NES facilitator stand out as one key choice. It is useful to develop a range of competencies (at least including facilitation and lobby skills) required for the NES and to specify which should be fulfilled by the NES facilitator and which by specific members.

The ideal situation of a multi-stakeholder platform with six types of actors is described in the NES manual. In practice, sometimes a civil society land network or alliance already exists, and sometimes a multi-stakeholder platform on land already exists (for example in order to implement the VGGT), and sometimes both of these. In these cases it is important to decide how to relate to these platforms. Also, in practice NES platforms still mostly consist of only a few types of actors (mainly civil society and land users, and to a lesser extent INGOs including research) and the extent and manner of engagement with the remaining types of actors (governmental, intergovernmental, private sector including investors) is subject to much debate.

6. Existing Land Alliances and Platforms. Clarify the fact that both a civil society alliance on land, as well as a multi-stakeholder platform with all types of actors are useful and necessary, and clarify the different ways in which a NES platform could relate to both. Contexts are too different to prescribe one line of action, but in general, proliferation of networks should be avoided. Concrete options are offered in the elaborate report in Annex 1.

4 Role and position of CBIs

CBI is a very useful strategic implementing modality and it has great potential. Major steps are made over the past year to harmonise the initiatives and to make the modality work as a strategic tool. In order to make full use of the promising potential, a number of propositions are made in this MTR.

CBIs show their relevance to the work and strategy of ILC. CBIs are highly appreciated by members as a place where they can connect to each other across borders and beyond their own network. Whereas NES serves to connect a group of actors in a context of multiple topics, CBIs connect actors around one specific theme or (lobby or data collection) purpose. Strong point of CBIs is that they have the force to address the one issue in a focused manner to the highest political level and can work across all levels - from national to global and back. Even so, there seems to be a mixed understanding among members on the role of the CBIs. The current diversity of CBIs feeds this confusion, which includes the struggle of members to make the shift from project to strategic thinking. The contribution analysis of this MTR shows that the strength of the ILC network is in connecting, strengthening and backing up members and non-members around ILC's cause. We recommend applying these mechanisms also to CBIs.

7. Use a Clear CBI Typology. Looking at CBIs from the perspective of ILC's strengths as a network, we propose to use and communicate a clear typology of CBIs to avoid further confusion. Based on the findings of this review, we propose CBIs to be one of the following types:
 - a. Regional thematic working groups; these are the CBIs that gather members (and non-members) around one of the ten commitments. This includes data generation. Most of the current CBIs fall in this category.
 - b. Regional engagement strategy (RES) platforms; these are the CBIs that gather members (and non-members) around a regional or sub-regional strategy or a specific lobby target at regional level or sub-regional level. The dynamics of this type of CBI are similar to those of the NES, but at a regional level, linking different commitments at the same time for the sake of strategy. Current CBIs of this category are the ones working with ECADERT and African Union. There are no CBIs yet for the implementation of the regional strategies. At the moment regional strategies are nicely formulated, but do not have anyone responsible for implementation. By creating CBIs with the regional strategy as focus, regional or sub-regional strategies can be revitalised. Regional Steering Committees in collaboration with RCUs should be responsible for the implementation of the regional strategy and thus heavily involved in the regional engagement strategies.
 - c. Global thematic working groups; these CBIs serve as an umbrella for regional thematic working groups and at the same time may need to engage in lobby activities at global level.

These CBIs can be created as a consequence of regional CBIs (bottom-up), or as a consequence of a global need (top-down).

At this moment there is a fourth category of CBIs, namely those that have grown into a large project or entity, like the Kilimanjaro Initiative, the Rangelands Initiative or Land Matrix.

8. *Celebrate and Let go.* When the typology above is applied, the CBIs of the fourth category, are no longer considered CBIs. As these CBIs receive funding from other parties, they can be celebrated and let go off. They can serve as independent programmes or entities and can still participate in relevant CBIs as an actor.

We therefore recommend ILC to do its utmost best to convince other donors not to canalise their funding through the secretariat for CBI actions if the funding is earmarked for project implementation. Ideally project funding goes directly to one of the members who takes on the responsibility and accountability of the project. Just as we described in the NES section. Unless this is not possible for legal reasons and the funding concerns a mere legal procedure without any accountability responsibilities attached to it and thus no need to include it in the overall CBI budget of ILC.

9. *Financing Network Activities.* Core actions of CBIs should focus on activities related to the key mechanisms found in the contribution analysis. For CBIs this means creating space, facilitating exchange, learning, inspiration, developing expertise, offering support in elaborating the ideas, providing seed money for testing, piloting and dissemination of (new) technical or methodological approaches, and possibly coaching of successful pilots in reaching autonomy including providing linkages to other resources. ILC can freely fund these activities as long as they correspond to the ten commitments and are strategically used. As soon as activities move away from this essence of the network, they should be let go off or reoriented. Once there is a clear framework of the kind of activities that ILC can support, CBIs should have the freedom to act. This includes freedom in timing of financing, in making use of different strategic connecting moments within or outside regional or global land forums.

A special potential of the CBIs lies in their relation to the NES. Where NES can include all ten commitments, CBIs deepen engagement of (non-)members around one specific commitment. In the current practices of CBIs and NES the strategic linking between the two is not yet fully developed.

10. *Strategic Linking.* More strategic linking can happen by making focal points aware of the need to know what happens at NES level. By putting it high on the CBI agenda, NES representatives participating in the CBIs can contribute with clear NES needs. NES needs are to be defined by the NES themselves, as is indicated in the NES section. All regional CBIs should consider actively which linkages are relevant. This should be promoted by RCU and secretariat by establishing concrete bilateral linkages (for example between CBI focal points and NES facilitators) as well as communication groups around each CBI.

The success of CBIs, of whatever type, greatly depends on the capacities of the focal point and hosting organisation. The MTR shows that the CBI collaboration efforts work when the focal point takes on a rather neutral facilitator role and has knowledge of how to practically manage the initiative. As a consequence of the former recommendation to let go project type CBIs, project

management skills will become less necessary, whereas the skills to facilitate multi-stakeholder or network dynamics become ever more important. In reality focal points are managing a mini-network. Currently, in most of the CBIs the capacities to facilitate a multi-stakeholder platform are (partly) missing.

11. *Capable Focal Points*. The ILC network should give priority to the capacity strengthening of focal points and their hosting organisations in the management of multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) or network dynamics. In Annex 1 section 4.2, an example is given of how to use a tool like the Circle of Coherence, but any set of (MSP) tools can be used. The importance lies in having focal points, just like NES facilitators, master these tools, so difficulties on this end are solved and initiatives can focus on content rather than network issues.

5 Capacity, Communication and Impact

MELC (Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning and Communication) is an essential strategic axis of ILC and has been developed much over the past years. But the term does not adequately capture what is being done, particularly in relation to capacity development. Furthermore, learning and communication are being linked to the other strategic axes, NES and CBI, but much less to the other half of the MELC acronym: monitoring and evaluation.

12. *From MELC to CCI*. The name MELC derives from the logic of the results cycle: Monitoring and Evaluation are done for Learning and are being Communicated. This logic is more suitable for project implementing organisations and does not adequately capture the work done by an international coalition. The work being done in relation to this third strategic axis would be better summarised by Capacity, Communication and Impact (each of these is elaborated below). Labels are important to communicate clearly what is done and changing the label from MELC to CCI would do more justice to this important part of ILC's work.

Capacity and Learning. ILC exhibits a strong focus on learning and innovation and makes creative use of a variety of approaches. Many initiatives have been and are being developed to facilitate learning, also to overcome the challenge that online-only instruments are not yet optimally used. Increasingly, the focus expanded to development of organisational and institutional capacities, based on demands from within the network and the need for more capacities of the leading agencies of the various network cornerstones. These initiatives make good use of members' resources and capacities and apply recent insights in capacity development. However, the growing focus on capacity development is not captured in the results framework of ILC, nor in the MELC acronym.

13. *Capacity in Results Framework*. Include 'improved capacities' as explicit part of the Mobilise output result. This should include institutional capacities of organisations and network cornerstones, as well as their organisational capacities. An alternative is to make it an (intermediate) outcome, but this would compromise the simplicity of the result framework.
14. *Link Capacity to Decentralised Funding*. Capacity development trajectories also hold the potential to be linked to an increase in decentralised funding. In the first place by facilitating capacities for fundraising and for financial and project management. But also through the joint

development of specific proposals, where a lead member takes responsibility for managing and implementing activities (probably with other members), and where the ILC secretariat (global or regional) is included in the proposal to offer further capacity development and an infrastructure for learning. This, in addition to the use of the ILC brand by the lead agency, could add to the credibility of the member(s) and to their chances of success in proposal writing.

Communication. The development of the ten commitments has helped to create a common ground of action for all members and cornerstones of the network. They are the boundaries that constitute the spaces that ILC facilitates, and provide the safety to use these spaces more freely for different concepts and approaches. The key mechanisms reveal that some of the working mechanisms through which ILC contributes to changes are related to communication, so the investments in capacities, strategies, messages and tools for communication pays off. Internal communication still shows a mixed picture, even though ILC employs a wide variety of instruments. Some members are inactive and the communication efforts are experienced differently, ranging from “too many emails” to “too little”. It is good that there is a mix of online and face to face instruments.

Results and Impact. The result framework is simple. The main terms are broad in meaning but are simplified through very few indicators. But the cost of the simplicity of having very few indicators is their narrowness. The few indicators for the outputs Connect, Mobilise and Influence are very specific but members interpret them very differently in order to report what they did. Therefore, the aggregated numbers have little meaning. This is aggravated by the fact that not everyone reports and therefore total numbers are always incomplete and hence anecdotal at best. At outcome level, the indicators for Agendas, Policies and Practices are too narrow and are often re-interpreted as outputs (for example, changed practice reported as ‘information presented’). The impact indicators about numbers of people and numbers of hectares do not fit the nature of a global network. In practice they are only reported by members who implement specific concrete projects, and in those cases, these data represent output results only. Finally, monitoring and other ways of getting insights in results are hardly used in internal communication and learning, and hence the result cycle (using results to improve action) is hardly effective.

15. Remove Specific Indicators. The indicators are too narrow. One option is to develop many more indicators. This would make the monitoring much more complex and would not solve the problem. Therefore, it is better to explain the concepts better. This could be done by providing bullet points of what sort of issues are included in Connect, Mobilise, Influence, Agendas, Policies, Practices. These bullet points should also mention specific gender issues. Request all network cornerstones to report what was done (outputs) in relation to Connect, Mobilise, Influence and what happened (outcomes) in relation to Agenda’s, Practices, Policies.
16. Use a Different Concept of Impact. No longer consider impact as the highest level of change, but rather as ‘that part of the change that ILC can claim as its contribution’. Such changes would be related to Agendas, Practices or Policies, and the contributions of ILC could be effected through NES or CBIs, through the operating mechanisms identified in this report, or still others. This also implies removing the current impact indicators from the result framework. If they are required for accountability or bureaucratic reasons, relegate them to the position of a side-note. Practically, NES facilitators, CBI focal points or any other network cornerstone would report along the lines of their own efforts (see previous recommendation), while a first

level of analysing impact (as contribution to changes) can be added by asking each of these cornerstones to also reflect briefly on how exactly the contribution of their efforts has been to the reported changes. This results in a simple reporting format with three main questions: What was done? (brief narrative, based on clearly explained concepts of C,M,I), What happened? (brief narrative, based on clearly explained concepts of A,P,P) and How exactly did 'what was done' contribute to 'what happened'?

A second layer of analysing impact (as contribution to changes) can be done by annually selecting one or two countries in each region, and one or two global themes, and analyse what changed (based on reports of the different related cornerstones, and on the country-level land dashboard related to the ten commitments), and in what way the different efforts of ILC (NES, CBI) have made a contribution to these changes. This could be done in similar fashion as the contribution analyses in this review, but simplified. This would result in analyses that can be widely communicated and can serve learning.

6 Diversity of Collaborating Actors

With good reason the ILC network is proud of its diversity of members and makes conscious use of this diversity. Diversity of actors is increasing even more in the context of the NES platforms. It is in this light that the MTR includes a set of recommendations concerning the management of both the diversity of current members and the diversity of non-members - but crucial actors.

17. *Stronger Voice of Constituency Based Organisations.* Constituency based organisation, meaning social movement, grass roots or member organisations of small farmers, women, or indigenous communities, are final beneficiaries of all the efforts of the ILC network related to people-centred land governance. However, their voice is not easily heard for a variety of reasons. At regional and global assemblies, special efforts need to be made to create spaces where constituency based organisations can discuss their position and opinion among themselves, before bringing them in in the overall discussion. Constituency based organisations have a great need for exchange among themselves, as they live in particular situations and needs which they recognise in each other. Special exchange moments can be created where they can motivate, inspire and support each other around specific issues across national boundaries. This kind of exchange will make the constituency based organisations more visible within the network, strengthen their position, and give them valuable information and insights (and thus leverage) to share in internal (possibly more conceptual) ILC discussions.

On the other hand there are non-members who cannot become a member at the moment, but would be very willing to contribute more than only money or comments. These actors, such as governments, could be of greater use to the ILC network.

18. *Use Strategic Partners More Strategically.* We recommend to redefine the position and role of a strategic partner, so a new potential can be tapped into. The concept of strategic partner could be broadened from the current definition to an actor with whom collaboration can be seen as crucial for ILC's strategy implementation, even though the organisation may not be a leader in land tenure, a substantial donor or well-known co-implementer. By changing the role of a strategic partner from advisor and observer to an active collaborator and strategic ally in

reaching political goals, new knowledge and networks are made available for ILC. European governments have a vast network of embassies which again have national networks that can be very interesting for NES platforms or CBIs to make use of. It can even concern (global) private sector players who are willing to accept the ten commitments of ILC, but have not been very actively involved in land tenure so far. It can also concern strategically interesting global networks like the Global Land Tool Network (access to land tools and national and regional lobby platforms), the International Federation of Surveyors (access to land surveyors working at land related ministries) or the International Indigenous Women Forum (access to a global network of indigenous women's groups). In all cases strategic partners would be of great use to ILC and by using their information and contacts, doors of regional or national actors, such as government entities or private sector, can be opened in a different way. The secretariat, from its global perspective, would need to identify in what way linking between strategic partners and ILC collaboration spaces (NES, CBIs, RCUs, RSC) can be useful.

7 Regionalisation and Decentralisation

The contribution analysis shows that regionalisation is working well. Members express their appreciation for the way the network has come closer to their homes, communication has become smoother, responses more timely and regional lobby support is effective. In this section a set of recommendations for further regionalisation and decentralisation is offered.

Since the regionalisation of the ILC network started ten years ago, an evolution of the concept regionalisation and the related decentralisation has taken place. Where it started out as the distribution of power among the geographic regions of the ILC network, nowadays the terminology regionalisation and decentralisation is used in the context of a multi-nodal or cornerstone network structure: decision-making, network representation, and capacity strengthening happen at different parts of the network, be it a CBI, a NES, an RCU or the secretariat. Even so, contribution analysis shows that the global identity of the network continues to play a crucial role.

19. Regionalisation in Balance with Global Identity. On the one hand, regionalisation and decentralisation should be continued and cornerstones need to grow further into the role they can play in the network. On the other hand, any decision on further regionalisation and decentralisation should not underestimate the importance of global branding. To maintain the global branding alive, a concrete global secretariat is needed, with specific tasks, responsibility, authority and accountability at global level. This means that the global secretariat plays an important and distinctive cornerstone role. What the consequences are for the secretariat, is narrated in the section on the roles of the secretariat below.

The cornerstone structure for thematic and operational support mechanisms is closely linked to the geographic regionalisation and decentralisation process. RCUs, NES and regional CBIs have a clear function in the region and are appreciated for their regional presence. At the same time, the current regional division of the network structure responds only partially to the political reality of members.

20. Allow (Sub-)Regional Approaches. Looking at context and capacity, no region is equal and all require a different approach. For more effectiveness, ILC should fine-tune the regions at sub-

regional level where relevant. Asia has the highest need, as the geographic region as currently used within ILC has no regional governmental bodies and at times, members share little common ground (although exchange between sub-regions is still highly appreciated by members). As for Africa, West-, East- and Southern Africa form distinct sub-regions and in LAC the Caribbean is experienced as a significant sub-region. The different sub-regions require different regional approaches, meaning differences in support structure and decision-making dynamics, as long as there is a common framework within which they can work. For each relevant level - region or sub-region - a strategy should be developed, responding to the specific political context. Regionalisation should take place at the level where there is a strategy and a group of active members who take responsibility. “Regions” in this regard can also be used as a term for specific themes, groups of actors (like global CSOs) or other relevant dimension.

Passing decision-making responsibilities on to the regions is part of the regionalisation process. At present this happens at different levels. At regional level by RSCs in consultation with RCUs, within CBIs by focal points together with the CBI members, and at national level NES hosting organisations take decisions with platform members. However, both members and secretariat staff expressed their concern about the current decision-making procedures. With the creation of the RSC, decisions started being easily dropped on the plate of the RSC instead of the assembly. This has put more weight to the RSC over the years and has come to the point where an RSC needs to take operational decisions when a regional coordinator is missing in an RCU. The regional assembly runs the risk to become mere information and exchange platforms, with a minor task of strategic decision-making.

21. *Make the Assembly Boss Again.* Taking the former recommendation one step further, members need to take the strategic decisions at regional and sub-regional level. This means that the regional assemblies need to get more weight. For each regional assembly, decisions need to be carefully prepared and special mechanisms of decision-making need to be put in place. The voices of the diversity of members needs to be equally heard (see recommendation 17) and true dialogue between members needs to be facilitated. Based on the decisions taken and agreed focus for the year in the assembly, the RSC receives a clear mandate to represent the assembly for that year, on which they will need to report throughout the year and before the next assembly. The task of the RSC, as a regional cornerstone, should be to guard the regional strategy and fulfil a political role, next to the regional coordinator, in the regional engagement strategy. This means that RSC members should be elected around the strategic and political role they need to play, and less for project management. Geographic representatives and representatives from other network nodes can be included as well as a person responsible for the gender equality focus. Decisions on financing should be made in function of the strategic perspective. Regional planning and budgets for network operations, NES, and regional CBIs (both the thematic working group CBIs and the regional engagement strategy CBIs, see recommendation 7) should be in line with the regional strategy and therefore the regional planning cycle may need to expand from one to three years. Assembly needs to have good insight in how the budget relates to the priorities of the regional strategy (and the regional engagement strategy).

Same principles should apply to the global assembly and the global council. The global assembly


needs to be the place where strategic key issues for the global network are discussed and agreed upon. This gives the council a clear orientation on the direction of the coming years. Council members represent ILC in global political matters, next to the secretariat staff.

The equal position of members within the network and the member-driven orientation of the support structure can bring about conflicts of interests. This is a given, and by being so, this needs to be addressed openly within the network.

22. *Manage Potential Conflicts of Interest Openly*. Develop clear procedures to prevent (real and perceived) conflicts of interest in relation to decisions on funding for the own organisation and the tension between members for holding each other accountable while being equal members in the network. Relevant codes of conduct or a set of good governance rules should be developed for every space where there are interests and money involved. Good governance rules and codes of conduct are culturally sensitive (f.e. what is an accepted way to act when a project proposal of one of the steering committee member is to be discussed and approved), so need to be formulated by each region, for each region. In addition, a mechanism needs to be in place where members can make their complaints or where a whistle-blower can turn to.
23. *Retain a Way-out*. As a consequence, when an emergency arises and the global name and brand of ILC are at stake, ILC needs to have a legal way to intervene. In practice, the party legally responsible for the money has the authority to intervene. However, in the current dynamics of the network this is not always made explicit and situations occur where, for example, a CBI focal point is not easily replaced when malfunctioning. The legal way out in case of an emergency needs to be clear to everyone, as part of the discussion on how potential conflicts of interests are to be managed.

If the ILC network allows for a variety of strategic approaches in regions and sub-regions, the decentralisation of administrative tasks and responsibilities will need to be adjusted accordingly.

24. *Conditions for Decentralisation*. Within regions there are differences in implementing capacity among members, RCUs and RSC members, due to organisational and individual characteristics and experience. The implementation capacity has a direct influence on the responsibility, authority and accountability a region can handle. While at the same time confusion is created in decentralisation processes, if any of these three elements is missing - who is accountable to whom, who should report to whom. Secretariat and RCUs should discuss openly what the mutual expectations and possibilities are and define accordingly what is and what is not decentralised in the region. This decision needs to be revisited regularly, as often capacities grow and thus responsibility, accountability and mandate can grow along. By doing so, each region is accepted to be unique, without being compared to one 'best' region or a particular blueprint. The specific contexts of the regions require flexibility in the regional decentralisation processes.



The best way to give regionalisation a boost, is by decentralising the funding. By being responsible for funding, regions become accountable, which increases their responsibility and gives them authority within the network.

25. Decentralisation of Funding. Link as much as possible the decentralisation process directly to the decentralisation of funding. This refers on the one hand to the current funding received by the secretariat, which is channelled to the members and activities in the region. On the other hand, this refers to additional effort of regional fundraising. Members feel it is time to strategically pursue regional fundraising opportunities. We therefore recommend ILC to make a special effort to strengthen fundraising capacity of (cornerstone) members, RCUs and the network as such. ILC could consider to contract quality fundraisers at RCU level to support members in the preparation of joint project or programme proposals. Members should be allowed to use the global branding in their proposals, as it is both the regional linkages among members as the global branding of the network that create the added value of joint fund raising.

In case there are no possibilities to decentralise funding (e.g. because back-donors are unwilling, or because there is no capacity to raise funds de-centrally), this should be taken into account in any decisions about regionalisation and decentralisation.

A regional fundraising strategy will influence the current funding model of the ILC network. As a consequence ILC needs to seriously start thinking of new funding models of the network, and especially its support structure.

26. Develop Funding Model for Support Structure. Explore different funding models for the support structure of ILC (globally, and in various decentralised nodes) for the longer term. One option is to move to a service provision model, where members pay for specific services related to capacity development or learning. This could be done when proposals are developed by members in which such ILC services are included (see also recommendation 14). A related option would be to borrow elements of a franchise model: members are stimulated to attract funding from donors, and ILC can offer support and the credibility of its brand name, but for a certain cost (similar as suggested for NES, see recommendation 2). Other options include attracting funding for the secretariat to carry out specific services to members (such as capacity development) or to continue to attract core funding for the functioning of the support structures. A final option is a fee-based model, where membership fees are significantly increased. However, for members who have difficulty to attract funding, this could be a challenge and a model that has a relation with funding possibilities of members would be more realistic.

When the recommendation to let go project-type CBIs and to focus ILC funding more on the core activities of ILC (in line with the key mechanisms), and less on implementing projects, the total budget at central level would be different. This would affect most parameters for efficiency (such as staff / operations ratio) and these need to be redefined.

In the regionalisation and decentralisation process it is important to clarify how the regional support structure is to function. Currently, it is not always clear if the RCU is accountable to the RSC or the global secretariat in lines of command, if the RSC is responsible for the well-functioning of the RCU or not, and in what cases the RCU should call in the help of the secretariat or rather the RSC.

27. One Support Structure. We recommend ILC to manage one support structure, where the RCUs function as an extension of the secretariat and vice versa. This means that the global secretariat

is responsible for the well-functioning of the RCUs. This way the tasks of the RSC do not become too heavy and too detailed on operational matters, but keep focus at a strategic and political level. RCUs will have only one boss to respond too. This does not take away that also the RCUs function as a member-driven supporting structure and thus for many actions need the back-up and approval of the members and the RSC in order to be able to move. Important to remember is, that by presenting the support structure as one, RCUs gain mandate to use the global branding of ILC for the political role they need to play at regional level.


An important consequence of the development of ILC into a multi-nodal structure, is the fact that the management of the network does not only lie with the secretariat or the RCUs anymore, but is done by all nodes or cornerstones. So focal points, NES facilitators, hosting organisations, they all take on part of the management the network. Network management is a competency that some know by intuition, while many others need to learn it. Currently, very few people within the network are consciously aware of network or multi-stakeholder platform management models or tools that can help the network become more effective and efficient.

28. Strengthen Cornerstones in Effective Network Management. There is still a lot to gain by only exposing the ILC members in key positions to simple but very effective models and tools on network management (like the Circle of Coherence mentioned in section 3.2. of Annex 1). Most participating ILC members come from hierarchical organisations. Networks work differently and need a different kind of leadership, as they concern shared ambitions among equals. NES facilitators, CBI focal points, RCU staff, regional steering committee members, and secretariat staff can make significantly more effective use of the network at all levels, if they are strengthened in cooperation dynamics within multi-stakeholder contexts. We therefore recommend a well-established capacity strengthening process on the basics of network management for NES facilitators and CBI focal points.

When these recommendations are accepted, it would lead to a network that operates at different levels and with different themes as and when most relevant to accomplish its mission: people-centred land governance. The network would focus on its core business and not on implementing project activities and it would be supported by a single, flexible support structure, located in different places as and where relevant, that is intent to serve the network cornerstones optimally. Funding for the network would be obtained through a healthy mix of income sources that are increasingly decentralised.

Roles of Secretariat

A crucial part of the regionalisation and decentralisation is the role the global secretariat needs to play. The secretariat very consciously has taken on a supporting role towards the network. Many different mechanisms have been put in place, so ILC can function as a member-driven network. Secretariat plays this role very well and should continue doing this. On the other hand, two other roles of the secretariat can use more emphasis.



29. Clarify the Secretariat's Donor Role. As explained in recommendation 27, members need clarity on the lines of command of the support structure. This includes clarity on the lines of accountability. As the global secretariat has the legal mandate to represent the ILC network, final accountability for funding towards donors also lies with the secretariat. The secretariat passes on funding to members through RCUs or directly. It is therefore important to communicate towards the members in what circumstances the secretariat needs to put on the donor hat. This can concern general processes like decision making, reporting or other related communication. Same goes for the RCU as an extension of the secretariat. In relation to the RCUs, the global secretariat needs to carefully discuss which parts of the donor role are for the RCU to manage and which parts for the global secretariat. The importance of this point will decrease to the extent that funding is decentralised.

As shown in the key mechanisms and mentioned in recommendation 19, the global branding of ILC is very important. The secretariat plays an important role in the global branding, which is very much related to the political role the secretariat needs to play.

30. Strengthen the Secretariat's Political Role. The secretariat already takes on this role, for example in critical moments of oppression of indigenous peoples in countries like Guatemala, or in the renewed contacts with La Vía Campesina. However, in representation of the network the secretariat can play an even stronger role and we recommend the secretariat to do so. For example in the engagement of intergovernmental organisations at national level, especially when it comes to IFAD and FAO. Members ask secretariat to make an explicit effort in this sense. Likewise, the engagement with actors like the World Bank, or private sector actors at global level and what such an engagement can mean at national level, is a political task which needs to be done at global level in representation of the network. By doing so, the secretariat can open up collaboration and funding possibilities for global actions, regional strategies, CBIs and NES.

An added value of the ILC network is the possibility to link local level to global level and vice versa. In the context of the growing multi-nodal or cornerstone structure of the network the strategic linking between the different levels and cornerstones becomes a responsibility of the secretariat of increasing importance. At this moment links between NES and CBIs do not function well, while the regional strategy has failed to be an active guide for regional initiatives. Currently, linking happens more by chance than by strategy, particularly between regional and global initiatives.

31. Linking Strategies. The value of linking levels and cornerstones should be maintained and actively strengthened, making strategic use of the NES, the CBIs, the (sub-)regional strategies and related regional engagement strategies (as one of the types of CBI). The secretariat, in consultation with the RCUs, is the only one that has the entire overview of the strategic intentions and needs of the different cornerstones and the strategic needs and possibilities at global level. Linking needs to happen at different levels:

- From NES to CBIs and vice versa
- From NES and CBI to the regional strategy and vice versa
- From regional strategies, CBIs and NES to global CBIs and vice versa

RCUs can play a facilitating role in linking the levels of strategy at regional level and needs to collaborate closely with the secretariat to facilitate the linkages with global CBIs and global actions. Secretariat and RCUs need to provide guiding formats where cornerstones can find

orientation on how to make the linking work and they need to proactively initiate such linkages and exchange between persons.

8 Project or Strategic Thinking


Across the different strategic axes and regions, members experience difficulties to move from project thinking to strategic thinking. Some members have strong backgrounds in implementing programmes and projects and this often qualifies the relation with their funders. Several CBIs also have a history of implementing activities as projects. However, the essence of ILC as a global coalition, is to join forces toward people centred land governance. Strengthening the key mechanisms through which ILC contributes to changes, requires strategic linkages, identifying windows of opportunity and right actors, and reflecting on ever more ways to move toward realising the ten commitments.

One of the reasons for the ubiquity of project-based thinking, is that when concrete interventions are being financed through ILC (both in NES and CBI), their specific value in a network space is not always reflected upon. Rather these interventions are done because they are good projects. They are carried out by whoever can do so best, or implementation is distributed across different members based on geography or influence on decision making. Related to this, the project management procedures of ILC foster a project mentality rather than a strategic thinking mentality.

32. Support Development of Strategic Thinking. Throughout the different network cornerstones, support the skillsets that are required for strategic thinking in networks. This includes combinations of network management and governance, facilitation skills and strategic thinking and development.
33. Stronger Focus on Core Business. In making decisions on what is being financed through ILC, reflect more explicitly on how activities sit in the life of a network; how they function in relation to what the network stands for; how they help to bring the key mechanisms into operation through which ILC contributes to changes in Agendas, Policies and Practices. See also recommendations 2 (on NES) and 9 (on CBI). Particularly when concrete project-like interventions are still being financed through ILC, assure their strategic value to the network.

ANNEX 1

Elaborate Findings and Analysis



Annex 1 Elaborate findings

Mid-Term Review –2016-2021

ILC Strategy

MTR 2016-2021 ILC Strategy

MDF Training & Consultancy

Ede, April 2018

Abbreviations

ALRD	Association for Land Reform and Development (Bangladesh)
CBI	Commitment Based Initiative
CCP	Confederación Campesina del Perú
CODECA	Comité de Desarrollo Campesino (Guatemala)
CONGCOOP	Coordinación de ONG y Cooperativas de Guatemala
CONVEAGRO	Convención Nacional del Agro Peruano
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECADERT	Estrategia Centroamericano de Desarrollo Rural Territorial
GiZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
ILC	International Land Coalition
INGO	International NGO
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MELC	Monitoring, Evaluation, Learning and Communication
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NES	National Engagement Strategy
NRLF	National Land Rights Forum (Nepal)
RCU	Regional Coordination Unit
RSC	Regional Steering Committee
SAA	Secretariat of Agricultural Affairs
TALA	Tanzania Land Alliance

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1. Introduction

The International Land Coalition (ILC) has its current strategic plan from 2016 till 2021. The strategic document is further elaborated in a roadmap document. Important issues addressed in this strategy are the three strategic objectives (connect, mobilise, influence) and the three strategic axes (NES, CBI, MELC) with implementing mechanisms at country, regional and global levels. Furthermore, the strategic plan puts emphasis on roles and responsibilities of members and the various network components and shifts in these roles.

This evaluation is a mid-term review (MTR) that focuses on the following main questions:

1. To what extent have expected results as well as other results been realised? (Chapter 2)
2. To what extent are the various components of the roadmap of ILC helpful (relevant and effective) toward implementation of its strategy? (Chapter 3)
3. What is the capacity, performance and relevance of the various institutional components of ILC? (Chapter 4)
4. To what extent have the interventions (strategies and activities) of ILC and their individual members contributed to outcome results that have been realised and in what ways has this contribution taken place? (Chapter 2, combined with question 1)

The evaluation questions were made operational in concrete issues in an evaluation framework, and translated into a generic interview guide. This was used for interviews with stakeholders at three regional assemblies where the team participated, for interviews with stakeholders in six country studies and with other stakeholders including secretariat staff, other ILC members, external experts and cooperating partners (about 140 interviews in total). In addition, relevant documents were analysed and a workshop with the council was used to gather additional perspectives on key issues.

The six countries were Bangladesh, Nepal, Cameroon, Tanzania, Peru and Guatemala. They were selected by ILC. During the regional assemblies and additional interviews stories and views from many other countries have also been taken into account.

The major framework used to analyse network components, is the Capacity Works model. Capacity Works is developed by GIZ to analyse and strengthen systems for collaboration¹. It includes five major success factors that were derived from analysing successful cases. The factors are strategy, cooperation, steering structure, processes and learning and innovation. They are discussed in Chapter 4.

The major analytical framework used to analyse results is Contribution Analysis combined with evidence databases and identification of mechanisms². This includes the following steps that are

¹ *Cooperation Management for Practitioners - Managing Social Change with Capacity WORKS* (2015). GIZ.
<https://www.giz.de/expertise/html/4620.html>

² These are the references: Astbury, B., & Leeuw, F. L. (2010). Unpacking Black Boxes: Mechanisms and Theory Building in Evaluation. *American Journal of Evaluation*, 31(3), 363–381. Delahais, T., & Toulemonde, J. (2012). Applying contribution analysis: Lessons from five years of practice. *Evaluation*, 18(3), 281–293. Mayne, J. (2001). Addressing attribution through contribution analysis: using

taken on the basis of information from documents, and interviews with stakeholders with internal but particularly also external perspectives: 1) determining the specific change, 2) finding all potential mechanisms and factors that may have contributed to the change, 3) for each of these mechanisms and factors compiling a database of all pieces of evidence, 4) assessing the strength of all pieces of evidence and compiling them to conclude on the contribution of each mechanism and factor, 5) assessing all actual contributing factors and mechanisms and concluding about the relative contribution of the mechanisms of the intervention to the change.

This report presents a brief analysis of the results and contributions in Chapter 2, the main strategies (NES, CBI, MELC) in Chapter 3 and the network components in Chapter 4. Each chapter ends with main considerations and recommendations. The five major issues identified in this MTR are summarized in the executive summary.

2. Results and Contributions of ILC

One purpose of the MTR is to review results. What results have been achieved so far? And are these the intended outputs and outcomes as defined in the results framework or are there also unintended positive or negative effects? ILC has systematically collected information about all intended results. These are used along with additional information, gathered mainly in the six field studies.

Output results answer the question to what extent ILC has been able to fulfil its core objectives Connect, Mobilise and Influence. Outcome results focus on changes in agendas, policies and practices related to people-centred land governance. The question can be raised if these changes did occur as an effect of what ILC has done, or if they are changes that would have happened anyway. Therefore, a major focus of this MTR has been to analyse the specific contribution of ILC to a series of specific changes. These contribution stories will unpack the specific processes and aspects of ILC as a coalition to the selected changes. The contribution analysis can be regarded as an answer to the question how the outputs help to bring about the outcomes.

For each of the three key outcomes, a brief summary of all reported results is presented, followed by concrete examples from the case studies and a discussion of contribution analyses of changes that relate to the outcome. An overview of these contribution analyses is shown below. Elaborate versions of the contribution analyses are included in Annex 2.

Agendas	Cameroon (dialogue), Tanzania (relations), Nepal (6 th amendment), Guatemala (human rights defenders)
Practices	Guatemala (joint implementation), Nepal (joint certificates), Bangladesh (property return)
Policies	Cameroon (policy change), Peru (law repealed), Peru (community laws)
Connect	Cameroon (unity)
Mobilise	Tanzania (capacity)

performance measures sensibly. Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation, 16(1), 1–24. Mayne, John. (2008). Contribution analysis: An approach to exploring cause and effect. ILAC Brief, 16, 1–4.

At the end of this chapter, a summary is given of the major mechanisms through which ILC contributed to positive changes.

2.1 Outcome results

Agendas

Inventory. Changes in the agendas of decision makers often come before changes in policies or practices. One indication is when decision makers engage with NES and CBI platforms and give them a recognized role. Ten NES countries and several CBIs report such recognition with very concrete examples of (series of) meetings with ministries, government commissions, official consultations or hearings where NES platforms are given a position. This happens mostly at national level, but also at lower administrative levels of government.

Examples from the case studies. Cameroon: broad recognition of the NES platform. Minister of lands attended ILC meeting in Dakar and since then asks for many inputs. Tanzania: more acknowledgements of CSOs and their input, even in a context reducing freedom of speech and high allergy for criticism. Togo: government is very active in NES platform and seeks many inputs. Guatemala: less criminalisation of human right defenders because the attorney general has become an ally. Nepal: NES members were more recognized after an international ILC meeting took place in Nepal.

Contribution analysis. The following four paragraphs provide examples where a major (Cameroon, Guatemala) or partial (Tanzania, Nepal) contribution to changes is evident. The annex provides more detail.

In Cameroon, the dialogue between government and other actors around land issues is improved. Several NES-related factors contributed to this change. These include the broadness of the platform and the global nature of ILC. The willingness of ministries as well as government staff on a personal title was also a major contributing factor, as is the fact that dialogue is a broader trend. Without the NES platform this improved dialogue would either not have occurred or would have been much more narrow.

Also in Tanzania, the relationship with the government is improved in a context that is difficult for civil society. The NES platform / TALA contributed to this through organisation of advocacy events as well as through including government in the NES components. However, there are other initiatives that run parallel to NES, either initiated by the government or international donors and INGOs that have also contributed to the strengthened engagement between government and civil society on land issues. It is too early to see real influence on policy or practice.

In Guatemala, the Attorney General has become an ally in the problem of criminalisation of human right defenders and is involved in resolving specific cases. ILC and NES member CODECA played a very important role in this shift by making use of the opportunity offered by a context of anti-corruption processes. The international backup of ILC was also an important contributing factor, along with lesser contributing factors from other agencies.

One of the achievements of NES members in Nepal is the 6th amendment of the Land reform act of 2016, which improves the rights of tenants. Landlords are very influential, and often members of political parties. Thus, the political will and commitment to address this issue is lacking. In this situation, being able to keep the issue on the political agenda is extremely significant in itself. The contribution of individual organisations (NES members) is large and evident. The contribution of the joint NES platform and ILC is more indirect: funding, visibility and strength that comes from being part of a broad network.

Practices

Inventory. Changes in practices of those who are in charge of land related issues could be regarded as following policy change. But while policy change is often slow and messy, concrete changes in practices can take place in the meantime, even if policy changes have not yet occurred. One indication that ILC has an influence on practices, is when ideas for good practices are being used. Two NES countries and four CBIs report concrete examples, mostly of providing technical support, or developing manuals that are then being used.

Examples from the case studies. Cameroon: ideas for land mapping used. Tanzania: demonstrations by CSOs of surveying and titles in rural areas. Togo: contract format for land concessions developed, and female inheritance of land from 15 to 28%. Guatemala: Secretariat of Agricultural Affairs (SAA) implements aspects of information dissemination and conflict resolution through NES platform. Nepal: increased use of joint male/female certificates. Bangladesh: vested property return act faster implemented, resulting in 500k people starting the process to get land returned. Albania: support and concrete examples for municipalities to implement new forest law that recognises user rights.

Contribution analysis. The following three paragraphs provide examples where it is evident that ILC had a major (Guatemala) or an indirect but essential (Nepal, Bangladesh) contribution to changes. The annex provides more detail.

In Nepal, NES members worked on the promotion of Joint Land Ownership Certificate where husband and wife are both owners of the land and they succeeded in accelerating the approval of the legislation and its application. In 2010 one member (NRLF) organised a big demonstration in Kathmandu to promote joint land ownership and advocated with the government to accord tax rebates on Joint Land Ownership certificates. NES members continued to promote joint ownership in the provinces in various ways. In 2015 NES members conducted a joint study that illustrated the progress made since 2010. In this story, organisations had a major contribution and the joint NES platform and ILC had an indirect contribution through funding, visibility and an international name.

In Bangladesh, the Vested Property Return Act of 2001 (granting land rights back to 1.2M Hindu families) is implemented faster and the Land Ministry has given an order to districts to implement directly. ALRD has addressed this issue for a long time, and realised some changes in policies, but not in implementation. The NES process, providing ALRD a broader platform, a broader voice, and international linkages, has increased legitimacy and credibility of ALRD in this process and this

contributed to accelerated implementation of the return of property, such that 500,000 people have now entered the necessary legal process. The contribution of ALRD is major, that of ILC is secondary but certainly positive.

In Guatemala, the government, through the Secretariat of Agricultural Affairs, acknowledges the NES platform as an important counterpart in the dialogues on agrarian policies and committed itself to implement relevant aspects (e.g. dissemination of information and resolution of conflicts) in collaboration with the NES platform. The NES platform, under leadership of CONGCOOP had a major influence on achieving this collaboration by working on both sides (governments and constituency based organisations). The international status and presence of ILC as a broker for this agreement was also an important contribution. The openness of the SAA itself contributed to the change too.

Policies

Inventory. Ten NES countries report positive changes in legislation on land issues. Sometimes, draft recommendations of the NES platform were accepted (Madagascar), sometimes a review of existing legislation were done that led (or will lead) to positive changes (Malawi, Philippines, Indonesia), sometimes implementation agreements were reached (DRC) or land use plans agreed at lower administrative levels (Kenya). Five CBIs also report positive changes in policy that they contributed to, such as more attention for gender (Burundi) and assistance in revisions and reviews of bills (India) on the specific themes addressed by the CBIs.

Examples from the case studies. Cameroon: clear signs of influence on the draft land bill. Peru: repeal of law DL1333 which leads to some more community influence on land issues, and positive gender changes in community laws in some areas. Nepal: amendment in land bill accepted that recognises tenant rights. Bangladesh: customary land rights and dispute settlement improved for Chittagong Hill Tract people.

Contribution analysis. The following three paragraphs provide examples where a major (Cameroon) or partial (Nepal, Peru) contribution to changes is evident. The annex provides more detail.

In Cameroon, there are examples of influence on the development of a new land bill. The improved unity and improved dialogue with the government (see above) contributed to this. There is sufficient evidence of real influence on the land reform process: the current ideas of the government have shifted and inputs are frequently requested, even though more change is needed. This takes place in a context of land reform, and the final extent of influence will only be evident when the new land bill and/or policy is published.

In Peru, a law (DL1333) that negatively affected community influence on land governance was repealed. The main actor in this change has been Pacto Unidad. They are recognized and influential. CCP is a member both of Pacto Unidad and the NES platform, and through this bridge, other NES members joined in this lobby, mainly by offering technical support, such as monitoring studies. In conclusion, the contribution of ILC (through the NES platform) has been secondary: strengthening an existing network and making its lobby effort more effective and successful.

Also in Peru, in ten communities in Ayacucho, local regulation is changed to allow more influence of women. The NES platform included this as one of its major objectives, and financed this as a pilot project. This is a major facilitating contribution, although the implementation was mainly done by one member. The successfulness of the approach is seen in the fact that other organisations replicate the approach.

2.2 Output results

Connect

Inventory. Connecting of ILC members to each other is indicated by 29 joint work plans and 24 campaigns, consultations and other joint initiatives. NES countries and CBI platforms report large numbers of different types of ILC members being involved. Connecting also refers to connecting members with other actors. Eleven NES countries report various types of non ILC members that engage in the activities. In most countries several tens of other organisations are mentioned, often government institutions, multilateral or donor organisations, in some cases research institutions, and in most countries also local level leadership (administrative and traditional), community-based organisations or committees and constituency-based organisations. CBIs report similar constellations of types of actors. Private sector actors are not specifically mentioned in this inventory.

Contribution analysis. The following paragraph provides an examples where ILC had a major contribution to improved connections between civil society. The annex provides more detail.

In Cameroon, civil society is more united and speaks more with one voice on land issues. The NES process, initiated and funded by ILC, has been a major and necessary factor to move a very diversified civil society toward more unity in a manner that is attested by internal and external stakeholders³. The explicit demand from the government for more unification has been another major factor, but this (as well as the existing connections between organisations) would not have been sufficient to create the current platform to voice joint concerns and positions.

Several other contribution analyses also showed that outcome results are often related to connecting organisations. For example, in the NES Guatemala, for the first time in history did indigenous and women organisations come together, respecting each other's views.

Mobilise

Inventory. Mobilising refers to the sharing of ideas and knowledge, such as innovations and good practices, but also to capacity development and learning. The first aspect is indicated by the development of 160 knowledge products such as documented good practices, studies, reports, books, tools, manuals, declarations, proceedings and papers and by 51 media expressions such as videos, radio interviews, bulletins and press releases. The second aspect of mobilising is indicated

³ The field study also identified tensions between NES facilitator and hosting organisations (see chapter about NES). After the field study this tension led to non-renewal of the contract of the NES facilitator. This will probably lead to stronger involvement of the host organisations, exit of a number of organisations, and inclusion of a few important organisations who had not yet joined the platform. It is expected that the increased togetherness of civil society on land issues will not be undone.

by 103 learning events, trainings, exchanges and joint missions with over 3,000 participants from 174 organisations.

Contribution analysis. The following paragraph provides an example where ILC offered a major contribution to capacity development. The annex provides more detail.

In Tanzania, TALA as a platform has been strengthened. Despite the fact that TALA already existed, it was dormant and the funding by ILC has been a major and vital factor in strengthening TALA in its role as Land Platform and Network. On top of that, related to ILC, are the INGOs/ILC members who have taken up a supporting role: Oxfam, Care and Maliasili have engaged TALA in various forms, which has contributed to its current form. Though it is still too early to see subsequent results (strength in convening power and influence) the structures and direction of TALA are taking more shape. Through ILC's contribution, other donors (e.g. Danida) have also started to gain confidence and have started to support.

Influence

Inventory. In ILCs Theory of Change connecting and mobilising are followed by influencing. This includes joint advocacy which is done in many NES and CBIs, indicated by 33 position and policy papers, reviews and reports. A second aspect of influencing is making the voices of land users heard and recognized. This is indicated by 35 events where this happened, including campaigns and consultations. The third aspect of influencing focuses specifically on the use of data and monitoring activities as a basis for concrete influencing. This includes global initiatives such as LandMatrix, development of national databases (Philippines, Indonesia, Ecuador, Nicaragua) or land observatories (six), or local level surveys or mapping exercises in relation to conflict or land deals (in ten countries).

2.3 Key mechanisms

A detailed analysis of the manner in which ILC contributed to positive changes reveals the major mechanisms through which this takes place. These are mechanisms 'of' the ILC. The acting subject of these mechanisms is in some cases the network as a whole, in some cases individual or joint members and in some cases the support structures (secretariat and regional coordination units) or governance structures (regional steering committees, council). Some mechanisms are a conscious effort, while other mechanisms just happen without deliberate effort. The mechanisms include the following:

1. Increasing the legitimacy of the voice of civil society by facilitating joint spaces that enable joint statements and voices that represent more than single organisations do.
2. Increasing credibility of members or national platforms through the international brand. This mechanism works two ways: internally to members by increasing self-confidence of members (being part of a bigger whole) and externally to governments or other actors by increasing the profile of the organisation(s). An example of this mechanisms is when international events are held in a country or when officials are invited to attend international meetings elsewhere.

3. Direct facilitation by providing financial resources (obtained from back-donors) that make actions possible. Sometimes this initiates new (pilot) activities and sometimes it helps continue or expand existing activities. The mechanism of providing linkages, guarantees or backup for raising financial resources occurs much less.
4. Facilitating spaces. By developing spaces at regional, national, and thematic levels, various actors (members and non-members) come together, which contributes to creative processes, dissemination of ideas, learning, and consensus building. This also includes the stimulus to include a wider variety of stakeholders than most organisations initially plan to. For several organisations, this entails a shift from mainly bilateral relations to multilateral relations. Part of this mechanism is also persuasion to overcome resistance to constructive dialogue among members.
5. Linking local to global and back. This happens by facilitating members (and sometimes non-members) to tell their story at wider levels of scale, digitally or in person, and by making global information locally available. This contributes to a wider knowledge base being available to a wider audience.
6. Providing technical, strategic, organisational or institutional support that contributes to more capacity or higher quality of activities or strategies of individual or joint members or network bodies. This, in turn, contributes to stronger mutual acceptance among members (perceiving more value in others) as well as stronger credibility among other actors.
7. Direct negotiation and brokering. In some cases, ILC representatives from outside the direct situation play a direct role in negotiating with various actors, or in brokering a specific agreement. A more indirect form of this mechanism is where government officials participate in regional or global ILC events.
8. Increased credibility and leverage through international members of ILC. This mechanism relates to the specific role international ILC members can play. When they are part of a NES platform, or backup other ILC members' activities, or when they lend their voice, network and influence it has a positive effect, particularly when such international members are also donors of governments.
9. Co-implementation and co-creation. Particularly in lobby processes, ILC support staff (of secretariat or RCU) sometimes help catch political opportunities to speak the right word, make the right connection, introduce the right people. This requires being close to the national and regional networks and always being aware of their strategic direction, as well as political sensitivity at all times.

Apart from these operating mechanisms that derive from in-depth analyses of processes through which ILC contributes to outcomes, ILC has also developed specific delivery mechanisms in its roadmap document for each of its three strategic objectives connect, mobilise and influence. These delivery mechanisms are being used in practice and continue to be added to and reference is made to this document.

3. ILC Strategy Processes

3.1 NES approach

Each NES has different characteristics and features. In the box below, we provide a simplified overview of the characteristics identified in the countries visited by the MTR. These include key features such as the number and type of members, the type of NES facilitator, the engagement with the government and the private sector.

Overview of the 6 NES

Cameroon 300 members Dedicated facilitator, independent ⁴ Multi-stakeholder platform Government very engaged. Government officials part of NES structures on personal basis. No engagement of private sector	Tanzania 7 members Dedicated facilitator Multi stakeholders platform Good engagement with government Some engagement of private sector
Nepal 6 members No dedicated facilitator ⁵ , works for CSRC ILC members with broad engagement with various stakeholders Government very engaged No engagement with private sector	Bangladesh 4 Members ILC members and non ILC members. Broad engagement Good engagement with government
Guatemala 6 members Few types of stakeholders, all constituency-based organisations except for the hosting organisation Mix of ILC members and non ILC members. Government is engaged No engagement with the private sector	Peru Few types of stakeholders but work well in collaboration with other platform Improved engagement with Government Engagement with the private sector

Relevance and Effectiveness of NES

Overall, NES appears to be very relevant: it takes a horizontal approach, creating an enabling space in which actors come together for land-related purposes and working toward people-centred land governance. This makes use of the specific added-value of a global network: space, connections, ideas, linkages between national, regional, global; while leaving themes open. This approach is implemented successfully in the four regions. At the same time, NES adapt to their own context and there are substantial differences among countries. For example, NES size varies

⁴ But after the field study it became clear that his contract would not be continued.

⁵ This was at the time of the field study. At the moment of finalising the report there is a dedicated NES facilitator

greatly: 6 members in Nepal, 45 members in Togo, and 300 members in Cameroon. Different types of actors can be involved in the NES: CSO, government, the private sector, Intergovernmental Organisations, etc.

The MTR identified a variety of situations that influence and potentially shape the type of NES platform that is established in the country. Responding to these situations requires strategic choices. Below we provide an overview of some possible situations and choices.

Choices and Options	Considerations and Assessment
If there is a civil society land alliance: how to relate to it?	
Identify NES platform with land alliance	This is a good option if the land alliance already has sufficient representation and legitimacy. NES would act more as process than as (new) platform. New members would become member of the land alliance (and thereby de facto of the NES platform). Consequence: this would restrict NES platform to existing conditions of the land alliance (and likely only to civil society members). Advantage: no confusion about multiple (and half-overlapping) platforms, and high ownership of the land alliance and therefore possibly more sustainable if the land alliance works well. For all countries where existing land alliances are involved, this option could be considered. It should also be considered not to use the name “NES platform” but simply the name of the land alliance. In situations where ILC mainly works with civil society in a certain region (e.g. Ecuador), this option could still work by identifying the “NES platform” as a regional department of the existing national land alliance or network.
Land alliance as facilitator of NES platform	This happens in many countries. Within this option, there are two possibilities: a) the NES platform is also only made up of civil society organisations: Organisations can be member of the NES platform with or without being part of the land alliance. This provides opportunities for engagement to others without binding them to the conditions of the land alliance. The disadvantage is the proliferation of (half overlapping) networks, both exclusively civil society, which is possibly confusing for others (do you speak with the land alliance or with the NES platform?). In this situation the NES platform is still dependent on the vibrancy of the land alliance and its fate likely correlates with it (Uganda). ILC should avoid this situation and could attempt to develop it into either the previous option, or the b) option below b) the NES platform is a multi-stakeholder platform, made up of different types of actors (including for example government,

Choices and Options	Considerations and Assessment
	private sectors service providers, traditional leaders), many of whom cannot become member of the (civil society) alliance. In this situation there is less confusion between the platforms, and the land alliance can use it to engage with this wider set of stakeholders. Alternatively, one of the other types of stakeholders could be the facilitator (e.g. Togo).
Start parallel platform with or without land alliance	Completely parallel would contribute to proliferation of parallel platforms and should be the very last option. This could be needed in situations where the existing land alliance is completely dysfunctional or politicised. Starting a broad platform of which a non-functional land alliance is a member would be preferable and could develop into one of the previous options. ILC rightly avoids this option.
In situations where there is no existing land alliance, the major question is if a NES platform consists of civil society actors who then engage with other types of actors, or a platform with multiple types of actors (MSP, Multi-stakeholder platform) as described in the NES manual. See the next choice.	
If there is a multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) on land (e.g. initiated by government, sometimes in relation to the VGGT): how to relate to it?	
Identify NES platform with it	This could be a possibility when the existing MSP is open and free. In several situations however (e.g. South Africa), the platform is considered biased and dominated by a certain type of actor (e.g. private sector lobby). In such cases it could undermine credibility of organisations (and of ILC) to identify with it.
Separate NES platform for civil society to prepare engagement in MSP	In this case the NES platform itself refers to (mainly) civil society (see also the previous choice and related options), and NES as a process would focus on how to engage in the best way in the MSP (and with the other types of actors in bilateral engagements).
No engagement with MSP or develop a parallel MSP	Developing a parallel MSP does not seem desirable not feasible. In most situations it would be better to engage with members and see in what way engaging in the MSP could contribute to the ten commitments. Alternatively, engagements could be done on a bilateral basis, but even then the focus could be to work toward engagement in a multi-stakeholder setting.
This choice and the previous interact with each other. Where there is neither existing land alliance nor existing MSP (e.g. Togo, Albania), NES has most freedom in making choices. In such situations the NES platform could be identified with an MSP (since it is not yet biased), where also the civil society actors have their own discussion platform to prepare their engagement. This is the case in Togo.	

Choices and Options	Considerations and Assessment
Position of NES facilitator	
This choice interacts with the first choice above (on relation of NES to existing land alliance)	
NES facilitator is staff of a member organisation which is not a land alliance or network.	This keeps the accountability of the NES facilitator clear, but there are several disadvantages: 1) s/he may be claimed for other activities of the hosting organisation, even if s/he should work full time for NES. 2) The NES platform may be considered to be co-opted by a single organisation, particularly when there is much suspicion between organisations and when the hosting organisation is not necessarily a leading agency on land issues or does not have broad legitimacy and recognition (since it is not a network or alliance). Accountability to (representatives of) other members of the NES platform will need additional attention. In situations where there is a land alliance, it is preferable if the NES facilitator is part of that organisation (see next option).
NES facilitator is staff of a member organisation which is a land alliance or network.	In line with the suggestion above that it is a good option to identify the NES platform with the land alliance insofar it represents civil society, it follows logically that it is a good option if the NES facilitator is part of this organisation. The issues of legitimacy, and the suspicions of undue influence of a single organisation are less relevant, since this land alliance or network will always already have to work on its legitimacy among members.
NES facilitator is independent of any organisation	In practice, even when a NES facilitator is independent, has her/his own office, contractual and legal s/he will be hosted by an organisation. And in the only country where this situation was seen (Cameroon), it did not work out well, even though this situation did manage to avoid the disadvantages of the first option above (namely the perception of being co-opted by a single organisation, see the contribution analyses of Cameroon). Given the disadvantages, this option should not be preferred. However, this could change when NES platforms change from majority civil society to real MSPs (see above), and when such independence would be a condition for further development of the platform.
Irrespective of the position of the NES facilitator, there is a choice if the NES facilitator is a full time position. In any case, the advantages of having a full time, dedicated position or such that it is preferable to having a part-time position. When a full time position is provided for, the accountability of the facilitator's work is also much easier.	

Choices and Options	Considerations and Assessment
Personality of NES facilitator	
Experienced and senior	Has the experience and recognition to engage in policy dialogue and lobbying, but could become too independent and dominant. Lobby could also be done too independently of members, making the relations and the influence less sustainable (cf. Cameroon), and thereby not using the strengths and the breadth of members optimally. This option seems to work better when the seniority of the facilitator is focused more on facilitation and less on lobby and advocacy: serving the members to engage with each other and with other actors. When the NES platform is or becomes a multi-stakeholder platform (e.g. Togo), more seniority would be needed to gain the trust of all actors, even for facilitation roles. When this option is chosen, the most important aspect is to ensure a facilitation attitude as opposed to an implementation attitude, and a deep realisation that the members represent the real value of the platform.
Young but dynamic	Is able to bring NES members together and facilitate dialogue among members. The lower profile of the person ensures that members play key roles in lobby processes. S/he may also be perceived as less threatening, since s/he does not assume any authority.
The choice between experienced and senior or young and dynamic would depend on context. But even in contexts where authority in front of groups is expected, it may be wise to bring a new dynamic and go against this expectation. It could be wise to develop a total range of competencies required for a NES process, some of which could be fulfilled by the facilitator, and others by specific NES members (for example those in specific committees).	
Number of members of NES platform	
Depth. NES composed by a small, but very engaged core number of organisations	Members can be ILC members or also other, but in this option the NES platform is usually restricted to civil society. This usually leads to active participation and taking up of responsibilities (for example in Ecuador, Bangladesh). The risk would be that the platform contents itself to engage only with civil society, or to focus on implementation of certain activities, rather than on engaging other actors, and developing a strategic, transformative agenda. A small group of dedicated civil society members can be a good starting point, if they have broad recognition and legitimacy. If this is not the case, broadening its base should be given high priority.
Breadth. NES is a large coalition, preference is given	Size can increase credibility and legitimacy. Often there will be an active core and a more inactive periphery. There will easily be a

Choices and Options	Considerations and Assessment
to increasing the number of members, but not all members are active	freerider problem and differences in expectation, especially when money is involved. Numbers of membership should not be goal, and legitimacy should not be equated with numbers. In countries with broad NES platforms it could be good to develop criteria for membership and procedures to reduce inactive members or members who have no added value (even not in increasing legitimacy).
Role of government organisations	
Members	Government becomes co-responsible for solving land issues; members may conform to governmental pace and limits of action. The strength is that such constructive role for government helps best to take them along. The risk is that government may be too dominant or may drive the agenda in the wrong direction (i.e. away from the ten commitments). However, the natural tendency of many NGOs may be to exclude government too easily, or to regard them only as lobby targets, and therefore, this option should not be disregarded too easily. It is a strength of NES that this option exists.
Members on personal title	Government officials become an ally in lobbying the broader government. This happens in several countries (e.g. Cameroon) and could be a good option if the previous option is not possible.
Only lobby target	Often, this is the practice where the NES platform consists of only civil society actors. While it is often evident that the government is a lobby target, government staff themselves are sometimes allergic to this attitude, and feels their constructive ideas are not regarded, or that their responsibility (namely to develop policies) is taken away (for example when too specific inputs for policies are provided). It would be good if NES platforms would attempt to go beyond this stage.
Role of private sector: investors, multi-national, farming corporations, any other business or service supplier to businesses that is relevant to land and land use.	
Attempt to involve in NES platform	It is obvious (and explicit in the NES manual) that private sector actors need to be engaged with, but this is one of the biggest difficulties of NES platforms so far. Membership of NES platforms is often not wanted by both sides (current, mostly civil society members of NES platforms, and private sector actors). Only with service providers to private sector, e.g. chamber of commerce, land meters and cadastres, this has proven possible. There are some good examples of constructive engagement directly with

Choices and Options	Considerations and Assessment
	companies. Individual NGOs could be helped to further understand a differentiation of roles, where they could keep a more activist ‘watchdog’ type role (possibly mostly antagonistic) while the NES platform (of which they are a member) would open the possibility for more constructive engagement and dialogue.
Only lobby target	This is mostly the situation. But even then, many NES platforms have difficulty even to reach private sector actors, because they mainly come from other sectors and from both sides a wide gap is experienced.
Role of non ILC members of civil society	
No difference with ILC members	The strategy of the NES platform determines roles played. In practice, when an organisation joins a NES platform, this sometimes leads to becoming an ILC member, but this is and should not be the focus. This option is always better than the option where ILC members have more authority or access to funding.
ILC members as leading organisations, others more secondary role	This can be a starting point. When the situation is continued, for example in order to ensure preferential access to funding, it detracts from the idea of a NES platform. If ILC members continue to have a leading function, simply because they are natural leaders (for example, when they are a land alliance or network, see above), this is not a problem.
Role of intergovernmental organisations (especially those who are ILC member)	
Member	It could be expected that those IGOs that are members of ILC (e.g. IFAD, FAO) would join the NES platform in a country. In practice this hardly happens (no examples found in this evaluation, even where relations were constructive). When at the global level, they are members of ILC, more emphasis should be given to involve them in the NES platforms.
External, but request backup and / or funding	When membership of IGOs for some reason is not feasible, this option would be second. IGOs could be approached for funding of concrete actions (of the NES platform, or of specific members individually or jointly with a lead agency), or for joining hands in lobbying other actors (such as the government). These ways of engagement are being explored and have already led to added value (e.g. Kenya, Guatemala).
No connection, or only lobby target	In case actions of the intergovernmental organisation are contrary to the objectives of the NES. Where this is the case, more use could be made of their being a member of ILC at global level (and therefore having committed to the ten commitments)

One important issue is the concept of multi-stakeholder platform. The NES manual describes six types of actors relevant to land issues and presents the ideal of a platform where all six are involved. In practice, most NES platforms have only two or three of these types (mostly NGOs, land users, research). The concept and structure of a multi-stakeholder platform is defined loosely in order to ensure that each NES can adapt to its specific context. This flexibility is well suited to fit the specific country contexts. There is some confusion around the definition of a multi-stakeholder platform and to what extent all types of actors should be members of a NES platform. In any case, it seems relevant to have a group of like-minded actors around land issues (mostly civil society, sometimes also land users and / or research or INGOs), but also a broad MSP, ideally with all six actor types (also government, IGOs, private sector / investors). The word “NES platform” sometimes refers to the smaller platform (ideally with a NES process that helps to relate to the remaining actors), and sometimes to the broader MSP.

In general, there is a tension between the willingness and the need for the network to be inclusive and the need for the network to function well and to be effective. NES have been created in different moments and members have a different degree of experience in working together. This is the case in India, where NES members need to consolidate their relationship and learn how to work together first before they will be able to expand and collaborate with external organisations. In other situations, the NES have been able to interact successfully with external actors (non-ILC members). In Peru, the collaboration of the NES with a large representing organisation of agribusinesses enabled the NES to find a place in agenda setting and formulation of law regulations. The benefits of this new dynamic are becoming evident.

The engagement with other types of actors is more varied and a bit more controversial. For example, the engagement of governments with the NES varies greatly. In some countries, such as in Nicaragua, NES members struggle to access, and influence members of the government, while in Cameroon, government officials participate in NES structures on a personal basis. In Africa, there is a discussion on what is the appropriate nature of the involvement of the government in the NES. In Asia, the government is not part of the NES but there is a close collaboration and NES members are successful in accessing government and in lobbying for policy change. The case of Nepal and Bangladesh are good examples of how members have become increasingly able to play a role and influence the government.

The engagement of the NES with intergovernmental organisations is uneven. In Africa, good synergies have been created, while in Asia the interaction is limited. At the country and regional level, the scarce engagement with these organisations results in missed fundraising opportunities. For example, in Guatemala, both FAO and the NES work with the Secretary of Agricultural Affairs and there is a scope for the two organisations to increase synergies and complementarities. A separate case is the engagement with the World Bank. In most regions, NES and ILC members are hesitant in engaging with the World Bank and often feel that the Bank approach is incompatible with their own work. This is not an issue, per se, at the country level. Nonetheless, it is something to keep in mind at the regional and global level, and in relation to complementarities and synergies of advocacy efforts conducted at the different levels.

A common challenge for NES is how to engage with the private sector. In many cases, the private sector is considered part of the problem members try to address. Thus, some members feel that it is not appropriate to engage with them. In other cases, members recognise the importance to engage with the private sector but have not yet found an appropriate strategy for this. This is a crucial issue, and most likely will become increasingly important in the coming years.

The channelling of funds through the NES is very important for the members but at the same time, this creates a double role for the NES: a platform for strategic thinking, and, at the same time, a channel for the distribution of activity-based funds. In some cases, the passage from project-based thinking to strategic thinking in the NES has been quite challenging. The competition over resources for the implementation of activities channelled through the NES lead to reluctance in opening up the NES platform to new members. If not managed, this tension may hinder the ultimate objective of the NES.

3.2 CBI approach

Currently ILC's CBIs include a variety of topics and forms, due to their history and nature. In total at global level, with the potential to link to global advocacy,⁷ CBIs, covering 5 commitments, are being implemented. At regional level 23 CBIs are distributed over three regions: Asia manages 7, Latin America and Caribbean 9, and Africa 8 CBIs. Some coincide with the global CBIs, others are a response to a regional matter. Same goes for the global CBIs: a number of them link up to the regional CBIs, others are unique in their purpose. Annex 3 shows the current list of CBIs as used for this MTR.

All CBIs show their relevance to the work of the ILC network and for the strategy. The strong points of CBIs are that they have the force to address one issue in a focused manner to the highest political level and can work across all levels - from national to global and back. CBIs are highly appreciated by members as a place where they can connect to each other across borders and beyond their own network. Exchange of practices, experiences and ideas are effectively taking place (Connect). Members are strengthened; they receive new information, gain insight in particular situations, and learn new skills (Mobilise). Information is officially published for member's use and links are established with other influential networks. Ground is prepared for the third output area- Influence. Results in this area are uneven. Some CBIs have clearly achieved results here, others have only recently started with this part of the implementation phase. The same goes for the contribution of CBIs to changes in agendas, practices and policies. The larger, older CBIs indeed show effect, such as Rangelands in the different regions, Kilimanjaro initiative, Land Mark, while the others in majority are too young to claim lasting change yet. Furthermore, the special position of regional CBIs as connector between NES platforms makes it more difficult to report on changes in agendas, practices and policies, as they are often indirectly involved in national level changes. CBIs directly focused on regional and global change, like the CBIs targeting ECADERT or the African Union, do (start to) show change, such as the inclusion of ILC topics in the agendas of regional political spaces.

Thus, while CBIs are very effective in connecting, CBIs still have lot to gain in the contribution to change. On the one hand, the limited change caused by CBIs has to do with the way CBIs are perceived by the members, how they are planned and implemented, and how they link up with NES. On the other hand, the CBIs perceived as the most effective ones, are the (large) ones with access to additional funding possibilities. We will further elaborate on these reasons below. In efficiency, CBIs are gaining experience. Administration and communication are identified by both the members (interviews) and the secretariat (learning note) as crucial elements to work on, in order to improve the current pace of administrative processes and implementation of activities.

In the following subsections the main points - the purpose of CBIs, how they fit in the global network and how they can be used for a major effect - are presented in detail.

Why CBIs?

Members manifest a high appreciation for the CBIs. The CBI is the place where members meet across borders and existing networks. CBIs, in that sense, work well in connecting people. Organisations that do not form part of any NES platform, have a place to be active within ILC. Certain CBIs are extremely successful in connecting members, and have achieved results beyond expectations, like the global Family Farming Initiative. In this initiative, connections are made with organisations that formerly have been difficult to relate to for political reasons (e.g. Vía Campesina).

Confusion on CBI's purpose

In many regional CBIs the exchange of information is a common action taking place, be it through shared research results on the same topic, or surveys done across countries. The exchange has proven to many members how valuable the regional connections are. The challenge is to translate these data and comparisons into adequate action at national and regional level for change in agendas, practices and policies. CBIs represent one of the two main modalities to implement ILC's strategy, therefore it needs to be clear how they then can be used by the network.

There seems to be a mixed understanding among members on the role of the CBIs. A number of CBIs, especially those at regional level, function as 'regional thematic ILC projects'. Individual members form part of a CBI and join in the project by implementing activities. The activities ideally were jointly defined by all members of the CBI, at an earlier stage. The members join a physical meeting during the annual regional event and keep in contact over the year for the implementation. The focal point is in charge of the management of the CBI, which means the coordination and administration, and are accountable for the project. Other CBIs function as a coordination unit for data collection (Land Matrix). And some CBIs engage members and actors around a lobby target (ECADERT, African Union). In the variety of CBIs the added value of the CBI as a network modality of working is sometimes lost.

ILC Secretariat has made a lot of effort to guide members in thinking of CBIs as a strategic tool in reaching changes in agendas, practices, and policies. Just as in NES platforms, members struggle to make the shift from project to strategic thinking. This fundamental switch asks them to go beyond their current knowledge and experience. They need to create new capacity and

experiences in line with the strategic needs. It's about engaging the right actors to make a change in a thematic area or to target established power relations or to set-up data generation, rather than implementing a project. LAC region is slowly making the shift. Members talk about it, the RCU orients focal points, and proposals are formulated along the new line of thinking. In Asia and Africa this is still less obvious.

Related to this shift are the constraints around coordination and administration. There is a tension between the strategic thinking and the way CBIs are managed. Many focal points still coordinate the CBIs as projects. There are situations where focal points take decisions on their own, execute many activities themselves and invite other CBI members only for a particular event. Coordination of a network asks for special skills, such as clear communication through different channels, stimulating equal participation, and facilitating elaborate decision making processes. LAC region created support groups in each CBI and Africa reference groups, as a response. Time will have to show if these measures are enough to make stranding CBIs move. As for administration focal points encounter difficulties in matching the strategy thinking with the project oriented ILC formats. Procedures are complex and financial management is very time consuming. RCUs and secretariat are trying to find ways to solve these issues. Formats and procedures are simplified at this very moment of writing. If recommendations on MELC are accepted, such as more open reporting (see section 3.3), working procedures will become easier to apply.

'Successful' CBIs

At the same time, some CBIs are perceived by members as extremely successful in implementation, because they have grown in capacity, funding and effect (Land Mark, Land Matrix, Rangelands Africa). In most cases these CBIs are run by global CSOs with major capacity (for strategic focus and administration), concern global data collection mechanisms serving a wide public, or cover popular development issues like rangelands in Africa. Large donors or other organisations join the action and these CBIs experience a rapid expansion and become a programme and in some cases even an entity on their own. ILC added value is very clear in the financing of initiatives that would not have existed without the network. Some of them have become (in part) appealing to other donors once they were running, others were not. The 'success' depends on the topic and the managing capacity. In many cases the lack of 'success' has to do with the fact that their objective is not popular as they challenge the status quo of power relations (be it culturally or politically). It is therefore important to understand that what can be seen by members or other donors as successful CBIs, for ILC often are not the ones to put the focus on. In the case of the 'successful' ones, ILC may look at them as CBIs that have (partly) matured and can be let go of; they can manage on their own, may it be for only the part that is financed by others.

Added value

The real added value of the CBIs- which is clearly present - is in creating space, facilitating exchange, learning, inspiration, expertise, offering support in elaborating the ideas, providing seed money for testing, piloting and dissemination, and possibly coaching of successful pilots in

reaching autonomy including providing linkages to other resources - but all theme related. This is confirmed by the key mechanisms identified in the contribution analysis. It's about engaging members throughout different levels of operation with the intent to deepen the understanding, capacity and strength on a specific topic. Where NES provide a horizontal approach of strategically connecting actors across different themes, CBIs provide a more vertical approach of connecting for in-depth thematic strengthening. CBIs may be seen as thematic working groups where strategic connecting, mobilising and influencing takes place.

Thus, the moment thematic working groups are turning into implementing programmes, ILC may consider to declare them independent, or in part, as the maturing may occur in a specific area represented in the CBI. This moment can be seen as a moment for celebration. For example, ILC can still 'claim' its contribution to the initial stages of the Rangelands Initiative, and can continue to offer spaces to connect and scale up or support in specific areas (according to the above mentioned criteria) where other donors don't. However, as a whole it can be considered as an independent programme. This is a matter of communication rather than strategy. Independent CBIs are not to be sent away, as they are crucial for information flows or connection to other ILC initiatives, but they very well can form part of the network, or the CBI for that matter, as a partnering entity or a special kind of member.

This change in communication is supported by the fact that ILC does not finance large amounts for average project activities, but supports strategic connecting, mobilising and influencing actions with relatively small financial incentives.

Enhancing CBI's effectiveness

Next to the clarity on the purpose of CBIs, also the effectiveness of CBIs is not yet reaching its full potential. Areas where ILC may consider some extra efforts are the embedding of the CBIs in the different strategic levels of operation and the practical management of CBIs.

Interlinking strategic levels

Linking with NES. One of the official criteria of a CBI is that National Engagement Strategies should serve as a starting point for developing CBIs across countries. CBIs ideally tackle issues emerging from NES. In practice this only partially happens. Indeed, CBIs touch upon crucial issues in countries: they are linked to the 10 commitments, which are relevant to all countries in one way or another. And of course NES platforms are working on topics touched upon within the CBIs. However, members currently join CBIs because of 'personal' interest and do not consciously feed back into the NES what takes place or what was learned in the CBIs. This happens in all regions. Some say this is due to the fact that CBIs serve as connecting ground for all members, including those that are not part of any NES. Others say they work with the commitments integrated in their NES and therefore don't address CBIs in particular. Nevertheless, if CBIs actually provide a deepening of understanding, a valuable exchange, and therefore strengthening of members and NES platforms, CBIs can be very valuable to participate in for a NES, through clear representation of one its members. Reality shows this is not the case yet in many and maybe most CBIs. Members expressed frustration about CBIs being more paper work than actual change boosting platforms. Aiming for a conscious strategic connection between the NES and the CBI and vice

versa, can boost both more effective functioning of both: NES and CBI. In addition, such a connection would give the CBI a direct link to changes in agendas, practices and policies taking place at national level.

Linking with regional political agendas. In the LAC region members talk frequently about the need of a regional political strategy: what 'change' is it ILC aims for in Latin America and the Caribbean? In the LAC region several members, especially those involved in the steering committee and in the management of CBIs, repeatedly asked this question. They feel the current regional strategy is more a result of the sum of parts (NES platforms, CBIs and regional actions of the RCU/Steering Committee) than a well defined, jointly established common direction among members, aiming for change in power relations at regional level. A particular CBI on ECADERT in part focuses on this regional advocacy potential of ILC. As in Africa a CBI was created to trigger changes in agendas, practices, and policies at the African Union. However, both Africa and LAC members feel there is more to gain in the union of members at regional level (see also Chapter 4.1) and ask the question who is officially in charge across the board of the implementation of the regional lobby strategy?

Both regional assemblies and CBIs are searching for direction. At this moment, there are quite a number of initiatives and result-oriented actions taking place, mostly next to each other. Imagine what the effect of a CBI could be if a region would have a clear political agenda - something like a regional engagement strategy or an engagement (horizontal) CBI with clear strategic objectives - and CBIs can serve as the link between the NES and the regional strategy and vice versa.

Linking with the global political agenda. Secretariat makes a deliberate effort to foster the creation of one global CBI per commitment⁶, addressing the general theme of the commitment and functioning as the umbrella of regional CBIs on the same commitment. Five out of the 10 commitments have one already, another two are in the making. It seems to be a matter of time before all 10 are there. The global CBI links with the regional ones; this grows organically. What will be more challenging, is to link the regional CBIs with the global CBI. A conscious effort will need to be made to make the global CBIs actually serve the regional CBIs (and thus ultimately the NES) and the other way around. This is, however, exactly where the effectiveness of both types of CBI can grow.

3.3 MELC approach

The framework, the tools and the practices

Result framework.

ILC has made a conscious effort to keep the framework simple: three outputs and three outcomes. The output triplet Connect, Mobilise, Influence is well-known and represents what ILC actually does as a coalition. The outcome triplet Agendas, Practices, Policies is less known and requires more explanation. Capacity development, an aspect that receives increasing attention and for which several new interventions are developed, is ill-represented in the framework. It could be regarded as part of Mobilise (mobilising capacities), but the current focus of 'mobilise' is

⁶ Although not all interviewees agree on this.

on innovation and learning. This aspect of ‘capacities’ could include institutional as well as organisational capacities of members and of network components. This capacity part of the mobilise outputs could also be regarded as the first outcome in a logical sense (referring to changes at the level of civil society, before changes at the level of decision makers and the population) and would also include issues such as ‘improved unity’ and ‘stronger voice’ which are often reported as first tangible results of ILC’s efforts.

The indicators that the framework uses to get insight in the outputs are narrow and miss out on several aspects⁷. The rationale for relatively easy and countable indicators is that they enable aggregation. However, members still report very unequal entities under a single indicator (they have a hard time finding the indicator that is closest to what they want to express). More seriously, reporting is very incomplete and this forfeits the whole idea of aggregation. For instance, there are “29 joint work plans” but only part of the members report on these; “25 campaigns and 2 workshops”, but several countries are not captured in this overview. Therefore, these figures have limited meaning.

The rationale of the impact level of the result framework is not very clear. It is evident that changes in people-centred land governance should benefit concrete people and should be seen in concrete areas of land. However, it is equally true that policy changes can hardly be expressed this way and that the pathway between the contributions of a global coalition and this level of change is too long.

The only members who are able to report at this level, are those who have small scale interventions that come close to direct service delivery, and in their case, reporting numbers of people and hectares is actually reporting at output level rather than impact level. Their concrete activities are often intended to serve as showcases in a more strategic lobby trajectory. So, in practice the impact level reporting is a lower rather than a higher level reporting.

For example, in Nepal, the achievement reported is the number of people who successfully claimed land. 50% of tillers had land certificates before. 25% of these applied for land titles. 10% of these was successful. However, the achievement is not the 1.25% tillers who got new certificates, but keeping this topic on the agenda of decision makers and negotiating ways to address the plight of the remaining 99% tillers without land security.

Reporting tools.

The current set of instruments to report is widely experienced as too complex and repetitive, and sometimes as rich. Frequently, NES facilitators, CBI focal points and members express that reporting does not benefit them, but only the bureaucratic aspects of the secretariat (acknowledging that this is also a legitimate function of reporting). In other cases, when the capacities of individual organisations are very low (for example in Asia), the RCU has to provide extensive support to members to be able to submit the reports to the secretariat.

⁷ For example, the ‘number of knowledge products’ is a narrow way to capture ‘mobilise, identifying solutions and improving practices’ and ‘number of joint declarations’ is a narrow way to capture ‘influence, joint advocacy’.

Reporting lines are not always clear in Asia and Africa, as here the relative roles of the RCU and the secretariat are not always clear to everyone. See Chapter 4 for further analysis of this lack of clarity.

New developments include a monitoring and evaluation on-line platform that allows users to drill down any and all results that are reported. A second development is a dashboard that presents the status of the ten commitments at country level, including elements of policy, practice and experience. So far, these developments are not yet linked, although it is realised that both dashboards would allow for deeper causal analyses, comparing what was done and what changed at country level.

Innovation and good practices

Innovation and the documentation of good practices receive much attention. ILC supports both the development and piloting of such practices as well as the documentation of it. The purpose includes both sharing for scaling up by others and showcasing ideas for advocacy and lobby. While the good practices database is considered as useful, actual use of it is limited. ILC realises this and has started more proactive sharing of specific good practices as well as facilitating their presentation in wider platforms and a wider approach to learning, for example through the Learning Hub (see also below about capacity development).

While learning on the basis of digital communication is limited, the face-to-face events are the places where (in the view of most respondents) learning and innovation actually happens, even though explicit time for exchange is sometimes limited due to tight agendas. There are numerous examples of good ideas born out of such spaces. Apart from regional assemblies, it is mainly events related to NES or CBI where further exchange, learning and innovation takes place. They are the “lifeline of ILC in between the assemblies”.

Communication

ILC has invested much in developing communication strategies, capacities, messages and tools, both externally and internally. For external communication, the development of the ten commitment and concrete messages to communicate has been effective (while also for internal communication and strategy, the ten commitments have been helpful). The key mechanisms (see par. 2.3) reveal that some of the actual working mechanisms through which ILC contributes to changes are related to communication, visibility and branding. Through this, ILC is able to add to legitimacy and credibility of its members and the various network cornerstones.

Internal communication shows a mixed picture: some members are rather inactive, others so much value face to face communication only, that the concrete involvement in NES or CBI is called the lifeline in between the regional assemblies. ILC does attempt to use as much as possible a wide variety of instruments and has developed several trials with social media and the use of apps, both with wider groups (e.g. all members in a region) and specific groups (e.g. all NES facilitators). Some such attempts do and other do not work. A similar creative attitude is shown in the use of awards, and other ways to improve participation in the network in between events. But

so far, this yields limited results and is experienced differently (“too many emails” and “too little, mainly around events”).

Communication of results (monitoring and evaluation) also receives attention but is less prominent than communication around learning. Learning therefore, is more centred around good practices and innovation rather than on the basis of (insights in) results. This means that learning and communication are not strongly related to monitoring and evaluation.

Capacity development

While some capacity development has been included in ILC’s support to its members and network structures in previous policy periods, so far this was mostly framed as innovation and learning, also in the result framework. Systematisation of and a wider approach to capacity development is more recent and was based on expressed needs from members and network structures. This includes broader leadership development, organisational development (including financial and resource mobilisation capacities) and institutional development. A broad range of instruments is being developed that makes good use of members’ resources and capacities (for example in the Fellows programme, and on the basis of mapping competences of members) and that applies more recent insights in capacity development (for example, focus on on-the-job training, combination of training events and facilitating follow-up and application in practice).

4. ILC as a network

After having presented the results of ILC and discussed the strategic implementation modalities, this chapter reflects upon the internal factors of ILC that may accelerate or hamper the delivery of the results and the application of the implementation modalities. It is the network structure of ILC and its dynamics that influence the effectiveness of the delivery. In this chapter we look at the network system of ILC and the current process of regionalisation and decentralisation linked to it. The cross-cutting topic of gender is not particularly addressed in this analysis, as the recent gender audit⁸ has done a wonderful job in identifying strengths and challenges of the ILC network in this area. As the gender audit suggests, the gender action plan is to be integrated with the action plan resulting from this MTR.

The ILC network is presented in the 2017 annual report as multi-nodal network, where members play a role as 'cornerstone' when they represent the network in a position such as NES facilitation, CBI focal point, or support structure (RCU or secretariat). This way of looking at the network was confirmed by most of the members during the Council meeting in December 2017. Having the ILC network function as a connection between cornerstones, has an effect on all the five success factors presented in this chapter. Strategy needs to take this into account at different levels, so all cornerstones are served and strengthened by it. Cooperation dynamics are influenced by the way cornerstone members facilitate collaboration efforts like NES and CBIs. Steering structure needs

⁸ International Land Coalition Gender Audit Report; Gender Matters (ILC, 2017)

to take into account the cornerstone members and the role they play in passing on funding and being accountable for it. Processes need to involve cornerstone members in order to be effective. Learning and Innovation depends on cornerstones and should address them for their well-functioning. In the elaborated sections presented below dilemmas are explained within this context of being a cornerstone network.

Within the ILC network both the terms regionalisation and decentralisation are used in the current internal change process. In this report 'regionalisation' concerns the shifting of political responsibilities, mandates, and accountability from secretariat to the regions, with the aim to be a member-led network. The word 'decentralisation' is used when we refer to administration and procedures that have been handed over by the secretariat to the regional coordination units, in support of the regionalisation process.

As explained in Chapter 1, the analysis of ILC's network system is based on the five success factors of Capacity WORKS, the networking methodology developed by GiZ. This chapter will describe ILC's reality along the line of these five factors.

4.1 Strategy⁹

The ILC network developed its current strategy in 2014 and 2015 and based it on the internationally recognised Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT), Framework and Guidelines for Land Policy in Africa (F&G), UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and the overarching Sustainable Development Goals. By doing so, the ILC strategy is highly relevant in the global, regional, and national land governance and political contexts.

In all regions, members show acceptance of the new strategy. The clear, overall acceptance of the strategy shows that the development of the strategy was done in a participatory way; members had the possibility to contribute and be part of the end result. During the strategic planning process the secretariat has played her role of facilitator and supporter very well.

The results of the main strategic elements - NES, CBI and MELC - are described in Chapter 3.

Nonetheless members do have difficulty to adequately apply the levels of the theory of change to their particular situation and transform it into a coherent logical framework. RCUs and secretariat are called in when NES facilitators and focal points need their support in the strategic planning phase. Several members express the need for support in translating strategy into concrete activities. Secretariat members take on this role and feel this support is rightly done, but puts a lot of pressure on their available time. However, there may arise tension if the same people within RCU and Secretariat act upon their donor role and support in strategic planning support at the same time. For strategic planning openness towards the needs of members and a certain neutrality is needed. The neutrality can be jeopardised if donor conditions are integrated in

⁹ Strategy is the joint result of a negotiating process between the parties involved and a selection from various options. A result-oriented, clear and shared ambition is translated into a strategy that leads to positive and joint results.

strategic discussions. It is therefore important to define who within the ILC support structure supports strategy planning and who is responsible for funding mechanisms.

The need of support to members in strategic linking becomes even stronger when it is related to issue raised in the section about the CBIs. The ILC network works with strategies at national level (NES), regional level (regional strategy) and global level (strategic framework). There are three regional strategies serving to give a regional orientation to the members. Although there is some regional direction, in practice, the regional work plan and related budget are mainly based on the sum of activities proposed by NES, CBI and the needed support of the RCU. At regional level, there is no well-established custom yet to discuss budget in line with regional strategic priorities. Members express the need to jointly identify regional political challenges in relation to regional changes longed for in land governance context. Each region, and even sub-region, lives a different reality, which has a significant influence on the way the strategy is implemented. For a stronger coalition at regional level, members need to define and agree on a regional or sub-regional *political* strategy, in order to effectively generate joint pressure on existing norms and power relations. ILC may consider to think of *regional engagement strategies*, as a complement or implementing modality of the regional strategy. They may take the form of a CBI under commitment 1, where all strategic engagement for lobby and advocacy purposes are gathered. Within a region like Asia it is probably even needed to think of sub-regional engagement strategies, as the region includes extremely different contexts in nature, politics, culture, and history, and has no clear regional governance bodies. In addition, regional engagement strategies can serve as a framework for joint resource mobilisation beyond ILC funding - an important need identified by members in the different regions.

4.2 Cooperation¹⁰

Next to coordination among cornerstones, cooperation among members is taking place in different spaces: at global level at the Global Land Forum and with and around the Council, between secretariat and members, within CBIs, at regional level around the RCUs and the regional steering committees, the regional events, in NES platforms, and during specific actions outside CBI or NES. Members can engage in different ways, from proactive to following, in physical meetings or at virtual platforms. The success of this factor lies in the degree that each member is heard and given space within the network.

Cooperation dynamics

Active members are satisfied with the degree of participation they have within ILC. There are members who have explicitly made a switch from another network to ILC, as they perceive the network as a member friendly place, where space and voice is given to all.

At the same time, just as in all networks, cooperation is challenged by inactive members, at all levels. At global level, members are registered, but do not participate in the global meetings. At


¹⁰ The capacity to select and design healthy and vital cooperation between several actors is based on the connection of partners inside and outside/around (other stakeholders) the “network system”. The extent to which the input from individual organizations is getting space, as well as the capacity to utilize the differences constructively for co-creation and win-win solutions, defines the success of cooperation.

regional level, active participation of members who are not part of any CBI or NES is a challenge. And at NES and CBI level some members only participate passively. The assembly requested in 2015 a new Membership Strategy where this situation should be addressed. The strategy was approved in 2016 and implementation is carried out at the moment. The tool developed for the engagement of members is the Member Engagement Index (MEI). Here each member's participation and financial contribution is registered. When members show inactive membership they receive a signal to update their participation and contribution. If the member's constraint to participation is organisational capacity, support is offered. The first signs of inactive members waking up are visible.

Although the MEI is starting to work, there may be other reasons than no lack of interest or capacity that make members not participate. Collaboration efforts - at all levels - pass through different phases of collaboration. And there are different reasons why members withdraw from the scene. A model that nicely shows how this internal cooperation dynamic works is the *Circle of Coherence*, coming from the FAN approach of E. Wielinga¹¹.

The circle (see figure below) represents the vital space, where everything happens in the network. The vital space includes four phases where each initiative in a network needs to go through, often repeatedly. The circle can be applied to the different cooperation levels as such (participation at global, regional, CBI or NES level), but also for each new initiative or action taking place within each cooperation level. At each stage of the cycle different dynamics are going on. In most cases, the collaboration or action starts at exchange phase. In the first phase members exchange information. When coming in new this will be about who you are, when starting a new initiative it is about your thoughts on the initiative. If common ground is found, and members are inspired, the process ideally moves to the next phase. If not, members flee and don't participate anymore. In the second phase, differences need to be explored; what is the added value of each member. Each member needs to be recognised in its differences and added value. If not, they can start to fight for it or withdraw. In the third phase structure needs to be defined, which means the agreement on how cooperation is going to work: rules of the game, funding procedures, accountability lines, decision making processes, etc. Structure creates safety; if members do not feel safe, they will resign and only passively participate or become frustrated. Finally, when structure is in place, members can come to dialogue and co-creation. Initiatives can lose sparkle after they have been successful, and members start to conform to the comfortable situation of what works. In such a case no more innovation takes place and cooperation dwindles.

¹¹Wielinga, H.E. (2001). Networks as Living Tissue; A Study on Knowledge, Leadership and the Role of Government in Dutch Agriculture since 1945 - <https://www.linkconsult.nl/en/publicaties>



In the figure we show a few examples. If we look at how collaboration is done at global, regional and national level, we see different patterns of interaction taking place. The examples show that members indeed have different reasons to step out of the network, or become (partly) inactive or passive. The FAN approach also shows what can be done in each case and helps to identify different types of interventions that can be applied to re-engage members who have become inactive for various reasons (or: who have escaped the vital space of cooperation at different stages).

On the other hand the Circle of Coherence also shows what to do at each stage of the collaboration. Every time new members come in (which is happening regularly at all levels), attention is needed for the exchange and the complementarity of each member in relation to each other, before talking about structures and co-creation. In reality many network collaborations tend to skip the second phase of the cycle and sometimes the third. The challenging phase concerns addressing differences and in some contexts this may be perceived as threatening. The fact that organisations join a NES for joint collaboration can be an argument to immediately jump to the joint activities (phase 4), without first address the reason of joining (phase 1), the complementarity of each member in relation to the NES (phase 2) and the way collaboration is going to take place (phase 3). Situations described above in 3.2 show that when a focal point focuses only on implementation (phase 4), other members adopt a passive behaviour, waiting for the lead to act, and no synergy is created. This passive attitude makes it extremely difficult to address the failing facilitation skills of the focal point.

NES and CBIs where members feel engaged, in most cases intuitively have followed this cycle. The cycle helps facilitators to understand the dynamics in their collaboration effort and what to do at different moments in time.

Effective use of diversity of members

The ILC network is proud of its diversity of members, stating that it is one of the major strengths of the network. This is indeed something to be proud. Nevertheless, a contrast is emerging

between ILC's types of members and the new practices of NES platforms, where other types of actors can form part of the collaboration. At this moment this may not yet present any trouble, but it may arise in the future, when NES platforms become stronger, actors become well aware of the benefits of ILC and would like to join, but can't. These actors probably would be governments and private sector. By then the ILC network would need to define clearly why they can or cannot form part of the network, beyond the argument of internal strengthening first. For now, we like to focus on current tensions observed and worthwhile to consider as soon as possible.

In the first place, there is a concern among members about the membership of grass roots movements or constituency based organisations, like representative organisations of farmers, rural women, and youth. These organisations are of very high relevance to ILC, but have the least resources and means to act. They are not sufficiently heard at regional and global events. Discussions seem to be lead by NGOs, research institutes and in some degree the intergovernmental organisations. These three types of organisations speak a similar language with developmental jargon like theory of change, logical framework, roadmap, impact and results. In the majority of the NES platforms they are better represented and have a significant weight. Constituency based organisations which are not part of any NES, often have a difficult time to continue participation in CBIs in between regional events, due to limited access to digital communication and resources. At NES level there are many platforms that have an organic collaboration dynamic between the constituency based organisations, NGOs and research institutes, like in Nepal and Guatemala. The challenge lies in how to give recognition to their added value (phase 2 of the Circle of Coherence) and thus make sure their voice is also heard at regional and global level discussions. They are eager to participate as they feel they have a lot to gain from ILC, but are confronted with limitations in participation. Some members suggest to organise special moments during the regional and global land forums, so they can make one voice. A number of constituency based members indicated themselves to appreciate the idea of occasional, separate exchange events, as they are mostly interested in practical solutions, rather than conceptual discussions. The exchange events they have participated in so far, are precious kept in their memories.

On the other side there are the intergovernmental organisations, also member of ILC, which do have the resources and the communication means to participate, but operate at a distance from the network. It would be interesting to find out if this is because of lack of inspiration (phase 1 of the Circle of Coherence) or because of the structure - no strong influence on decision making process like they may be used to - (phase 3 of the Circle of Coherence) or for some other reason. In quite a number of interviews members have indicated to long for a much better relationship with ILC members like the FAO, IFAD and the World Bank, especially at national level. On the one hand, these organisations are the cause of resistance in collaboration with certain NGOs and grass roots movements, on the other hand their membership present an enormous potential for national and regional engagement, collaboration and resources. Nationally based members in the Africa and LAC regions ask secretariat and global members to make major efforts to increase the involvement of the intergovernmental organisation members, so collaboration at national and

regional level can become a given instead of an exception. In Asia scepticism is too high and members prefer to avoid collaboration with them.

Then there is a third group of organisations where cooperation could be improved. ILC receives funding from strategic partners, often European governments. These governments are very interested in sharing their network, for example their representatives at embassies, for the sake of more equitable access of land. However, as they are not members of the network, they are not included in communication loops and are not thought of in lobby and/or advocacy strategies concerning regional and national government entities and their officials. They feel they can only partially contribute to the network - they recognise their value from phase 2 of the Circle of Coherence, but are limited by the structure of phase 3 and thus cannot participate in phase 4. Although strategic partners would love to become a member of the network - which in their opinion also would change the picture of financial sustainability at once - opinions of members are divided about their participation as a member. In any way, it seems worthwhile to think of a mechanism where good use can be made of the political weight and entrances these governments have in NES countries and regional level.

4.3 Steering structure¹²

Steering structure concerns the way decision making takes place in the network. Two important elements to look at in this section are the role of the secretariat and the current regionalisation and decentralisation process. As for the terms regionalisation and decentralisation, we like to mention that within the ILC network the two terms are used to express the difference between the political autonomy regions are gaining and the administrative and procedural transfer of tasks and responsibilities. As MTR team we understand the difference as perceived by the members of ILC. We believe the regionalisation process is key, but is intimately related to decentralisation, in line with the motto “structure follows strategy”. They are not always easy to separate as they increase or reduce each other's effectiveness in a number of areas. This is confirmed by the observations presented below.

Regionalisation and decentralisation

ILC's steering structure has gone through some crucial changes over the past 10 years, since the regionalisation was initiated. Where in former evaluation reports an overactive implementing secretariat was identified, nowadays secretariat very consciously guards the limits between support and implementation and avoids to be dictating. This is possible due to the progress made at regional level. In the past two years, in all regions the delegated secretariat work through the RCUs has become visible, even though the process has not been totally smooth in all regions. While the RCU in Latin America and the Caribbean has been stable for the past six years and has advanced remarkably as a regional extension of the secretariat, in Africa it has been only in the

¹² The steering structure in a network is meant to organise predictable behaviour on communication, decision-making and interaction between members. The steering structure should contribute to managing expectations (strategy, decision making, planning, funds, conflicts), and accountability of members regarding their strategic commitment, the mutual agreements, their responsibility towards their constituencies and finally towards principle agents (boards, donors, society etc.).

past half a year that NES platforms started to know the current RCU staff. Asia's RCU is well established, since 2013, and is gaining recognition. In all regions members mention the great benefit of having ILC support closer to home. Members have a stronger feeling of belonging. Communication is easier, more fluid, and more efficient. In LAC the regional coordination has expanded with some extra staff dedicated to project management and communication, which gives the regional coordinator the opportunity to move from project management to regional advocacy work and ILC (political) representation in national contexts.

At national level NES platforms have gained strength and have formulated clear directions for national collaboration and link up easily with the RCUs (with exception of Africa, where the link was made recently). Although not all NES facilitators have a clear vision of their role, they did express to have developed their capacity and feel a bit more confident in managing their multi-stakeholder platform. The facilitators have gained significant strength in their role since the previous MTR. The collective capacity development efforts of the past two years have brought facilitators together and stimulated exchange and mutual learning. Facilitators are inspired and feel better equipped to orient members at national level in strategic engagement. For CBI focal points this process has not been so strong yet, but is equally needed.

Roles of the secretariat

The secretariat staff and work is highly appreciated by the ILC members. Communication is always swift and timely. Staff is capable, professional and dedicated. The secretariat staff always emphasizes their supporting role to the network. However, in practice the secretariat plays and needs to play three different roles: (1) a supporting role to the global network, (2) a political role, implementing global level advocacy, and (3) a donor role, passing on funding from back-donors to member organisations. The first role, the supporting role, the secretariat fulfils very well. As for the second role, the political role, the secretariat takes on responsibilities, as members need it, but seems to perceive it more as part of her service to the members, rather than a conscious role to play. In the field studies, it became very clear that the international branding of ILC guarantees legitimacy of NES platforms and CBIs and is crucial in obtaining results. National constituency based organisations find their credibility and legitimacy enhanced by the international back-up of the regional and global ILC when in their country criminalisation of social movements is high. It's the secretariat and the RCUs that embody the international branding. Members therefore ask secretariat and RCUs to proactively approach the intergovernmental organisation members and the global and regional private sector actors. The importance of this role shows that not all tasks and responsibilities of the central secretariat can be regionalised. The third role, the donor role, is the most delicate one. It's in this role where regionalisation and decentralisation come in directly. The secretariat strongly communicates not to be a donor, but a mere facilitator to create access to resources¹³. Nevertheless, as long as the money flows through the secretariat (formally IFAD), the secretariat also represents the (back-) donor, both in reality and in perception of members. By denying this third role, accountability relations become unclear and confusion is created.

¹³ There are a few exceptions among Secretariat staff: some fully confirm the donor role.


Who's the boss?

As a result three areas of tension are visible in the current steering structure, namely:


- a. Tension between donor and support roles of the secretariat. In the donor position, secretariat has to demand accountability from any fund recipient, both on finances and content, while the support role is about network vibrancy, energizing, stimulating ideas, offering support to elaborate and pilot ideas, linking up, etcetera. Tension comes in when on the one hand the secretariat expresses to only support members, while on the other hand accountability and results are asked for.
- b. Tension between the decision making roles of the secretariat versus decision making roles of the council and the regional steering committees (and sometimes hosting members). As long as funding is not fully decentralised, the steering committee takes decisions, even decides about priorities of funding proposals, but the secretariat can decide if conditions for funding are met (in the modality of advise) and about amounts of funding. In Africa where the RCU is only recently gaining autonomy, several members commented that the decision power seems to remain in Rome.
- c. Tension between the accountability related roles of the secretariat and the regional coordination unit. Especially in the regions where money has come directly from Rome, it's difficult for the RCU to demand reports. Even if contracts clarify that the RCU has the right to demand accountability on behalf of the secretariat, members don't feel urged to report to the RCU, as money was not received through the RCU.

The way funding is organised is decisive for the accountability relations and the related decision-making power. If regions succeed in mobilising their own resources, the share of the funding coming from secretariat will reduce and thus decision-making power of the steering committee or the RCU will grow. Furthermore, the moment RCU or steering committee are made responsible for the full amount received from secretariat, as a lump sum,


accountability of the region will increase. If accountability increases, so will the decision-making power. The triangle of *authority (decision-making power)* - *accountability* - *responsibility* is crucial, supported by the right organisational *capacity*. As long as secretariat is the only responsible for the money passed on to the regions, regionalisation will never occur in its full potential. In case it is practically not possible to transfer financial responsibility to the regions, then decentralisation stops here. This is where the MTR team finds regionalisation and decentralisation to be very much linked and not that easy to separate.



As the triangle shows, capacity was encountered to be the fourth condition in the current regionalisation and decentralisation process. Although some members expressed their frustration about the decision-making power remaining at central level, the responsibility for fundraising and financial management was not taken on fully either. Often the degrees in which responsibilities are accepted depend on the capacity of the RCU staff, hosting organisation and cornerstone organisations (for NES and CBI). In LAC it's clear there is capacity among RCU staff, hosting organisation and the regional members. This kind of capacity is less easy to find in the other regions. This is only one reason why it is not possible to think of the LAC region as a blueprint for others.



Chain of command with RCU as secretariat extension



Chain of command with RCU as support structure of RSC

Closely related to the issue of accountability is the question how to look at the relation between secretariat, RCU and steering committee. Who's the boss? Although this question touches also upon Processes (the next section below), we prefer to discuss it here in its full extent, in order to avoid confusion.

Secretariat and RCU function as supporting entities, the first to the entire network, the second to the region. The way they relate to the regional steering committee and to each other is different per region. The RCU can function as an extension of the secretariat, in the sense that the RCU serves the secretariat, with the purpose to just operate more closely to the members. Or the RCU can function as the supporting entity focused entirely on the needs of the region, serving as such the steering committee and the regional members in their regional political proposition. The first modality seems to be the one closest to the current situation, especially in Africa and Asia. If this is the best option, it may be helpful to use a term like ILC Africa Secretariat instead of RCU, in order to create a clear common understanding of its function. The second modality reinforces the regionalisation, but is not fully possible if the region doesn't receive full authority and financial mandate. If reality asks for a combination of both modalities, because some parts of the RCU work related directly to the secretariat and other parts directly to the regional steering committee, this is possible. Either modality or a mix of both can serve the network, yet a clear pronouncement on the choice enhances the functioning of the steering structure.

Similar tensions are felt at regional and national level. Like the case of RCU in Asia where the regional coordinator asks for reports and accountability of the members. Some members do respond others don't. In the latter case the RCU staff ends up writing the reports themselves. In the CBI and the NES platforms the focal point and the hosting organisation are responsible for the money while at the same time they're perceived as one among equals. This also creates tension. Organisations feel resistance towards the donor role they need to play next to being the facilitator.

Here the same triangle plays a role: if you don't receive the authority together with the accountability, you can't bear full responsibility. If focal points and NES hosting organisations receive authority to demand certain standards of accomplishment (in implementing activities as well as participation in general), their accountability task becomes more easy. In the case of the RCUs the way to give them more mandate is to clarify their role: or they are the extension of the central secretariat and therefore receive the mandate to ask for accountability (with possible consequences for members coming from central secretariat in case of no compliance), or they are support structure of the Regional Steering Committee and the RSC asks the members for accountability and RCU executes.

There is the specific case of the LAC region, which is worthwhile to mention. It concerns a unique situation, but still a very valid one to take into consideration in the context of regionalisation. Several LAC members, especially representatives in the steering committee, would like to discuss the current decision-making process within the region. At this moment 1 RCU member, 1 secretariat member, a representative of the hosting organisation of the RCU, 1 member from Central America and 1 member of South America participate in the steering committee. In practice, this means that a lot of work is prepared by the RCU, sometimes in close collaboration with the hosting organisation. The steering committee therefore is unintentionally led by the RCU, while the hosting organisation may be a bit better informed. This happens, because the RCU staff is full time dedicated to this work. The other steering committee receive the processed information and need to update themselves in little time. As a result discussions prior to decisions mainly focus on practical implementation issues and often don't touch upon the strategic issues like budgeting criteria, political steps to take in the region, strategic representation at the council meeting or strategic use of the regional land forum.

This situation links again to the chain of command we presented above and to the question who's the boss in the region? If it is the steering committee, how then can the RCU serve the members (and the steering committee as representative organism) in such a way that strategic discussions can take place in an even more participatory and accountable way than is the case already in LAC.

In conclusion, at all levels the authority in relation to the accountability and responsibilities of the different institutional components need to be pronounced more clearly, especially of the implementing entities of secretariat, RCU, CBI focal point and NES facilitator / hosting organisation.

Regional approaches

For some years the ILC network hoped to export the positive RCU experience of the LAC region to Africa and Asia. By now reality has shown that this is not an easy thing to do. The regions are too

diverse to treat in one same way. Africa and Asia are not as homogeneous a region as the LAC region is. This is due to very different contexts in nature, politics, language, history and culture. Thus, the effort to harmonise the regional members' needs is much more demanding for an RCU in Asia than in the LAC region. Members themselves express to experience moments where they feel not to have anything in common or to exchange. Both Africa and Asia seem to benefit from a sub-regionalisation within the region or from more than one 'region' on the same continent.

As mentioned above, the LAC region is a region with high capacity among members, steering committee, RCU staff, and RCU hosting organisation. In Africa and Asia it has been more difficult to find the adequate capacity for one or more parts of the steering structure. At different moments this has led to a weak RCU, an indecisive steering committee, and dominance of a few member organisations in decision-making processes via the steering committee or as hosting organisation. Taking the capacity differences among regions as a given, ILC needs to consider different working modalities for different regions. The two extreme options of chain of command are shown in the figures above. In every region though, a different approach can be adopted, from one extreme to other, with different combinations of both. As long as it serves the region and it is very clear for all members which modality or mix is used in which region.

In case of extremely strong growing regions, where the chain of command tends to flow from the steering committee towards the rest of the network, the ILC network will need to guarantee a way out in case of emergencies. If a region is fully managed by the regional members, a mechanism needs to be in place where the global secretariat can step in at regional level if needed. The need arises when the global brand of the network is at stake by actions of the regional steering structure or cornerstones.

Today conflict of interests may occur, for example when tensions are too high between facilitating network initiatives and demanding accountability or when members abuse their position for financial or other personal interests. At this moment the ILC network would already benefit from clear defined mechanisms on how to deal with conflict of interests at different levels within the network.

4.4 Processes¹⁴

In this section only two observations are shared. Part of processes are the decision-making processes. However, as they are intertwined with the steering structure and its decentralisation, we already discussed them in the previous section.

Time consuming procedures

Members know and largely accept the processes as they are within the network. There are a few processes that received extra comment and attention. Especially the time consuming flow of money was mentioned. The time needed - from the moment a planning is made, sent to RCU, passed on to secretariat, money transferred by secretariat to RCU, then from RCU to NES hosting

¹⁴ There are two types of processes: firstly, the working processes underlying the interventions designed to bring about the agreed joint activities of the network (what are our activities and which outputs do we deliver?); secondly, the network's internal management processes (strategic steering and management support).

organisation or CBI focal point and finally to the individual members - can take up to more than half a year. This means that time for actual implementation is often very limited, which again puts pressure on the accomplishment of results. Secretariat knows this is a problem and is simplifying procedures to reduce as much time as possible. External factors as IFAD regulations are more difficult (if not impossible for ILC) to change.

Election process

The process of election of representatives for the regional steering committee and thus for the global council is done at the regional land forum. In the election a balance is sought between representatives of different sub-regions, languages and organisations. This works well as long as there are enough organisations available with the right capacity. In some situations this is not the case and for the sake of inclusion those members are elected, who have limited capacity to effectively operate in the region and adequately represent the region in the global council. It is not easy to define clearly which member can or can't be elected, while on the other hand regional representation and the power balance between governance structure (RSC) and support structures (RCU and secretariat) can suffer significantly over a longer period if it is not addressed.

4.5 Learning & Innovation¹⁵

Learning and innovation is the engine behind all cooperation in a network. The ILC network has understood this very well. Having given MELC a higher position in the secretariat's structure confirms the importance given to learning and innovation. The MTR team has been pleased to find high quality, elaborate learning programmes in place or in the making. As this factor concerns MELC as such, we refer to Chapter 3.3 for our findings and observations for this fifth success factor.

¹⁵ Learning and innovation is the engine behind all cooperation in networks. The learning capacity is the capacity for change – making new choices based on new insights that contribute to positive change in a) the cooperation network, b) the individual organization and c) the people that work in organizations and networks.


ANNEX 2

Contribution Analyses


Annex 2. Contribution analyses

Cameroon 1 – More unified civil society

In Cameroon, a series of related changes were analysed and are summarized in the figure below.



The contribution analysis for the first change is visually represented in the figure below, and elaborated in the table.



The NES process, initiated and funded by ILC, has been a major and necessary factor to move a very diversified civil society toward more unity in a manner that this is attested by internal and external stakeholders. The explicit demand from the government for more unification has been another major factor, but this (as well as the existing connections between organisations) would not have been sufficient to create the current platform to voice joint concerns and positions.


<u>Change:</u> Civil society is more united and speaks more with one voice on land issues	
<u>Causal question:</u> To what extent has the NES platform contributed to this change?	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
The NES approach brings actors together and create a space for dialogue	+ this is factually true, on the basis of action plans, budgets, reports
	+ several NES members with and without positions in committees indicate that it was the NES initiative that brought these actors together, which had not happened before
	+ two different government representatives credit the NES process as instrumental in bringing actors together, being inclusive and vibrant and offering leadership
The NES facilitator is neutral and therefore has trust of many actors	+ several NES members indicate it is important for them that the NES facilitator is not linked to a single organisation with its particular vision
	+ observation: the NES secretariat has its own location, and formally it is hosted by two (not one) organisations
	+ one external expert states that many networks are co-opted by a single organisation, but not the NES platform. And this is one reason to start cooperation.
	- the downside of this factor is that the independence of the NES facilitator has a negative effect on trust with the host organisations, leading to discontinuation of his contract (after the field study)
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	
Connections between organisations already existed	+ two working group members claim that many NES members already had strong connections
	+ one ILC member already had a land observatory in the NW region. This basically became the regional hub
The government is more intent to give a voice to civil society, and stimulates a joint voice	+ several respondents state that government is more intent on giving a voice to civil society, also in other sectors. For example "more inclusivity is also a wish of the government".
	+ the ministry (MINDCAF) requested to come together with one voice.
	+ after submitting a first set of 8 statements (by 156 NES members), the government had received a total of 20 inputs. A parliamentarian suggested to include other actors as well and to harmonise the statements. This resulted in the current 12 positions by the larger NES platform
Influencing factor	
Existence of clear problems and concrete cases drives civil society together	+ the first launch of land reform 2011 (likely driven by the intention to get more foreign investors) pushed civil society to action
<u>Concluding statement about contribution:</u> The NES process, initiated and funded by ILC, has been a major and necessary factor to move a very diversified civil society toward more unity in a manner that this is attested by internal and external stakeholders. The explicit demand from the government for more unification has been another major factor, but this (as well as the existing connections between organisations) would not have been sufficient to create the current platform to voice joint concerns and positions.	

Two further comments can be made:

1. The change itself is relative rather than absolute. The twelve positions have been published and serve as a common reference, but the manner in which these positions should be realised in practice is certainly not agreed upon by all NES members. Some indicate that more in-depth discussion on land-related issues is lacking and the NES platform is too superficial. One example of an issue that would need further deepening is the risks linked to the intentions of the ministry to focus on simplifying getting private land titles and the question if these risks outweigh the benefits of such change (risks include the implication that communal land ownership will receive less attention; all land not in private ownership can be sold more easily; private land can be sold for money leaving poor people landless)
2. The perception of neutrality of the facilitator (or not being co-opted by a single organisation) is not necessarily linked to the location of the secretariat. The independence of the facilitator (and perceived lack of accountability) also has its downside.

Cameroon 2 – Improved dialogue and influence on policy

Analysis of the second and third changes is summarised in this figure and elaborated in the table.



The various mechanisms and factors are divided into ILC and NES related factors, other actors, and external factors. For each, an indication is given if the contribution is relatively more to the 'improved dialogue' part of the change or the 'real influence' part of the change, in the right bottom corner of the description of the mechanism description.

<u>Change:</u> The dialogue between government and other actors is improved and thereby there is real influence on policy formation	
<u>Causal question:</u> To what extent has the NES platform contributed to this change?	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
	+ the fact that many field organisations are included increases credibility "field experiences are seen as valid"

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
The fact that the NES platform is broad and representative builds trust and legitimacy Dialogue	+ government likes the fact that many traditional leaders are also represented, and also that attempts are made to connect to private sector (e.g. bar association, chamber of commerce)
The NES facilitator (and some NES members) have good relations with government officials Dialogue	+ observation: the NES facilitator easily walks in and out of government offices and knows many people there + personal relations are a key factor for the improved dialogue, but they need to become broader.
The fact that the NES platform has global linkages increases trust and influence Dialogue	+ the minister personally knows ILC (participated in land forum Dakar) and respects the network. This is actively stimulated, e.g. by ILC staff visiting the minister while in Cameroon.
The ministry takes up NES positions into the reform process Influence	+ observation: the new draft bill has indeed taken up several of the twelve NES positions (even if not all, and even if the manner in which is partly unclear and partly contested) + the initial reform process was meant to be a fast process. But the government 'opened a Pandora box'. This made the process much slower, but the government is much more prepared now to listen to inputs. + external organisations (e.g. Greenpeace, Transparency International) attest to having seen an influence of the NES platform on the ministry + government officials state that the ministry "will certainly use" the inputs provided by the NES platform. The minister officially requests for inputs on an increasing number of themes. - currently the reform process is not moving very much and it is expected that only after the 2018 elections further steps will be taken.
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	
Ministries send official representatives to participate in NES events Dialogue	+ internal and external persons indicate that both relevant ministries (MINDCAF and MINDUH) were involved from the beginning and always send high level representatives. + government staff confirms this and have concrete examples of their participation at high level. Mostly the technical advisors number one. The minister herself participated at the ILC land forum in Dakar.
Government officials participate and share on personal title Dialogue	+ a senator is chairperson of the steering committee. He is also a paramount chief. "This helps a lot". The chairpersons of the working group is also a government staff. + government staff informally give access to draft documents. + government staff give informal advices that help to smoothen the relation, e.g. not to not to develop draft documents, as this would infringe on government tasks, but rather to review and develop positions as input.

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
The ministry basically wants the same changes	+ some external respondents indicated that this is the case. To the extent that this is true, it diminishes the influence of the NES platform
Influence	
Government officials informally ask NES platform to raise certain issues	+ apart from formal requests from government for inputs on documents or ideas, some officials also informally request the NES platform to raise issues. In this way the NES platform can influence internal lobbies in the government. This was stated by two working group members.
Influence	
Influencing factor	
There is a broader trend of constructive dialogue	+ some NES members mention this; for example, in work on EPAs the relation with government was strained some years ago, but the government has become more open across the board
Dialogue	
There is an international context of land reform that stimulates government	+ VGGT and F&G also help the government to include the issues that NES also proposes in the new land policy / bill
Influence	
<p>Concluding statement about contribution: The NES platform was designed to improve the dialogue with the government and this has indeed worked out. Several NES-related factors contributed to this change. The willingness of the ministries as well as government staff on a personal title was also a major contributing factor, and the fact that dialogue is a broader trend. However, without the NES platform this improved dialogue would either not have occurred or would have been much more narrow. There is sufficient evidence of real influence in the land reform process: the current ideas of the government have shifted and inputs are frequently requested, even if more change is needed. This takes place in a context of land reform, and the final extent of influence will only be evident when the new land bill and/or policy is published.</p>	

Two further comments can be made:

1. The fact that the NES facilitator has good relations is a contributing factor, but it is also contentious. Various NES members would prefer to be more involved in contacts with government staff, for example by rotation. Also, there is a tension between such personalised contacts and the necessary transparency to NES members.
2. Not all NES members have the same perception on the engagement of government officials. Sometimes it is obvious that they are 'lobby targets', for example when they are visited. In other situations, they participate (mostly on personal title) as experts in their own right. In such cases some regard them as equal experts with whom to have an in-depth dialogue, but others regard them rather as lobby targets even in such situations.

Tanzania 1 – Improved capacity

Change: TALA as a platform has been strengthened	
Causal question: To what extent has the NES platform contributed to this change?	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
Funding became available & opportunity for TALA to host NES	+ this is factually true, without the funding TALA would still be dormant, it only existed on paper

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
TALA got support from ILC international staff	+ several NES members mentioned Alain and Fiona as very supportive in building the network, guidance on structures, reporting requirements, and assisting in finding complementarity in NES among members, as well as technical support to specific components of NES
TALA is established formally, structures in place, gaining independence from the hosting organisation	<p>- observation: still hosted at Hakiardhi, few staff, still some structures lacking</p> <p>+ several NES members indicate it is important for TALA to be independent</p> <p>- still it is blocking the branding and visibility of TALA: during the ITV debate, TALA organised, but Hakiardhi was shown as leading.</p> <p>- TALA did not have a logo, used Hakiardhi's logo. this is not correct.</p>
Having a full time NES facilitator	<p>+ First facilitator was part-time/voluntary for TALA and also engaged in/employed by Hakiardhi, which was confusing his role + difficult to find balance and time to spent on TALA tasks.</p> <p>+ Baha is full time which made TALA more active, he is experienced, only recent in job (may 2017) but since things have moved. He is said to bring linkages to a good network</p>
TALA got support from INGOs ILC members	<p>+ Maliasili strategic planning</p> <p>+ CARE lets TALA organise events, supports coordination, advocacy tool, drafting document on land issue priorities in TZ</p> <p>+ Oxfam assistance in API and component 1</p>
TALA and NES members are aware, agree on the role and see the need for a network	<p>- not completely clear on the role for TALA yet: regarding growth of member base, becoming a ILC member itself or not, resource mobilisation role, implementation part. Need more power, not only be a messenger</p> <p>+ The lead organisations of the NES components force TALA to work/demand action, support TALA by attending meetings</p> <p>- some members do not attend meetings so often, still some challenges in convening, no budget available for travel of staff to Dar</p> <p>+ mentioned as factor by several partners that the commitment and ideas are there, as to strengthen TALA as a network platform. Members themselves are strong</p>
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	
Connections between organisations already existed / already active in other frameworks	+ Maisha Bora programme brings actors together

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
DANIDA Land Tenure Support Programme ongoing discussion about engagement of TALA for several years	+ have been discussing involvement of TALA, however it never came of the found until ILC came in
	+ now TALA is strengthened this could strengthen TALA's role as a platform further
Influencing factor	
Existence of TALA	2010 with 7 founding members
<p><u>Concluding statement about contribution:</u> Despite the fact that TALA was already existing, it was dormant and therefore the funding for TALA by ILC has been a major and vital factor in strengthening TALA in its role as Land Platform and Network. On top of that, related to ILC, are the INGOs/ILC members who have taken up a supporting role: Oxfam, Care and Maliasili have engaged TALA in various forms, which has contributed to its current form. In terms of structure, a major change is the full time NES facilitator/TALA secretariat, independent from hosting organisation Hakiardhi. NES members also contributed to the improvements; the leads of the various components demand TALA secretariat to be active. The members see the need and relevance of TALA as a coordinating unit and attend meetings. Through it is still too early to see the actual results (strength in convening power and level of influence) the structures and direction of TALA are getting more shape. A lot of work has still to be put into the strengthening of TALA, yet it is on the right track. External to NES/ILC has been the developments around the Land Tenure Support Programme and DANIDA's intentions to engage TALA. However, without ILC's support this engagement would have not proceeded. Now it is a factor that could build upon TALA as a framework that ILC has revived.</p>	

Tanzania 2 – Improved relation with government

<p><u>Change:</u> The relationship with the government is improved</p> <p><u>Causal question:</u> To what extent has the NES platform contributed to this change?</p>	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
NES members have good relations with government officials, Government officials are part of NES, and Government officials participate in events	+ Observation: it was easy to get interviews with several government officials for the MTR, they went out of their way to meet the consultant, even at odd times, indicating a good relationship and willingness to collaborate
	+ Active participants: National Land Use Planning Commission, Ministry of Livestock, Ministry of Land, part of NES components
	- PAICODEO says it is not enough to just talk to some few people in government, it needs a broader approach. Especially when inviting ministers, they send representatives instead of coming themselves, and these representatives have no power

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
<i>Dialogue</i>	- Ministry of Land says it brought 5 representatives to the television debate, however the criticism the ministry received was not constructive and hence damaged the relationship
TALA/NES through component 1, national advocacy efforts have been made, government has been approached, and it takes into account NES input	+ Land policy reform process is consultative, consultations have taken place and NES members have provided input/organised meetings for review
	+/- reform process is about to finalise before end of the year
	- Policy influencing budget is lacking
<i>Influence</i>	- National Land Use Planning Commission said that despite the input the law is fine and will not change much
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	
A multi-sectoral Task Force was set up by the government	+/- TALA is a part of this task force but did not yet participate, other members of NES did
<i>Dialogue</i>	+ A strategy was created and presented to the ministry in August 2017
The Land Tenure Support Programme (LTSP) creates linkages between government and civil society actors	+/- Representative of Ministry of land part of design (2014), many actors involved, builds on prior programme on land transparency, support of international donors, they request CSO oversight of the implementation by government
<i>Influence</i>	+ Danida delayed to engage TALA for 2 years, now with ILC funding and a stronger TALA network, it is likely the engagement will take concrete shape/agreement to be signed
Individual ILC/NES members already have relations with government	+ Oxfam, CARE, TNRF, UCRT, MWIWATA, PAICODEO, they are all strong civil society actors with long term track records in Tanzania
<i>Mobilise</i>	+ TNRF explains how the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Livestock used to be working for TNRF. Other partners such as Ministry of Livestock also explained

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
	the other way around, he used to work for CARE
Influencing factor	
There is a broader trend of constructive dialogue	+/- government has become more open across the board, say government officials, this has been a trend since the 1990s...
<i>Dialogue</i>	
The momentum was there to engage with government in light of the Land Policy Review process	+ all partners mention this, engagement was done, consultation process ongoing, almost finalised
<i>Influence</i>	
President Magufuli's government poses both opportunities and threats, limited space for civil society - hampered freedom of speech	- NES members say it depends on the topic whether the government officials can be approached. (infrastructure not, civil rights not, but land tenure yes)
<p>Concluding statement about contribution: Several NES-related factors contributed to improved relation between civil society and government, through organisation of advocacy events as well as through including government in the NES components (implementation). However, there are other (external) initiatives that run parallel to NES, either initiated by the government (task force) or international donors and INGO (LTSP) that have also contributed to the strengthened engagement between government and civil society. NES/TALA can benefit from this and take a role in these initiatives to continue strengthening the dialogue. There is not enough evidence of real influence in the land reform process. The context and political environment is challenging. It remains to be seen whether the new land policy will reflect the input from the NES members.</p>	

Nepal 1 – Influence on policy

<p>Change: 6th amendment of Land reform act 2016 was accepted</p> <p>Causal question: To what extent has the NES platform contributed to this change?</p>	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
Lobbying and activism of CSRC and NLRF	+ this is factually true, on the basis of several interviews
	+ all stakeholders confirmed that these two organisations were instrumental in lobbying for this (not alone but in collaboration with other actors)
	+ Ministry of land confirmed that CSRC was instrumental in bringing about the policy (assisted the ministry with content and made suggestions on issues that had to be included)
Contribution of ILC (funding and leverage because part of a national/ international network)	+ mentioned several times by one of the members
	+ one member explained in details how they were more able to engage with government as a consequence of being part of ILC network
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
The constitution contained a provision for the law	+ several NES members and other stakeholders that this was an essential element
War and Peace and change in the country	+ it is a fact that the historical moment and the changes in the context created the space for new legislation and for making progress on this issue
Other cooperating actors (Care)	+ members mentioned collaboration with other actors
	-one stakeholder stated that the contribution of international organisations is limited
Influencing factor	
War and Peace and change in the country	+ two stakeholders mentioned this but in different ways (one thanks to peace, the other one thanks to the value that were promoted by the war).
	+ it is a fact that the historical moment and the changes in the context created the space for new legislation and for making progress on this issue. When the king dismissed all political parties in 2005 the whole process stopped for 10 years.
<p><u>Concluding statement about contribution:</u> The NES process, initiated and funded by ILC, has an overarching contribution to this result. While the contribution of individual members to this is quite evident, well described by members (events, sequence, confirmed by the government and external stakeholders), tracing back the contribution of the NES is more complex especially because the NES in this country is not working to its full potential. However, the contribution of the NES and ILC is seen by members more like an ongoing overarching contribution that is very important to the work of individual members and instrumental in the achievement of results. This contribution is spelled out in terms of funding, visibility and strength that comes from being part of a broad network. It is therefore a factor that contributes to all the results in Nepal.</p>	

Two further comments can be made:

1. The change in the policy led to a change in practice. The numbers of tenants that were able to claim the land from land owners are indicated in the monitoring reports. However, the achievement is more political than in terms of numbers, and on the fact that members managed to keep the issue on the agenda of the government.
2. There are many limitations to this results. First of all, this law applies only to an estimate of 120,000 people that had already a sort of certification recognising that they were tillers. Furthermore, the implementation of the law is very complex, the process for application is cumbersome, long, and expensive and even when people apply, they may still not be granted the land.

Nepal 2 – Practice of joint certificates

<u>Change:</u> The Joint Land Ownership Certificate is more being used	
<u>Causal question:</u> To what extent has the NES platform contributed to this change?	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
	+ this is factually true, on the basis of several interviews

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
Lobbying and activism of CSRC and NLRF	+ all stakeholders confirmed that NLRF and CSRC were instrumental in lobbying for this (not alone but in collaboration with other actors) The mobilisation efforts of NLRF were recognised by most stakeholders as the trigger for the legislation to be passed. The process was also very well described by NLRF. +The role played by NLRF and CSRC is also explained in the report of DCS
	+ Ministry of land confirmed that CSRC was instrumental in bringing about the policy. However, the ministry has some questions about the impact of the JLO in terms of women empowerment. It is costing the government quite a large amount of money (due to the tax reduction granted to families that make use of the JLO) but what is the exact return for women empowerment they are not sure. The CDS impact report tries to explain exactly that but it was not mentioned by the ministry as a relevant or sufficient source of information.
Contribution of ILC (funding and leverage because part of a national/ international network)	+ mentioned several times by one of the members
	+one member explained in details how they were more able to engage with government as a consequence of being part of ILC network (This remains an overarching contribution to all the results)
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	
The constitution contained a provision for equal rights Political parties and Government	+ several NES members and other stakeholders that this was an important element
	+ members confirmed that political parties were supportive
	+ it is a fact that the historical moment and the changes in the context created the space for new legislation and for making progress on this issue
Oxfam	+ members mentioned collaboration with other actors such Oxfam. To be clarified further as it was not possible to talk with Oxfam in Nepal
Influencing factor	
Sympathy/collaboration from other movements (dalits, women movement)	+ One member stated that on this issue they obtained the collaboration of other movements -one member stated that women movement are critical of the achievement because they do not think this is enough for women. However, the members have the view that this provision is good because it increases harmony in the families and does not create divisions. It is a conservative position. This is the difference with the women movement.
	-a stakeholder stated that there is not much collaboration and support between different movement
<u>Concluding statement about contribution:</u> The NES process, initiated and funded by ILC, has an overarching contribution to this result. While the contribution of individual members to this is quite	

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
	evident, well described by members (events, sequence, confirmed by the government and external stakeholders), tracing back the contribution of the NES is more complex. For instance CSRC mentioned an impact study that was conducted by them in 2009 and triggered the whole campaign. At the same time there is an impact study of CDS produced in 2015. This study states that there is a contribution of NES partners to the change in the legislation. However, the contribution of the NES and ILC is seen by members more like an ongoing overarching contribution that is very important to the work of individual members and instrumental in the achievement of results. This contribution is spelled out in terms of funding, visibility, and strength that comes from being part of a broad network. It is therefore a factor that contributes to all the results in Nepal.

Bangladesh 1 – Implementing the Vested Property Return Act

In Bangladesh the contribution analysis has been done in a less detailed manner as summarized in the table below.

<i>Change:</i> Vested Property Return Act of 2001 (granting land rights back to 1.2M Hindu families) is faster implemented by districts and the Land Ministry has given an order to districts to implement directly
<i>Causal question:</i> To what extent has the NES platform contributed to this change?
Explanatory mechanisms and factors
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors
NES brought together various types of actors, and this increased credibility and the strength of their voice
NES contributed to capacity development of various actors. This includes joint missions and joint activities for lobby and advocacy such as press releases.
ALRD (itself being a network) has already been active on this topic for decades, also influenced the development of the act itself. However, their work accelerated and its influence and legitimacy grew by being linked with an international network and name.
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors
There is a national platform (that includes ALRD) that addresses issues related to this act. They also do joint fact finding missions.
The government has a generally positive attitude toward this issue, except for those persons who themselves have vested interests in these areas.
<i>Concluding statement about contribution:</i> ALRD has addressed the injustice of land expropriation for several decades. Some important steps were made in terms of policies, but implementation was stalled. The NES process, providing ALRD a broader platform, a broader voice, and international linkages, has increased legitimacy and credibility of ALRD in this process and this contributed to accelerated implementation of the return of property, such that 500,000 people have now entered the necessary legal process. Apart from broadening the actor base of current activities, the NES also broadened the resource base. However, this is done in conjunction with several other actors who address the issue. The contribution of ALRD is major, that of ILC is secondary but certainly positive.

Peru 1 – Repeal of a law

<p><u>Change</u>: Repeal of a law (DL1333) that negatively affected community influence on land governance. This contributes to more communal land ownership (even if this repeal is not yet sufficient)</p> <p><u>Causal question</u>: To what extent have the NES platform and members contributed to this change?</p>	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
CCP has played a key role as member of Pacto Unidad and the NES platform	+ Factual: CCP is a member of both
	+ Other NES organisations recognise the role CCP played to enlarge the influence and base of Pacto Unidad by adding their voices to the effort
	+ One other Pacto Unidad member is joining ILC in order to strengthen the international backup of its efforts
CEPES and IBC have given technical support to Pacto Unidad	+ Products of these studies are available
	+ Pacto Unidad indicates they could not have done this by themselves
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	
Pacto Unidad, a combination of six national farmers' organisations lobbied for this repeal and influenced it	+ FAO recognises them as a major actor
	+ Several external websites refer to their actions
	+ They have good relations with congress members (esp Pariona) and concrete activities to meet them
<p><u>Concluding statement about contribution</u>: The main actor in this change has been Pacto Unidad. They are recognized and influential. CCP is a member both of Pacto Unidad and the NES platform, and through this bridge, other NES members (notably CEPES and CBI) joined in this lobby, mainly by offering technical support, such as monitoring studies. In conclusion, the contribution of ILC (through the NES platform) has been secondary: strengthening an existing network and making its lobby effort more effective and successful.</p>	

Peru 2 – Community laws

<p><u>Change</u>: In 10 communities in Ayacucho, the regulation is changed to allow more influence of women</p> <p><u>Causal question</u>: To what extent have the NES platform and members contributed to this change?</p>	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
The NES platform financed this as a pilot project (carried out by SER)	+ This is factual
SER did activities on awareness (of men and women), capacity development and advice on adapting regulations.	+ Website and activity reports
	+ Attested by community members
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
Onamiap and Oxfam replicate the activities at bigger scale. In other areas of Ayacucho, but also in other locations. This indicates that the project is regarded as successful and influential.	+ Interviews Onamiap, SER
	+ Website Onamiap
	+ SER influenced Onamiap by working very closely, also at staff level
Communities have realised that fighting for community rights is stronger if it includes women rights (and SER influenced this changed discourse)	+ interviews with community leaders
	+ interviews with SER
<i>Concluding statement about contribution:</i> The NES platform included this as one of its major objectives, and financed this as a pilot project through SER. This is a major facilitating contribution, although the implementation was mainly done by one member. The successfulness of the approach is mainly seen in the fact that other organisations replicate the approach.	

Guatemala 1 – Improved attitude toward human right defenders

<i>Change:</i> The government, through the Ministry of Public Affairs and the State Attorney General in particular, acknowledge the delicate situation and the criminalisation of the human rights defenders and collaborate with CODECA in resolving specific judicial cases	
<i>Causal question:</i> To what extent has the NES platform contributed to this change?	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
ILC and NES member CODECA carried out a study on criminalisation of human rights defenders and many lobby efforts. In doing so, they increasingly focused on structural issues of human rights	+ study and activities: 3 interviews. Attorney general received the study well and acted upon it.
	+ changed framing: 3 interviews and public acknowledgement of academic M.R. Morales
CODECA gained credibility and legitimacy by being linked with other actors (also through NES) and being able to mobilise people	+ 1 interview, and factual: many organisations joined in the Sept 2017 strike called by CODECA
	+ convening power: 5 interviews mentioning long history, absence of bribing, leadership school, broad network, expertise. Factual: many respond to a call for strike by CODECA
CODECA publicly supported the Attorney General in its fight against corruption, making them allies.	+ factual: this was done during a march during the strike. Attorney also publicly called CODECA an ally
Increased legitimacy and self-confidence by international backup of ILC. Regional assembly in Guatemala, ILC stayed when other donors left.	+ letter from ILC to government available and 3 interviews
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	
	+ factual: ambassadors have visited 2 persons in prison

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
Support of other international actors, e.g. EU and ambassadors of EU countries visiting defenders in prison	+ 2 interviews
Urban groups starting to support CODECA, for example in its last call for strike. And other actors started changing their message about them (incl. agro and private sector). This in turn enhanced the dialogue with the government	+ urban groups: 2 interviews, observation by colleagues who were there, public support stated on websites + changed message: interview and articles about CODECA
The UN working group made statements about arbitrary detentions and offered these to the government	+ 5 interviews. Official document available, contains recommendations to look into CODECA cases. This led to creation of technical committee and letters to president.
Influencing factor	
Anti-corruption processes against high level politicians changed the attitude of the Attorney General and turned them into allies of (among others) CODECA	+ 3 interviews, reports of CICIG and newspaper article + the existence of the technical committee is proof of this
<u>Concluding statement about contribution:</u> ILC and NES member CODECA had a major contribution to this change in attitude and the concrete positive actions of the Attorney General. The contextual factor of anti-corruption processes also contributed to this change. The contribution of ILC to this has been secondary but very essential: by being a member of an international body, the self-confidence as well as the public legitimacy of CODECA was increased. Other international actors also contributed to this but not as closely as ILC.	

Guatemala 2 – Secretariat of Agricultural Affairs cooperates with NES platform

<u>Change:</u> The government, through the Secretariat of Agricultural Affairs (SAA), acknowledges the NES platform as an important counterpart in the dialogues on agrarian policies and committed itself to its implementation (relevant parts) in collaboration with the NES platform, understanding that the spreading of information and the conflict solving are necessary to implement the policy.	
<u>Causal question:</u> To what extent has the NES platform contributed to this change?	
Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
ILC / NES related mechanisms and factors	
Articulation among constituency based organisations (national farmers organisations) provides legitimacy. This was stimulated by ILC.	+ 2 interviews. This process also brought convergence in opinions of these organisations, but mainly increased strength of their voice
ILC taking on the role as international broker and bridge between government and national constituency based organisations and signing the agreement – thereby overcoming mistrust	+ 6 interviews. ILC's presence and co-signing has been essential in developing the letter of intent
History in collaboration (of different NES members - CONGCOOP mostly) with the government in relation to agrarian policy	+ 2 interviews. CONGCOOP had been involved in development of agrarian policy.

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
FAO (as hesitant ILC member) gives legitimacy to the constituency based organisations and NES as a whole, by stating their recognition to NES and its members in their conversations and negotiations with government and SAA in particular	+ 2 interviews. FAO contracted CONGCOOP before and wants to collaborate with the NES platform - 1 interview stating that FAO has not been decisive
FAO has been insisting over the past two years to SAA to involve society in their work and the implementation of the SAA work, for example with the supposed implementation of the 'Auditoría Social de la Política Agraria'. This insistence helped SAA to open up.	+ 1 interview. This includes the work around 'Auditoría Social de la Política Agraria'.
CONGCOOP is trusted by both the constitution based organisations and the government. CONGCOOP has worked with both parts of society and as they took on leadership of ENI as a natural consequence, this has helped the construction of the agreement between both sides of gov't and constitution based orgs	+ 1 interview. The NES facilitator played an important role.
RCU bumped into SAA Secretary on regional events in Latin America and prepared the ground at these events to have the Secretary open up, trust ILC and be ready to sign the agreement	+ 2 interviews. This also indicates sensitivity to political and lobby opportunities.
Informal conversations between Secretary and Helmer Velásquez (CONGCOOP) at events like a FAO event on land as a working tool, created an understanding of common ground and interests around the issue of land	+ 1 interview. The conversation as such is rather factual.
Openness of constituency based organisations to sit at the table with government - open hostility has changed into a (high) scepticism, which makes dialogue possible	+ 2 interviews
Mechanisms and factors related to other actors	
Government looks at ILC as a possible resource of financing as they have members such as WB, IFAD and FAO and thus is interested in signing a contract with ILC	+ 2 interviews
Government (SAA) has indicators on number of people informed on the content of the policy, but have no means nor contacts to get to the people. NES members do have the network and the mechanisms to get to the people, so interest of SAA is also in reaching their own objectives by collaboration with NES	+ 2 interviews. This is also factual, as it is stated in the agreement.
New leadership style of new Secretary of SAA - less technical, more political and open for dialogue and intention letters like this one	+ 3 interviews.

Explanatory mechanisms and factors	Pieces of evidence (+) or counterevidence (-)
Influencing factors	
Topics of land stated in the Agrarian Policy are of high interest of the NES members and is part of the Agrarian Policy, so this is where common ground was found	+ 2 interviews. This also included a decision to focus on the common interests.
National recognition of the constituency based organisations helped government to be willing to collaborate with them	+ 1 interview, and confirmed by government publications
<u><i>Concluding statement about contribution:</i></u> The NES platform, under leadership of CONGCOOP had a major influence on achieving this collaboration by working on both sides (governments and constituency based organisations). The international status and presence of ILC was also an important contribution. The openness of the SAA itself contributed to the change too.	

ANNEX 3

Current CBIs

Annex 3: Current CBIs

The current CBIs include a variety of topics and forms, due to their history and nature. In total at global level, with the potential to link to global advocacy, 7 CBIs are currently implemented, covering 5 commitments. At regional level 23 CBIs are distributed over three regions: Asia manages 7, Latin America and Caribbean 9, and Africa 8 CBIs. Some coincide with the global CBIs, others are a response to a regional matter. Same goes for the global CBIs: a number of them link up to the regional CBIs, others are unique in their purpose.

The overview below shows that all ten commitments are covered by multi-country initiatives, some with many, others with a few. There are some comments to be made about a number of commitments, which are not visible in the overview.

Commitment 1 - secure tenure rights - is an area where a lot is happening, but rather in a lobby and advocacy manner. As the commitment is general, actually all topics of the other commitments in some way can be included in this commitment. Reports show that both at global and regional level numerous efforts are made in this area, without having a specific CBI on this topic, except for Latin America and the Caribbean region. An unexpected development in this area has been the useful linkage the global work on SDGs to CBIs. Members were trained on how to be conversant in SDGs in relation to their CBI topic, which has helped a lot in the communication with governing bodies.

Commitment 2 - strong small-scale farming systems - has only recently started, but has a lot of potential as many members of ILC are somehow involved in the topic of family farming. The push created by the global CBI is felt by the members and regional CBIs are currently in the making. For commitment 4 - equal land rights for women - the possibility of a global CBI is under consideration. Members like Huairou Commission and Landesa are asked to map the options and make a proposition.

Commitment 6 - locally managed ecosystems - is a commitment is taking more time to develop. There are two initiatives at regional level, one of which links also closely to commitment 3. Secretariat mentions the lack of in-house expertise as a possible reason for this topic to arise more timidly. On the other hand, if members don't feel the urge to formulate proposals for regional CBIs, it may just not be one of their core competencies. Looking at the list of members, environmental organisations, who are often the ones heavily involved in ecosystem management, are less represented in the ILC network.

Commitment 7 - inclusive decision-making - started out as a more general inclusive commitment. Over time the past two years it turned to especially serve the topic of youth and land, the inclusion of youth in the land issue. So the commitment is turning towards youth as the main theme and the secretariat is foreseeing the contracting of a youth & land expert, who can support the network to formulate an effective strategy in this area and present it at the Global Land Forum in September this year.

Commitment 10 - protected land rights defenders - counts three regional CBIs at the moment. The proposition for a global CBI, supported by the global human rights defenders project DefendDefenders and global CSOs like RRI, Global Witness, and Transparency International, is currently under review and will probably soon be up and running.

No.	Commitment	Level	Title
1	1 / 2 7	Regional LAC	Tierra y territorio en la ECADERT
2	2	Global	Family Farming Global Initiative
3	3 / 5	Global	Global call to Action on Indigenous and Community Land Rights
4	3	Global	Global Rangelands Initiative
5	3	Regional Asia	Rangelands Initiative Asia - Diverse Tenure Systems
6	3	Regional Africa	Rangelands Initiative
7	3	Regional Africa	Observatoire des Terres de Parcours et de l'Intégrité des couloirs de transhumance et commerciaux pour la Mobilité du bétail en Afrique sahélienne de l'Ouest et du Centre (OPTIMAOC)
8	3	Regional LAC	Iniciativa Gobernanza Colectiva de la Tierra y el Territorio
9	4	Regional Asia	Ensuring Gender Justice: Enriching Land Rights Movement
10	4	Regional Africa	Women Land Rights for Inclusive Development and Growth in Africa (WIDGRA)
11	4	Regional Africa	Initiative Kilimanjaro en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre
12	4	Regional LAC	Mujer rural y Derechos sobre la tierra
13	5	Regional Asia	Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights
14	5	Regional Africa	Pursuing Community Resource Rights in Africa
15	5	Regional LAC	Derechos a la tierra y el territorio para pueblos indígenas y afrodescendientes
16	6	Regional Asia	Pilot, Adapt and Scale-up Solutions: People-Centered Ecosystem Management
17	6	Regional LAC	Semiáridas de América Latina - <i>Acceso, uso y gestión del territorio y del agua en procesos de ocupación efectiva de comunidades indígenas y campesinas en zonas Semiáridas de América Latina</i>
18	7	Regional Asia	Youth and Land
19	7	Regional Africa	Consolider la Plateforme de la Société Civile Continentale pour une Gouvernance Foncière Juste et Inclusive
20	7	Regional LAC	Juventud Rural y Acceso a la Tierra
21	8	Global	LandMark: The Global Platform of Indigenous and Community Lands
22	8	Global	Land Ownership Transparency and Accountability
23	8	Global	Land Matrix Initiative
24	8	Regional Asia	Land Watch Asia - <i>Sustainable, Reliable and Transparent Data and Information Towards Responsible Land Governance</i>
25	8	Regional LAC	Red regional de observatorios - <i>Observatorio Venezolano de Tierras, Ambiente y Pobreza Rural</i>

26	8	Regional LAC	Red de iniciativas de monitoreo de la gobernanza de la tierra y los recursos naturales
27	9	Global	Community Land Protection Initiative
28	9	Regional Africa	Challenging land grabbing in West and Central Africa
29	10	Regional Asia	Defending Land Rights and Human Rights Defenders
30	10	Regional Africa	Protection des Défenseurs des Droits Fonciers en Afrique en vue de la Bonne Gouvernance Foncière
31	10	Regional LAC	Protección de Defensores de la Tierra y el Territorio

CBIs rely on a diversity of approaches. In autumn 2017 the secretariat defined a number of them: knowledge and data generation, advocacy and campaigning, thematic leadership and capacity-building, and policy dialogue. This content division has not yet been embedded in the management of the CBIs, nor mentioned as categorisation in the overview of active CBIs. The secretariat expects this to be ready after the present report is published. Once secretariat and RCUs agree on the categorisation, it will be interesting to use the categorisation as a mean of comparison, in order to see if there are any tendencies in how certain CBIs develop, which types of CBI have highest potential to grow independently, etcetera.

