LAND INEQUALITY
FRAMING DOCUMENT

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Members of the International Land Coalition (ILC) are concerned about inequality. Research undertaken by ILC member Oxfam and others, such as the World Inequality Lab, shows that extreme inequality in most regions is rising, not falling. Inequality is becoming one of the defining features of our economies and societies and is increasingly shaping struggles for justice and well-being. Struggles for land rights are no exception, as land inequality remains a fundamental reflection and determinant of a broader set of inequalities.

With the expectation that inequality will increasingly become an element that frames the work of ILC members and in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – particularly the commitment to “leave no one behind” – the ILC network is embarking on a medium-term research project on land inequality. As a diverse and broad-based coalition, ILC is well positioned to take up a global issue such as land inequality in its multiple national and local manifestations. If not addressed, these will undermine the possibility of achieving ILC’s vision of “a just, equitable, and inclusive world in which land rights are secure and poverty is eradicated”. 1

With members spread across the world and ranging from grassroots organisations to global intergovernmental organisations, ILC is positioned to play a decisive role in mobilising, raising awareness, and having influence around land inequality, an issue which is central to the policies and practices that our members seek to improve and reform. Through well-established partnerships between research institutes and civil society organisations, as well as intergovernmental organisations, among others, such collaborations will provide evidence-based research and objective information.

The research project will include several phases, with the first beginning in 2019. The first phase is aimed to better define how to approach the complexities of land inequality in its broader context and in light of inter-relations, identify a coherent framework for research and action, and suggest research themes and questions that will guide the next phases of the initiative. This framing document is the output of this first phase. The next phases will aim to develop reliable data and knowledge on land inequality from across the globe, providing the evidence and analysis needed to better grasp the nature of land inequality itself, as well as the complex and inter-related linkages between it and a broader set of inequalities.

The project will also result in a number of products. First of all, the data and knowledge gathered will be compiled and made available by way of several knowledge products, a synthesis report and, ultimately, a manifesto on land inequality. The data provided will be made available for ILC members and others to use in interventions at different levels, such as campaigns around land inequality. Finally, the research will develop and promote common means of measuring land inequality, thereby establishing the basis for a longer-term monitoring exercise on land inequality at a global scale.

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https://www.landcoalition.org/en/resources/international-land-coalition-strategy-2016-2021
SUMMARY

Inequality is one of the profound challenges of our times. It determines the relative power and opportunities of individuals and groups and undermines the chances of peace and prosperity for all. Land inequality is an important part of this wider inequality and directly shapes the quality of life for the billions of people whose livelihoods depend on land and its linked resources. Land is not only an asset and a source of income and food: it is also part of many people's culture and identity. The inequality in land is increasingly undermining effective land governance, including the growing incidence and risks of conflict, and hindering efforts to combat environmental destruction and climate change. This is widely understood, as shown by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) commitments to tackle land inequality, as an issue that has to be addressed to achieve many of the SDGs. Less widely agreed are the causes of land inequality and the best ways to deal with them.

It is important to understand the multidimensional nature of land inequality and how it links to wider inequalities. Most obviously, land inequality is the difference in the quantity and value of land that people can access and have rights to. Just as important are inequalities in tenure rights, the actual control of land, and the control of benefits derived from the land. These factors, and the extent to which land can fulfil its potential to meet people's needs, are shaped by the economy, political power, social practices, and the state of the environment. Land inequality, in turn, shapes this wider context, as can be seen, for example, in land concentration leading to the concentration of political power, which undermines democracy and is used by elites to drive further accumulation of land, wealth, and power.

There are limits to the availability and accuracy of data on land inequality, meaning that more analysis and improvements to data gathering, mostly by national governments, are required to get a full picture and to track changes. Beyond that, it is also necessary to develop a framework for understanding land inequality which captures the different dimensions and subjective perceptions of the issue. What can be seen is a global concentration of land in large holdings while small-scale farmers, Indigenous peoples, and other communities dependent on land are losing their land or are reduced to struggling for survival on less and less land. Worldwide, around 84% of farms share 12% of the total agricultural land area, while just 16% of farms control the remaining 88%. In the most unequal countries, fewer than 1% of land owners control 50% or more of agricultural land. These inequalities are being accelerated as elites, large corporations, and investors take control of more land and, just as importantly, appropriate more of the value from the land and food sector, leaving farmers both big and small and workers on farms with a shrinking share of the value of what they produce.

Addressing this unjust and unsustainable situation requires challenging the fundamental drivers of accumulation of land by the few, including elite and corporate power. Land - and with it the environment - and labour cannot be treated simply as commodities for the most powerful to profit from. A range of different interventions can be made, from agrarian reforms to land and wealth taxes and market regulations. Agro-ecological production practices need to be promoted, supported by democratically controlled sources of finance, and linked to territorial markets that work for small-scale producers. People, through struggles to defend their common land and increase their autonomy from corporate power, are building solutions in practice that need to be backed.
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“Outsiders have a financial view of the land. They see it as money. We see it as life. We have to win... for the future of our people.”

Nicholas Fredericks, Wapichan people, Guyana, 2016

“The reason we fight for the rights of the earth is because we know who we are because of the earth, it is our identity. Mother earth made us as humans to protect her. We, people and earth, are washing each other’s hands, that is how we do it.”

Nonhle Mbuthuma, Xolobeni community, South Africa, 2017

“We are building unity in response to the challenges of inequality in the distribution of land. As in the ‘60s, this inequality remains unchanged, deepening the economic, social, cultural and environmental risks as a result of the primary [commodity] specialization of the economy.”

Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, 2012
WHY LAND INEQUALITY MATTERS

“It is not the relations of capital and labor, not the pressure of population against subsistence, that explains the unequal development of society. The great cause of inequality in the distribution of wealth is inequality in the ownership of land.”

Henry George, 1879

For long periods of history, land has been – and still is in many contexts – the primary source of food, shelter, income, wealth, and power. It is seen by many as something that can be owned, a commodity to be purchased, an asset to make profit from, a resource to be developed and exploited.

The importance of land, however, goes far beyond its economic value. Many people have an intimate cultural and spiritual connection with land that makes it a central part of their identity and existence. They consider themselves as belonging to the land and responsible for its health, in contrast to the notion of land belonging to the people (Black, 2011).

Land is also a question of survival. Despite rural transformation processes,2 the number of people whose livelihoods and welfare directly depend on land is still growing (Losch et al., 2010) and they are often the most vulnerable. Three out of every four people among the world’s poorest live in rural areas and rely on agriculture and related activities for their livelihoods. Most of them are smallholders or landless workers with insecure access to land (FAO, 2016).

But land is not only essential for the people whose livelihoods depend on it. It is vital for the lives of all of us. Land provides common goods such as biodiversity, clean air, water, and landscapes. How we use land today will determine our survival as humanity and our capacity to reverse climate change and to regenerate the fertility of the soils that we need to feed the growing world population. These are among the most important challenges of our time, and all of them depend on our use of land today.

Land can be a major engine of shared prosperity or one of the most pervasive drivers of inequality. For a long time, the struggle for land has given rise to conflicts, displacements, and human rights violations. Recent waves of land acquisitions and investments – where global market dynamics converge with the interests of local elites – have again raised

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2 “Rural Transformation may be defined as a process of comprehensive societal change whereby rural societies diversify their economies and reduce their reliance on agriculture; become dependent on distant places to trade and to acquire goods, services, and ideas; move from dispersed villages to towns and small and medium cities; and become culturally more similar to large urban agglomerations.” – Berdegué et al. (2014).
serious concerns about the land rights of marginalised groups such as women, the elderly, marginalised castes or ethnic groups, small-scale farmers, and pastoralists (Borras Jr et al., 2014; Cotula, 2009; De Schutter, 2011). These accumulation processes are causing more inequality in the distribution of land, in the capacity to decide over land use, and in the sharing of rents extracted from the land.

The social, economic, environmental, and political consequences of land inequality are significant and deeply interconnected. As elaborated below, the price of land inequality is more poverty and social conflict, environmental degradation, food insecurity, and gender imbalances. Secure and more equally distributed land rights have long been identified as beneficial for democracy, peace, agricultural productivity, gender equality, and general social and economic progress (Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987). These potential benefits have repeatedly been confirmed as important, including in international frameworks shaping policies and discourse on land and inequality, as outlined in Annex 1.

Figure 1: Linkages between land inequality and development goals

The price of land inequality is more poverty and social conflict, environmental degradation, food insecurity, and gender imbalances.

Source: the authors
1.1 LAND INEQUALITY PERPETUATES POVERTY

The lack of access to land is a key factor keeping rural people in poverty. When land is controlled by a few, production activities are limited and rents are concentrated, while the majority see their opportunities constrained. Increasing inequality in the distribution of land and the benefits obtained from it determines the ability of farming families to invest in human capital development (especially through education), improve agriculture outcomes, or seek new economic opportunities (Carter, 2000).

Large-scale farming and extractive activities reduce local linkages and positive impacts on local development. Smaller farming operations have greater poverty-reducing effects because of their positive impact from spending and trading (multiplier effects) in the rural non-farm sector (Mellor and Malik, 2017; Mellor, 1999). More equally distributed land not only contributes to more equal societies overall, but also fosters growth and development on more solid foundations (ECLAC, 2016).

Redistributing and securing land rights, especially women’s rights, is essential to breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Furthermore, land provides resilience to shocks of various kinds. As economic shocks usually affect the labour and food markets, those who have secure land tenure and their own means of production can turn to this for self-employment and food provisioning.

1.2 LAND INEQUALITY INHIBITS GROWTH

Beyond the justice and equity arguments, land redistribution is also supported for economic and development reasons. A more equitable distribution of land contributes greatly to social cohesion, which fosters more inclusive institutions and policies, and hence promotes higher levels of economic growth and long-term development (Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2009).

Deininger (2003) and Easterly (2007) provide evidence of the long-term implications of extreme land concentration in terms of development. A cross-country analysis found that only two of the 15 developing countries with very unequal land distribution managed to grow their economies at more than 2.5% over the period 1960–1992 (Deininger and Squire, 1998). Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) demonstrate the same patterns when comparing the evolution of North America and South America, tracing political (in)equality initially to land distribution and subsequently to negative impacts on economic growth, democracy, and education.

Contrary to the common belief that large farms are more efficient and productive than small farms, the lack of economies of scale in agriculture and other factors (such as the high cost of managing agricultural labourers) support the inverse relationship between farm size and agricultural productivity. Small-scale farmers generally use land, labour, and capital more efficiently than large-scale farmers who depend primarily on hired labour. This inverse farm size–productivity relationship implies that redistributing land from large farmers to family farmers can have a significant positive impact on agricultural output, increasing rural incomes and overall economic growth.
A comparative study showed how in South Korea, which has much more equitable land distribution, productivity per agricultural worker was more than 50% higher than in El Salvador, where land distribution is highly concentrated (Vollrath, 2007).

On the other hand, small family farmers usually use more labour (their own plus hired) per hectare (or per unit of output) than do their larger peers. Hence, they generate more employment per hectare (or per unit of output) for the economy as a whole, an economy-wide advantage where unemployment is widespread. Family farmers also spend more of their income on locally produced goods and services than large-scale farmers, creating a positive relationship between family farms and non-farm incomes in the local economy (Mellor and Malik, 2017; Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2009; Mellor, 1999).

### 1.3 Land Inequality Exacerbates Food Insecurity

Most of the people who are chronically hungry live in rural areas without secure access to sufficient land. Land is the main source of food, whether directly through production for home consumption or indirectly through income-generating activities. With the growing number of undernourished people in the world (FAO et al., 2018), our capacity to eradicate hunger will largely depend on how people – women in particular – and communities gain access to land (FAO, 2011; Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Deininger, 2003).

The increasing concentration of land use for producing agricultural commodities risks exacerbating food insecurity. The accelerated expansion of extractive uses of land, mainly industrial agriculture, extensive livestock farming, and forest plantations to satisfy global demands is displacing local food systems and threatening the food security of vulnerable populations. Most developing countries that are commodity suppliers are at the same time increasingly reliant on food imports, and are therefore more vulnerable to global market fluctuations. Such loss of control of land and food has led to demands for food sovereignty and the emergence of alternative and local food markets (La Via Campesina, 2018; Van der Ploeg et al., 2012; La Via Campesina, 2011a; Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005; Renting et al., 2003).
1.4 LAND INEQUALITY UNDERMINES WOMEN’S RIGHTS

Women across the world have substantially less secure land rights than men, and when they have land rights it is invariably on smaller and poorer-quality plots and under less secure tenure conditions (FAO, 2011; FAO, 2010; Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Standing between formal equality of rights recognised in laws and practice there is a wall of entrenched cultural norms and institutional barriers that reproduce historical exclusion of women and often take precedence over the law (Kelsey et al., 2014; Deere and León, 2003). As a result, women tend to be less able to realise their rights to access, own, use, and control the land on which they depend for food, income, and survival. This determines their access to essential goods and services including credit, education, and technical assistance, their decision-making power at the household and community levels (CEPAL, 2017), and their exposure to gender violence (IFAD, 2008).

Land disposessions reinforce women’s unequal access to land across all tenure systems, as there are important variations in outcomes for dispossessed women as gender intersects with class, caste, and other inequalities (Levien, 2017). Despite often being the most affected, women are rarely effectively involved in decision-making regarding land deals (Levien, 2017; Tandon and Wegerif, 2013). Securing and strengthening women’s land rights is about creating gender equity, which is essential and a right in itself. It is also vital for women to be able to make their full contribution to transformative leadership and improved development outcomes and to benefit from these (CEPAL, 2016). Such outcomes include more sustainable land use practices, agricultural productivity, and improved household health, nutrition, and education (Bose and Das, 2017; Daley et al., 2013; Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Quisumbing, 1997).

1.5 LAND INEQUALITY DRIVES DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE

The growing concentration of land use for commodity production is one of the main drivers of deforestation. Large-scale industrial agriculture, mining, fossil fuel extraction, and forestry combined are responsible for more than 50% of the global loss of tropical forests (Curtis et al., 2018). The final responsibility for this deforestation can be found thousands of kilometres away from the forests, at the end of international supply chains trading in food, minerals, fuel, wood, and other commodities to satisfy rich countries’ insatiable demand for raw materials. In this way, high-income countries externalise their land use and transform distant natural ecosystems around the world into monocultures, large-scale farms, and forestry plantations (Meyfroidt et al., 2013; Weinzeitel et al., 2013).
In Latin America, a region with the highest rates of land inequality, agricultural expansion is the major cause of tropical deforestation. This expansion is associated with the production of commodities; only when land property is concentrated enough is the production of such commodities financially viable. For example, the technological package associated with genetically modified soybeans is particularly suited to large-scale farming operations. Inequality – in all its forms, including land inequality – favours agricultural expansion instead of sustainable agricultural intensification (Ceddia, 2019). Among other reasons, this is because greater income inequality has allowed economic elites to shape the institutional context to their own advantage, particularly through access to public lands and natural resources.

The most aggressive advance of extractive activities is taking place in areas considered to be “marginal” but holding valuable natural and cultural wealth, characterised by greater inequalities. This is the case in the Gran Chaco Americano, where powerful economic players – both international investors and domestic landowners – are expanding soybean plantations and cattle ranches for export purposes, and in the process causing a silent but alarming devastation and eviction of Indigenous communities.3 In the Amazon basin, tropical forests are being replaced by soy plantations, pastures, and export corridors of highways, ports, and railways (Torres and Branford, 2018).

Deforestation, climate change, and land inequality are interconnected and mutually reinforcing (Ceddia, 2019). If tropical deforestation was a country, it would be the third biggest carbon emitter globally (Gibbs et al., 2018). As climate change unfolds, struggles over land, water, and other natural resources will intensify. Rising sea levels, melting mountain glaciers, severe droughts, and other consequences of climate change will lead to displacement and migration on an unprecedented scale. Land governance will be challenged to equitably allocate rights to displaced people, resolve conflicts, and protect the rights of vulnerable groups (IPCC, 2014).

Effective measures to conserve carbon stocks emerge as a critical feature of virtually any mitigation pathway. Indigenous peoples and local communities play an essential role, as they manage at least 24% of the total carbon stored in the world’s tropical forests (RRI, 2016). Mitigation actions, such as REDD+,4 may, however, profoundly affect land governance and, in some cases, lead to dispossession of land and forests from poor and vulnerable peoples (USAID, 2013).

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3 See data on deforestation affecting the Gran Chaco on the Global Forest Watch website: http://data.globalforestwatch.org/datasets/3d668cf0fcb415bb01ec00bc6263877; and information on threats to Indigenous land rights in the region at Mongabay: https://news.mongabay.com/2018/03/tech-and-collaboration-are-putting-indigenous-land-rights-on-the-map/

4 “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries” (REDD) is a mechanism under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which involves payments to developing countries that will prevent deforestation or degradation that would otherwise have taken place. For more information, visit: https://ređd.unfccc.int/
1.6 LAND INEQUALITY TRIGGERS SOCIAL CONFLICT

Since the beginning of time, control of land has implied social, economic, and political power. The mounting competition for land and other natural resources is part of an accumulation process that stretches from the most local to the global, between very unequal players. In Latin America, for centuries the struggle for land has caused more wars, population displacements, social conflicts, hunger, and inequality than any other factor (Guereña, 2016). Extreme land concentration was a major cause of the internal armed conflict in Colombia and Guatemala, and land redistribution is a key and difficult issue in many peace processes. Most civil wars and political crises in African states have a background in disputes over access to and control of land and related resources (Peters, 2004).

Violence against people defending land and environmental rights is increasing every year. 2018 had the unfortunate record of seeing 321 human rights defenders murdered in 27 different countries. Almost 80% of them were defenders of land, Indigenous peoples, and the environment, an increase from 67% in 2017. Agribusiness has become the sector causing the most deaths, with 46 defenders killed in 2017, overtaking mining for the first time ever, and widespread impunity for violence is a key human rights issue (Global Witness, 2018).

The impact of large-scale forced evictions was recognised in 2016 by the International Criminal Court (ICC) expanding its mandate, following alleged widespread and systematic forced evictions (over 800,000 people displaced since 2000) associated with land grabbing by Cambodia’s ruling elite (Mistura, 2018).

1.7 ILC’S WORK ON LAND INEQUALITY

The International Land Coalition (ILC) has launched a research project on land inequality. The first phase aims to better define how to approach the complexities of land and inequality in their broader context and inter-relations, identify a coherent framework for research and action, and suggest research themes and questions for the next phases of the initiative.

For now, the focus will be on rural land, though with an awareness of the relevant links between the land and urban worlds. ILC and its members work primarily on rural land issues, and to include urban processes of land accumulation would add even more complexity to an already complex topic of analysis.
This document is structured in five sections, including this introductory one. Section 2 explains the core concepts framing the issue of land and inequality and shaping our approach to them. Section 3 relies on the best available data on land inequality to show what we know and do not know yet about land inequality, identifying the existing approaches, complexities, and gaps in measuring it. Section 4 describes the current trends and drivers behind land inequality, from its historical roots to the current market functioning and policies, from both global and local perspectives. Finally, Section 5 explores some of the potential pathways to address land inequality and possible policy interventions including redistributive policies, progressive taxation, agro-ecology and environmental protection, and land market regulation, among others.
2.1 LAND AND INEQUALITY FRAMEWORK

In this document “land inequality” is used to refer to inequality in land access, tenure, and control, while “land and inequality” is used to refer to land inequality and wider related inequalities.

Land inequality is more than just differences in the size of land area that people can access and have rights to. It is also about the quality of the tenure rights held and the power that people have, in practice, to control land and the benefits from that land. This wider conceptualisation and analysis of land inequality is increasingly relevant in a world economy where 1) “accumulation by dispossession” has become more important than accumulation through “expanded reproduction” (Andreucci et al., 2017; Harvey, 2004) and 2) the forms of appropriation and distribution of value have become more complex, moving from a simple land/ground rent to what Andreucci et al. (2017) refer to as “value grabbing”. The approach used here, therefore, includes four axes along which to analyse land inequality: the size and/or value of land that people access or hold; the level of security of tenure that people have; the actual control that people have, which includes their decision-making power over land; and their control of the benefits from the land, i.e. the ability to appropriate value from the land. These are illustrated in the centre of Figure 2.

Land relations (including levels of land inequality) exist within a wider context that they contribute to shaping and that also shapes them. These are summarised as social, political, economic, and environmental factors and are represented in green on the outside edge of Figure 2. Political power, for example, will shape outcomes for communities attempting to defend their land rights. The dominant economic structure will determine the benefits that small farmers can derive from their land and their labour on that land. Environmental constraints, such as soil degradation and climate change, are affecting different land users in different ways and, if current trends continue, will seriously limit land use options for future generations. Social factors, such as gender discrimination, are reducing some people’s enjoyment of land rights, regardless of the form of land tenure they hold on paper. All of these factors play out, and can therefore be engaged with, from local to international levels. All involve a mutual interaction between the land dimension of inequality and wider inequalities: for example, a concentration of land ownership and control is often the basis for a concentration of political power, and that political power gets used to enable further concentration of land ownership (Guereña, 2016).
Figure 2: Land and inequality conceptualised

Source: the authors
2.2 INEQUALITY

In simple terms, inequality is defined as: “[d]ifference in size, degree, circumstances, etc.; lack of equality”,\(^6\) hence, as per Figure 2, the degree of inequality is best visualised on axes between different points (e.g. larger or smaller). Whether specific inequalities are fair or not is a subject for debate and opinion, but inequality is a central concept in social justice theories (Afonso et al., 2015). For a long time, inequality was regarded by influential orthodox economists as a necessary evil to create incentives for economic growth, especially in the early stages of economic development. They argued that market economies would self-correct, improve the lives of all, and reduce inequalities over time (Kuznets, 1963; Kuznets, 1955). Today, however, this belief has been widely refuted, based on the analysis of empirical data over time (Lannen et al., 2019; Piketty, 2014). It has also been shown, and is increasingly recognised by policy-makers, that high levels of inequality have a negative effect on growth (OECD, 2014; Stevans, 2012). At the same time, most people share a common ethical position that high levels of inequality are wrong (Zak, 2011; McKay, 2002) and this sense has been captured in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with commitments to reducing inequality and leaving no one behind (UN ESC, 2016).

The understanding of inequality has evolved from the traditional outcome-oriented view to the opportunity-oriented perspective (Caillods and Denis, 2016; Afonso et al., 2015). This potential achievement perspective argues that what should be equal are the opportunities and choices that any person has – the opportunities or the freedom to pursue a life of their own choosing.\(^7\) Equality of opportunity exists when life outcomes depend only on factors for which persons can be considered responsible themselves, and not on disadvantageous attributes outside of their control. In practice, equality of opportunity requires policies and programmes to compensate individuals facing disadvantageous circumstances.

A more holistic approach requires looking at the multi-dimensional nature of people’s lives and the intersecting factors that affect their choices. Such a multi-dimensional approach to inequality takes into account political, security, social, knowledge, cultural, legal, spatial, and environmental inequalities that cannot be measured based on income or wealth alone (Caillods and Denis, 2016; Kabeer, 2016; Stewart, 2002). Understanding and addressing these inequalities requires, among other interventions, looking at discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and gender and the level of equality in access to services, such as healthcare, education, and security (McKay, 2002; Lorber, 2010).

Most measures of inequality focus on the individual and on the changes in the aggregate income of individuals grouped according to income or wealth percentiles, in what is referred to as vertical inequality. Examining horizontal inequalities involves looking at inequalities that arise between particular groups of people defined by some form of common identity.

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\(^6\) This approach is based on Amartya Sen’s capability framework developed in the late 1970s, which proposes that well-being should be defined and measured in terms of the beings and doings valued by people (functionings) and the freedom to choose and to act (capabilities). For more information, see Sen, A.K. (1999) Development as Freedom, Anchor Books.

\(^7\) This is again based on Sen’s capability framework.
These inequalities are associated with the power relations linked to embedded cultural and social characteristics and values of a given society, such as around race, culture, religion, and gender, and therefore require analysis of the situation of particular groups within the society (Bartlett, 2017; Kabeer, 2016; Stewart, 2002). Such group-based experiences of inequality are important as contributors to social disruption, including violent conflict, and can also have psychological impacts for members of particular marginalised groups (Stewart, 2002; Bartlett, 2017).

Horizontal inequalities also relate to how different people from the same income level at a given point do not progress at the same pace. Some may fall back and others advance, while some remain at the same level. This “churning” can leave aggregate inequality figures the same, missing important changes for the actual people involved. Differences in progress could be due to discrimination against particular ethnic or other groups, but it can also be due to the different composition of people's wealth and income. This results in policies impacting people differently: “For example, some of the poor are net suppliers of food while others are net demanders, which means that changes in the relative price of food associated with trade reform benefit some but hurt others” (Ravallion, 2004: 20).

Most analysis of inequality is based on relative inequality (the proportional difference in income or wealth), but absolute inequality (the absolute difference) can be just as important in terms of the impact it has and people's perception of the level and fairness of inequality (Milanovic, 2006; Ravallion, 2004). This overlaps with debates on the measure of relative versus absolute poverty; clearly both measures are important in understanding people's positions and relative life opportunities.

### 2.3 LAND INEQUALITY

Land inequality fits within the concepts and measures of inequality discussed above. It is a source of income and an asset and is important for social, political, and cultural factors that make up the multi-dimensionality of inequality. Horizontal inequalities are of particular importance in relation to land, as gender, ethnic, racial, and other forms of group identity (whether imposed or embraced) are used to discriminate against people in relation to land rights and access. The central role that land and related natural resources play in the cultural life of many people and communities, especially Indigenous communities, also needs to be given particular attention as it is not easily measured, so can be overlooked.

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8 The implications of looking at absolute as well as relative inequality can be seen in a simple example. Farmer X has one hectare of land, which is 2% of the land of farmer Y, who has 50 ha. After land reforms, farmer X has two hectares, which is still 2% of the land of farmer Y who now has 100 ha. In relative terms nothing has changed, but in absolute terms the difference is now twice as big and farmer Y is now controlling 98 hectares more than farmer X, compared with 49 hectares more before. This could have a number of implications for things such as their relative production opportunities and political influence. At a global level, the difference in the two approaches is well illustrated by comparing the “elephant curve” with the “hockey stick” when analysing the share of income growth going to different percentiles of the population: see Annex 2.
Land inequality can be structural or caused by market mechanisms, or (in most cases) a combination of both. Structural inequality reflects historical and ongoing events driven by factors such as state power: for example, events such as conquest, colonisation, and land distribution by colonial powers or by the state. Market inequality is the consequence of unregulated market forces that tend towards accumulation by those who are already powerful and wealthy, with inevitably uneven results across individuals, groups, and regions. The recent rise in land inequality in China is argued to be market-based, while high levels of inequality in Brazil or South Africa are more structural (Easterly, 2007).

In analysing land inequality, there are some important factors to be considered that go beyond the typical inequality debates. One of these is how to take into account the inter-related but different concepts of land rights and land access. Being able to access land is an important form of right to the land and the starting point for being able to use it, but the nature of rights to land when accessing it defines the choices a person has. Land access simply refers to a person having the ability to enter onto and use land, without fear of imminent reprisals for doing so. This could range from living and building on the land to being able to only collect certain natural resources, perhaps only at certain times of year. It is the nature of rights, therefore, not just access, that will shape the capacity to control land, exploit it, and benefit from its linked natural resources.

Bartlett (2017: 282) has pointed out: “Whether and to what extent economic inequality is a problem also depends ... upon what goods are freely available, without purchase.” This is an especially pertinent point in relation to land, due to the large amounts of public land that exist in many countries and the different ways that this public land is governed. In some countries there is an availability of public land to be occupied or allocated to people without charge, or at low administrative rather than market costs (Brown, 2018). Public lands that are accessible for grazing or for recreation make these activities available to citizens who do not have land or wealth. At the same time, the presence of public land and state custodianship of land do not necessarily mean greater equity of access, as state control has often been used to exclude the poorest people and to favour elites with preferential access, as most starkly seen in the wave of land grabbing over the past decade which, with state assistance, has often targeted community, public, and state land (GRAIN, 2016; Knight et al., 2012; Anseeuw et al., 2012).

9 Public land includes a range of different land, most often held by the state for purposes from schools and hospitals (which have been part of land grabs in some countries) to municipal commonage land and land that is occupied by communities and governed communally.
2.4 LAND AND TENURE RIGHTS

“Tenure: How people, communities and others gain access to land and natural resources (including fisheries and forests) is defined and regulated by societies through systems of tenure. These tenure systems determine who can use which resources, for how long, and under what conditions. Tenure systems may be based on written policies and laws, as well as on unwritten customs and practices. No tenure right, including private ownership, is absolute. All tenure rights are limited by the rights of others and by the measures taken by states for public purposes (VGGT, 2012).”

IAEG-SDG, 2018

Land tenure rights are now widely understood to be made up of a bundle of rights and to be on a continuum of land rights with formal rights (e.g. registered freehold ownership) at one end of the continuum and informal rights (e.g. undocumented rights of occupation) at the other. In between these is a range of rights that are not necessarily on a straight line but in fact overlap with one another. This is not intended to suggest that one or other end of the continuum is the better option, but to recognise that there exist a range of tenure options that can be more or less appropriate and effective within particular contexts (GLTN, 2015; GLTN, 2012). The theory of a bundle of rights goes beyond a narrow conceptualisation of ownership to take into consideration the fact that, like a bundle of sticks, tenure rights involve many parts – such as the right to use land in particular ways, to sell, to bequeath, to encumber with debt, to lease, to defend from use by others, etc. These combinations (bundles) of rights vary in different contexts, including in the way that some parts of the bundle may be held by different people (GLTN, 2015).

Secure tenure rights are important as a basis for people’s investment in and care of land and contribute to their sense of well-being. Tenure rights are secure when they give the holder long-term certainty and when they can be defended from encroachment or removal. This involves legal recognition and social acceptance combined with accessible means of redress should the tenure rights be violated (Quan, 2015). Secure tenure rights have been included in targets and indicators of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and, for purposes of measurement, have been simplified to be “comprised of two sub-components: (i) legally recognized documentation and (ii) perception of the security of tenure, which are both necessary to provide a full measurement of tenure security” (IAEG-SDG, 2018).
Tenure rights can only exist and be secured within some form of *land governance*: i.e. the “rules, processes and structures through which decisions are made regarding access to and the use (and transfer) of land, how those decisions are implemented and the way that conflicting interests in land are managed” (IAEG-SDG, 2018). The state usually plays a leading role in land governance, providing legal recognition for tenure rights, providing land administration services, and setting up and running courts or other dispute resolution mechanisms. Customary and other community structures also play key roles in land governance, especially on community-controlled land, and are typically based on their own regulations and rules. Rules for land governance can be enshrined in laws and regulations, and can also be more socially constructed norms often rooted in traditional and historical practices. Land governance challenges often arise where the statutory law and customary law systems exist alongside each other and are not compatible. In reaction to the land grabbing issue and recognising the consequences of weak land governance, states and civil society have agreed on the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (the VGGTs), which are intended to support efforts towards development goals, with an emphasis on vulnerable and marginalised people (CFS, 2012).

*Control of land and benefits from it* is sometimes narrowly conceptualised as being only about land tenure and governance, but it has always been linked to wider power relations, such as the control of labour. Now, changes in the agri-food sector are imposing further means of controlling land and land use, thus necessitating a wider perspective. Increasing concentration of ownership and power, backed by states and multilateral agencies – from inputs to markets and financing, with increasing vertical integration of all parts of supply chains in the agri-food sector – is shaping and limiting the choices that land rights holders have (Ikegami, 2015; Amanor and Chichava, 2016; Willoughby, 2014). The corporate control and promotion of certain seeds, pesticides, and fertilisers is shaping production options (Greenberg, 2015; Holt-Giménez and Altieri, 2013). Likewise, the inflexible demands of food processing companies and supermarkets exclude many farmers and are making certain products unviable for farmers, as the prices received do not cover the full production costs, and dictating what other products should look like (Ledger, 2016; Patel, 2007).
2.5 COLLECTIVE LAND TENURE RIGHTS

Up to 2.5 billion people around the world depend on land held under forms of collective tenure for their homes, incomes, food, medicine, and cultural identity. Many of these are Indigenous communities, and almost all Indigenous communities use collective tenure arrangements based on some form of customary land rights and administration. While acknowledging the diversity of such tenure arrangements, for simplicity we will use “collective land tenure” to refer to Indigenous and other community tenure systems. In such situations the land or “territory” – a wider concept that refers to the inter-relationships connected to land and all the living, material, and spiritual entities linked to it – is held and administered by a group on behalf of its members (Pearce, 2016; Giovarelli et al., 2016). These arrangements follow the continuum of land rights in that they range from legally recognised and documented community land holdings through to non-statutory and undocumented rights. Within the community, or territory, rights are allocated to particular groups, families, and individuals based on customary or otherwise established community rules and norms. Various international conventions have recognised aspects of community and Indigenous people’s rights, but the enjoyment of tenure security by communities depends largely on political power and national legislation and its implementation, as well as the level of social acceptance of these tenure forms by the majority or the powerful within the wider society. The level of security of families and individuals within communities depends again on legislation and the social norms and practices within the community (Knight et al., 2017; Pearce, 2016; Larson and Springer, 2016; Cronkleton and Larson, 2015; Knight et al., 2012).

With increasing pressure on Indigenous and communal lands, there are efforts to codify and obtain legal recognition and protection of customary land rights, including the mapping and documentation of members’ rights within communities (Giovarelli et al., 2016; Knight et al., 2012). These communities, many of them Indigenous, hold around 65% of the world’s land but have formally recognised ownership over just 10% (RRI, 2015). The diversity of practices and the lack of documentation pose particular challenges for measuring inequality in communal land holding, although a number of initiatives are now under way to raise awareness and gather information on community land rights.10

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10 The global platform LandMark was developed in 2016 to fill a critical gap in information on the land rights of Indigenous people and local communities (IPLCs). Alongside the Land Rights Now campaign (www.landrightsnow.org), it shares geographic information on collectively used land and territories owned by Indigenous peoples and communities. See: http://www.landmarkmap.org/
2.6 WOMEN’S LAND RIGHTS

One of the most pervasive land inequalities is gender inequality, arising from patriarchy and discrimination against women that leaves them with weaker rights to less and poorer-quality land (Doss et al., 2013; FAO, 2011; FAO, 2010; Deere and León, 2003). At the same time, it is increasingly recognised, including in the SDGs, that secure tenure rights for women are essential for gender equity and wider development, but achieving this is complex and context-specific and involves a range of elements that have to work in combination (Doss and Meinzen-Dick, 2018). Almost universally, when land tenure is formally registered, more land is registered to men than to women. Across all tenure systems, within communities and households, women have less decision-making power and control over land than men. Often, women access land through male family members (their husbands, fathers, or sons). This leaves them with less control over land and more vulnerable to eviction and dispossession, especially if relationships sour (FAO, 2013; FAO, 2011; Meinzen-Dick, 2009).

Across the world, women carry far more responsibility than men for family reproduction and unpaid care work, particularly in areas such as child care, ensuring that food is available for the family, and taking care of the sick. This has an impact on women’s time, finances, and well-being, thus also affecting their ability to assert land rights and benefit from land use. Interventions, such as to increase agricultural production, that do not take this into consideration can add to women’s burden, with negative outcomes for their quality of life (EGM on CSW 62, 2017; Budlender and Moussié, 2013; FAO, 2011; Wegerif, 2017). Given that women earn less than men, and have less access to legal services, women can also be structurally disadvantaged in market-based land systems (UN Women, 2015).
FRAMING DOCUMENT ON LAND INEQUALITY
3.1 A GLOBAL OVERVIEW BASED ON AVAILABLE DATA

There are currently limitations on the amount and quality of reliable data that specifically relate to land inequality. Quite a bit of the analysis that has been done is on farm sizes and how these are changing over time. This is not necessarily a measure of inequality itself, but it is part of the inequality picture and can show inequality when linked with other data.

Globally, estimates of the number of farms range from around 570 million (Lowder et al., 2016b) to just under 610 million (GRAIN, 2014), using a total agricultural land area of around 5 billion hectares (ha) (FAO, 2019a). An indicator of the level of inequality in agricultural land holding is that 84% of the farms (smaller than 2 ha) account for just 12% of the world’s farmland, which leaves just 16% of farms (larger than 2 ha) controlling 88% of all farmland (Lowder et al., 2016b). Based on the varied definitions of “small” farms in different countries across the world, it has been calculated that 92.3% of farmers are “small” farmers, relying on just 24.7% of the world’s farmland (GRAIN, 2014). Figure 3, from Lowder et al. (2016b), illustrates the levels of inequality in the amount of land falling into different farm (or agricultural holding) size classes. On the far left of the figure can be seen the 84% of farms, with just 12% of agricultural land, through to the far right where a tiny fraction (0.02%) of the farms cover close to 20% of all agricultural land.

**Figure 3:** Global farm/-agricultural holdings size (hectares) and share of farmland areas used by size class

![Figure 3: Global farm/-agricultural holdings size (hectares) and share of farmland areas used by size class](image-url)

*Source: from Lowder et al. (2016b: 26)*
There is a trend towards larger average farm sizes in wealthier countries and in land-abundant countries, with declining average farm sizes in developing countries (EC, 2018; Lowder et al., 2016b; Jayne et al., 2016). For example, average farm sizes in Europe grew from 14.4 ha in 2010 to 16.1 ha in 2013 (Eurostat, 2015). Meanwhile, average farm sizes are in decline across Asia and are now below 2 ha per farm in many countries (Lowder et al., 2016b). The trend is similar across Africa (ibid). However, the figures showing these trends may be missing a more problematic dynamic of the creation of an increasingly unequal “bimodal” world agricultural sector, with a mass of poorer people struggling to survive on increasingly small pieces of land while large land deals and corporate investments establish mega-farms (Nolte et al., 2016; Land Matrix, 2019; GRAIN, 2016; GRAIN, 2014). Latin America is the continent with the most extreme land inequalities, with a Gini coefficient for land of 0.85 for the continent (Asia is 0.55), and some countries have more extreme inequalities (FAO, 2019c); for example, in Colombia just 1% of landowners hold over 80% of the agricultural land, with the largest landowners controlling over 50,000 ha each (Guereña, 2017). Annex 3 provides further data and trends from the continents of Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and North America.

The scale of gender inequality in land rights is contested, with inadequate and often incompatible ways of measuring it, but its existence is clear (Doss et al., 2013; FAO, 2011; FAO, 2010). In the absence of global figures, we can draw on certain regions to get a sense of the situation. Across the European Union, women’s agricultural land holdings are on average 7.6 ha compared with an average of 19.5 ha owned by men; also, women control only 28% of all agricultural land holdings and 13% of the land (EC, 2018). In Latin America, women make up fewer than 12% of land reform beneficiaries (Deere and León, 2000) and on average only 18% of farms in the region are in women’s hands, ranging from 8% in Guatemala to 30% in Peru, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)’s Gender and Land Rights Database (GLRD) (FAO, 2019b). In Africa there are a few countries that report having gender equality in land holdings. For example, in both Cape Verde and Rwanda over 50% of land titles are in women’s names, although the total extent of land controlled by women is likely to be less than that controlled by men, due to women having smaller farms and legally registered rights not always translating into the enjoyment of those rights, due to discriminatory social norms and practices (FAO, 2019b; Kelsey et al., 2014). Other African countries show much higher levels of gender discrimination, with just 9.1% of land holdings in women’s names in Senegal, for example, and 16.3% in Uganda (FAO, 2019b). The situation in Asia appears to be worse, with women having a very small share of land holdings: from 4.6% in Bangladesh and 8.8% in Indonesia to 27.4% in Thailand (FAO, 2019b). There are few, if any, systemic data capturing women’s land rights in other tenure systems – for example, the control or power that women exert over collectively held lands or in customary systems.

Landlessness and land poverty constitute a growing crisis. Many of those affected still depend on land for their livelihoods and often work as temporary, vulnerable, and underpaid labourers in agri-business, and they are in a weak negotiating position with no options left for independent production (see, for example: Ledger, 2016; Wegerif et al., 2005; Du Toit, 2004). A study in five African countries revealed that roughly a quarter of agricultural households were virtually landless, controlling less than 0.1 ha per person (Jayne et al., 2003).
In Bangladesh, 29% of rural households own no farmland at all, with a total of 8.7 million landless rural households as a result of land pressures and environmental changes (FAO and UN-Habitat, 2010).

There are a range of ways that countries and industry bodies gather data on where the share of value from agricultural products goes across different supply chains; however, approaches do not appear to be comprehensive or consistent across and between countries. What does emerge from other research is a clear trend of great value going to corporations in food retailing and processing and less to labour (Cochet, 2018; Ledger, 2016).

3.2 EXISTING APPROACHES, COMPLEXITIES, AND GAPS IN MEASURING LAND INEQUALITY

Below we go into some of the existing sources of data on land inequality and highlight their strengths and weaknesses. Annex 2 presents some of the main ways of measuring inequality currently used, along with suggestions for how these can be built on to generate a more holistic picture in the future.

3.2.1 EXISTING SURVEYS AND CENSUSES

Most of the analysis of farm sizes and land inequality currently comes from agricultural censuses and from a range of household surveys, including national population censuses, national general household surveys, the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS – led by the World Bank), and the Demographic and Health Surveys programme (DHS – led by USAID). The agricultural censuses focus on agricultural land, leaving aside the important question of how to define agricultural land and the identification of the agricultural population that are seen as sharing in that land. Some national population censuses now have land and agriculture questions included but these are very limited, rarely identifying the size or value of land even when respondents are identified as being involved in agriculture. The various household surveys (including the LSMS and DHS) are increasingly including land information, although with limitations that will be elaborated upon below. The LSMS-ISA (Integrated Surveys on Agriculture) initiative is adding a more extensive agricultural module to the LSMS surveys, but these have only been rolled out in a few countries so far.

One of the challenges with agricultural censuses is that they do not exist for some countries and are out of date in many more (Lowder et al., 2016b). Given this situation, the global estimates of agricultural land and farm sizes rely on outdated information and some level of extrapolation and estimations based on available data to cover the gaps. Despite the efforts of the World Programme for the Census of Agriculture (FAO, 2019d), there are also inconsistencies that make international compilation of data tricky; for example, there are different cut-offs in relation to the minimum size of farms to be counted; some censuses gather information on land size, while others gather information and base the analysis on the economic size of the operation; and some include forestry land and others do not (Lowder et al., 2016b; HLPE, 2013). More information on the interpretation of data from agricultural censuses is contained in Annex 4.
Due to different farming conditions in different contexts, caution is also required when comparing issues like farm sizes, but the proportional level of concentration should remain valid across these different conditions. Most agricultural census information is also lacking in socio-economic information that would enable analysis of horizontal inequalities, such as those based on gender, race, and ethnicity. Newer-generation censuses, such as the most recent one carried out in Colombia, do contain some of these data and it is hoped that more will follow such best practices, enabling greater analysis in the future (DANE, 2016; FAO, 2018; FAO, 2017).

General household surveys, including the LSMS and DHS, enable land data to be linked with other socio-economic data, but they also have constraints related to small sample sizes, the unreliable capture of land sizes, and a propensity for the rich to understate their wealth. This all leads to unreliability and to an undercounting of the largest land holdings. For example, in Tanzania the last LSMS survey had a sample of just 3,265 households, resulting in very low sample sizes, such as just 15 respondents for medium- and larger-scale landholders (Jayne et al., 2016).

There are also some important differences in approach across countries, as some surveys collect data on land use (how much land under cultivation), while others collect data on land ownership (Lowder et al., 2016a; Lowder et al., 2016b). Household surveys also suffer from household-level reporting that involves one person providing information on behalf of other members of the household. This is problematic in that it is less accurate and unlikely to pick up intra-household differences, especially where factors like gender discrimination are involved. The recommended approach, coming out of processes such as the development of methodologies for monitoring progress on the SDGs, is to add a self-reporting module to be administered to randomly selected individuals within households (IAEG-SDG, 2017).

In order to develop a more comprehensive and accurate picture, it is increasingly common to combine a range of sources, such as household surveys and agricultural censuses (Jayne et al., 2016; Lowder et al., 2016b). This provides usable information from current data, even as longer-term work is done to improve the quality of data gathered.

### 3.2.2 ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Internationally comparable data currently rely largely on surveys or censuses, but at the national level states use administrative data for land audits and other forms of analysis. Ideally, administrative data would be able to provide concrete information on registered land holdings, and the increasing digitisation of land registration information will make analysis of such data easier.

As part of good land governance, states should provide systems – such as registration, cadastre, and licensing systems – to record individual and collective tenure rights across the continuum of rights, including those held by the state and public sector, the private sector, and Indigenous peoples and other communities with collective tenure rights. Such systems should record, maintain, and publicise tenure rights and duties, including who holds those rights and duties and the parcels or holdings of land, fisheries, or forests to which the rights and duties relate (FAO, 2012). There are, however, some considerations to be taken into account. New digital records are used only for new transactions, so do not include older
land records. Land administration data rarely contain socio-economic data, such as on race and gender. When land is registered in the names of companies or trusts, information on the owners of these is often not identifiable. For example, when doing a land audit in South Africa, it was found that 61% of private land was held by companies and the government was unable to identify who the owners were (DRDLR, 2017). The value of land administrative data is reduced if land is not registered, as in many collective land settings, or the registered information is not accurate, as is often the case even with established land ownership systems (Cousins, 2018).

3.2.3 GENDER INEQUALITY

Gender analyses of land rights are increasingly being done, but this currently remains at the level of simple male/female comparisons. Although many women’s experiences of insecurity have broad similarities, it is important to do more analysis that takes into account the reality that women are not a homogenous group. Women have different experiences of discrimination according to factors such as their age, marital status, sexual orientation, class, ethnicity, and cognitive or physical diversity. Transgender and non-binary people can also face unique challenges, given how gender roles inform access to land (EGM on CSW 62, 2017).

Further, in national statistics women are often considered as “helpers” in agricultural work and to only hold land rights through men; consequently, they are not recognised in employment data and their contribution is not taken into account for economic purposes (Guereña, 2017; Guereña, 2015).

A significant proportion of rural women access land and forests through community-based or customary tenure regimes. An analysis of customary rules in 30 low- and middle-income countries concluded that community rules are often markedly discriminatory against women and fall far short of international standards (RRI, 2017). Measuring inequality in this context requires the measurement of levels of power and the nature of land governance, something that is not widely done at present and that will likely require some qualitative analysis.

3.2.4 THE LANDLESS AND LAND-POOR

The poorest and most marginalised people always face the risk of being left out of surveys and census processes due to factors such as their lack of accessibility, lack of fixed addresses (which are used in many sample frames), and prejudices on the part of enumerators. For example, immigrants, who form a large part of agricultural labour forces in many countries, have good reasons to avoid being counted. Remote Indigenous communities, often not on good terms with the state, can also easily be undercounted.

Agricultural censuses are based on land holdings, so they miss people who do not have land in their name but who may be or have been involved in agriculture and still have an interest in it. In Colombia, this means that 800,000 rural households whose livelihoods are dependent on land are missed in the agricultural census, as they do not own land due to the conflict in the country and debt-related displacements (Bautista, 2018). Many landless people are wage workers, most often temporary, in the agribusiness sector.
This can be addressed to some extent by drawing on household surveys, but most of these will also not identify an individual or a household as being involved or interested in agriculture if they are not currently producing. Thus the landless and land-poor are often missed, even though they might be the most important target group for land and agrarian reforms.

### 3.2.5 MEASURING THE QUALITY OF LAND RIGHTS

The main ways in which land inequality is currently measured do not address or compare the quality of the land rights that people hold. The nature of ownership and other forms of land rights on the continuum of tenure rights varies between countries and for different people within countries. This has been recognised in work on measuring land rights in relation to the SDG commitments, especially for SDG Indicators 1.4.2 and 5.a.1. The methodology developed for measuring these looks at two factors. One is the legally recognised documentation of land rights and the other is the perception of tenure security that people have, which is assumed to indicate, albeit in a limited way, their feelings about the overall quality of their land rights (IAEG-SDG, 2018; IAEG-SDG, 2017). The approach to measuring the perception of tenure security is being developed by, among others, the Prindex initiative, which has piloted surveys in a number of countries and is planning to roll them out to more countries (Prindex, 2018). The advantage of the measurement of perceptions of tenure security is the potential to apply the approach and compare it across all tenure types (IAEG-SDG, 2018; Quan, 2015). This, of course, is still a fairly simplistic way of assessing the quality of rights that people enjoy.

### 3.2.6 DEALING WITH COMPLEXITY

There is an allure to numbers and graphs that give us a clear and simple picture of what is happening not just in one area or country but across the world. Such data are certainly valuable in showing broad dynamics and for use in advocacy. But it is essential not to forget the complexity that is often missed in such quantitative data. For example, administrative and survey/census land data make invisible the substantial differences in land quality in different locations. Even within a single village, the productive potential of land parcels of the same size can vary dramatically. Within countries and regions there is far more demand for land of good quality, with access to water and near to roads, other infrastructure, and markets. The broad overviews of farm sizes and land concentration, or the lack of it in land-abundant countries, can miss the fact that the real contestation and even conflicts are almost always over land in such high-value areas.

The dynamics of Indigenous and other collective land situations are generally harder to capture in large quantitative analyses, as people’s rights to land are moderated through (in some cases shifting) social relations and relations with a changing natural environment. A simple example of the challenge is how one would quantify the amount of land (whether through survey or land administration system) that a particular member of a pastoralist community has a right to. That person’s right to land is negotiated in relation to others and shifts as the community changes and the land used at different times of the year changes, and may overlap with other groups’ use of the same land. This flexibility is the strength of such systems, which should not be undermined by the desire to measure. People’s actual rights in practice are often moderated through hard to identify social norms and power relations, certainly in communal land settings but even in settings where formal land titles are issued.
Using perception surveys of people’s access and rights to land is one way to measure in collective land areas, including territories of Indigenous peoples. In many of these areas there will be no effective land values (due to an absence of functioning land markets) that can be applied, so it will be necessary to rely on land size and use. Qualitative research can be used to establish a better understanding of the value (holistically conceptualised) of territories and communal land and related natural resources to peoples and communities. Political power, sometimes linked to legal power, is often hard to measure and may be beyond the knowledge of local people and their perceptions but it remains a determining factor, as seen in a recent order by the Supreme Court of India that could lead to the eviction of millions of forest dwellers (Masih, 2019). In addition, therefore, to equitable processes for accessing and controlling land at the community level, it is important to gauge to what extent marginalised groups – such as landless and land-poor people – are able to contribute in meaningful ways to national-level rules and norm-making and, therefore, defend or assert their rights at multiple levels.

Some key points emerge from the above:

- Through combining different data sources, it is possible to do better analysis of the vertical inequality of land holdings across different size classes. This can provide a good base for advocacy aimed at creating greater equality in land systems.
- It is also possible now, and is becoming more possible with newer surveys and censuses, to do more analysis of gender inequalities in some countries. This can also be used in advocacy.
- Landless and land-poor people should be included when measuring land inequality, in order to shed light on the issue of landlessness and to take these people into account in policy design.
- It is not currently possible to do much meaningful analysis of horizontal inequalities beyond simplistic gender analysis. Pilots can be tried, however, in countries where different data sources can be combined.
- There is room for the implementation of targeted surveys combined with qualitative research, to gather more nuanced data on land and inequality. These would be a way to check on the reliability of official statistics and would serve as examples of what can be done.
- There is significant advocacy work to be done around improving data capture and analysis, including for improved household survey and agricultural census data gathering and analysis and improvements in data capture and analysis from land administration systems. The aim should be to have the ability for full and reliable horizontal and vertical land inequality analysis that can be linked to work on wider inequalities.
- More work is needed to find ways to take into account the complex and different realities of land and people’s lives, including the often overlooked power relations that have an impact on land rights and the control of benefits from land.
Figure 4: Reinforcing cycles of land and inequality

Alternative views and opinions are marginalised.

Alienation and frustration lead to counter-movements. Constructive and/or destructive.

Philanthropists, NGOs, IGOs, academic institutions follow money and power. Buy into and re-enforce paradigm.

Policies, budgets, tech infrastructure geared to elites/corporations and their paradigm.

Modernisation and growth paradigm.

Accumulation by elites.

Losses to some.

More elite wealth.

More concentrated elite corporate social and political power.

Some lose power.

Existing colonial ad/or other elites with capital and influence.

Source: the authors
In Europe, half of the total agricultural land in 2013 was controlled by only 3.1% of all farms (of 100 ha or more).

This extractive approach to land-based resources sees land divorced from its biophysical relationships and from the daily needs of local people.

MAIN TRENDS AND DRIVERS OF LAND INEQUALITY

The increasing concentration of land tenure, use, and control has raised concerns among civil society organisations (CSOs) (Bautista, 2018; GRAIN, 2014; Zagema, 2011) and international institutions (FAO, 2014). This is an issue not only affecting developing countries. In Europe, half of the total agricultural land in 2013 was controlled by only 3.1% of all farms (of 100 ha or more) while small farms (of less than 10 ha), representing three-quarters of all farms, controlled only 11% of the total utilised agricultural area (Kay, 2016b).

The creation and maintenance of land inequalities – and the wider inequalities that these are part of – involves a range of inter-related, mutually reinforcing factors. This process can be summarised as involving a combination of factors: 1) a dominant (hegemonic) view of “modernisation” and “progress” that is used to justify actions that drive inequality; 2) historic conditions of wealth and power inequality that are built on, using approaches sanctioned by the dominant paradigm; 3) a stronger position of the wealthier elite to influence policies in their favour, enabling further accumulation; 4) the exercise of wealth and power in influencing a wide range of actors who then provide support to and reinforce the dominant paradigm and its implementation (this often includes academic institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and philanthropists); and 5) the tendency for critical or alternative views to be marginalised, while frustration at levels of relative poverty drives counter-movements that can be either destructive or constructive (or a combination of these) in finding new ways of working that could overcome inequality (Figure 4).

4.1 HISTORIC ROOTS AND THE EXTRACTIVIST PARADIGM OF MODERNISATION

Countries with colonial histories tend to have higher levels of inequality today, as a result of accumulation by dispossession and imposed systems of production and distribution. This has combined with gender-, ethnic-, or caste-based discrimination, which was used as part of a narrative to justify inequalities in wealth and power. Colonial regimes tended to use these divisions in society to their advantage as part of the means of control and exploitation that put more wealth into the hands of a small number of colonialists and some of their allies (African Union, 2009b; Mamdani, 1996).

Based on land accumulation, enslaved work, and the exploitation of nature, a dominant extractive model was established to supply minerals and raw materials to growing economies in Europe (Rodney, 1972). This extractive approach to land-based resources sees land divorced from its biophysical relationships and from the daily needs of local people.
A dual agricultural system emerged with, on one side, large-scale plantations administered through state institutions; on the other, subsistence-oriented small farms on land predominately governed by customary authorities and with a lower provision of public services (Frankema, 2010). This dual system based on a deep-seated and narrow modernisation paradigm that includes productivism (the belief that productivity and growth are the purpose of human organisation), combined with discrimination against the agricultural practices of the majority, has informed agrarian policies until today (Brockett, 1992). This has been used to justify the concentration of land and non-regenerative uses of land, water, and forests. The shift to these forms of reorganising land use and access is often underpinned by physical or structural violence to restrict the viable exploration of alternatives.

Meanwhile, in Europe the benefits of (often inherited) land ownership are still reinforced by agricultural subsidies that transfer more state funds to larger landowners and little to small-scale farmers, thus exacerbating class and gender inequalities (Möllers et al., 2011).

The processes of liberation from colonialism did not end the inequalities created, but rather saw efforts by those in power during colonial times to hold onto their wealth, if not political power. With time, traditional elites established new alliances and other elite groups emerged that reconsolidated structures of privilege and inequality. South Africa is a particularly stark and well documented example of this process (McKinley, 2017; Bond et al., 2014); this experience is outlined in Annex 3.

More recently, the extractivist paradigm and the dominant development model has pushed the colonisation of tropical lowlands sponsored by the state in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and other Latin American countries. Based on the myth of unoccupied and underutilised land, extensive territories have been allocated without consideration for prior rights, fostering inequality and triggering serious land conflicts with Indigenous communities (Griffiths, 2004).

Today, there is a new cycle of accumulation by dispossession (Andreucci et al., 2017; Harvey, 2004) and voices calling for more of the world’s land to be put under technology- and capital-intensive production in order to meet an increasing global demand for food (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). According to FAO, the global area under soybean cultivation is set to increase by one-third to some 125 million ha by 2050, the sugarcane area by 28% to 27 million ha, and the rapeseed area by 16% to 36 million ha (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). As for oil palm, there are currently 15 million ha under production for edible palm oil (not biofuels) and this is expected to nearly double, with an additional 12–29 million ha coming into production by 2050 (Corley, 2009). Much of this expansion will happen in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The argument of “available” land, however, has been questioned by others who warn about potential violation of the land rights of local communities and increasing inequality (De Schutter, 2011; Merlet, 2013a). The lack of effective protection of collective rights, despite being enshrined in major international instruments, is another driver of land inequality. Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs) claim 65% of global land, but only 10% is actually recognised by governments (Alden Wily, 2011).
4.2 MARKET FORCES: GLOBALISATION, FINANCIALISATION, AND INVISIBLE FORMS OF CONTROL OVER LAND

The dynamics of land concentration are not new, but at this time they are happening within an advanced form of corporate capitalism involving investors (capital) squeezing whatever they can from the increased production of goods (or “expanded reproduction”). This is no longer bringing sufficient returns, however, which is leading to increasing concentration of wealth and power by means of “accumulation by dispossession” and the extraction of profit through multiple forms of “rent” (unearned income) capture from land, labour, and other “pseudo commodities” (Lannen et al., 2019; Andreucci et al., 2017; Harvey, 2010; Harvey, 2004; Polanyi, 1957). Greater returns can now be made from capital gains and rents than from investing in actual production (Andreucci et al., 2017; Piketty, 2014; Harvey, 2010), with potentially disastrous implications for employment and food security as such factors no longer align with investors’ interests. This is combining with other drivers including population growth, land degradation, climate change, urban expansion, and changing diets, all contributing to increasing pressures on land.

Through a process of financialisation, agricultural land is becoming an “alternative asset class”, with decision-making moving further from farmers and any connection to land and production, as the priority becomes returns to investors and shareholders (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2018; Clapp and Isakson, 2018; Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2017). Farmers have lost power and face reduced returns and growing competition for their farmland. The line between food and finance has blurred, and corporate food retailers have emerged as dominant actors. The politics of the regulation of agricultural derivatives has shifted the global price of food away from the material aspects of supply and demand to become more volatile and more tightly pegged to financial markets (Isakson, 2014; Clapp and Helleiner, 2012). All of this is intensifying the exploitation of workers, who are in a weaker negotiation position, and pushing real wages down, with a steadily increasing share of value, including that from improved productivity, going to capital and less going to labour (Lannen et al., 2019; Cochet, 2018; Cochet and Merlet, 2011). In prioritising returns to shareholders, financialisation exacerbates inequalities across and within different geographic locations, drives socio-ecological changes that undermine food system resiliency, and impedes collective action due to the highly complex nature of financial instruments and expanding elite lobbying power (Clapp and Isakson, 2018).

Though still a debated concept, financialisation refers to the “increasing growing role played by financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial establishments in the functioning of local and international economies” (Epstein, 2005, cited in Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2018). For more information, see also Thomson and Dutta (2015).
The food price shocks of 2007 and 2008, coupled with the global financial crisis and the demand for agro-based energy, stimulated a wave of large-scale land acquisitions. The Land Matrix Initiative\(^\text{12}\) had by January 2019 registered 1,800 concluded or pending land deals – most of them in Africa and Asia – affecting over 69 million ha of land (equivalent to the land area of Kenya and Malawi combined). Almost half of the affected area was formerly owned by communities (Noite et al., 2016). This accelerated accumulation of land raises serious concerns about the land rights and food security of marginalised groups such as women, the elderly, marginalised castes or ethnic groups, small-scale farmers, and pastoralists (Cotula, 2009; De Schutter, 2011; Borras Jr et al., 2014). The impacts can be particularly severe where local land governance is weak and/or shaped by widespread corruption and the use of extrajudicial violence. The long-term decline in agricultural livelihoods also affects the willingness of adult children to take on their farming parents’ land, opening a space for financiers to step in.

In recent years the number of investment funds operating in the agri-food sector has grown exponentially from 38 in 2005 to 240 in 2014 and 440 in 2018, managing US$73 billion in assets (Valoral Advisors, 2018; Valoral Advisors, 2015). Pension funds are some of the largest players: by August 2018, 76 public and corporate pension funds had jointly allocated roughly US$15 billion to farmland investments (GRAIN, 2018). Increasingly, development finance, such as World Bank Group loans, is directed through “financial intermediaries” such as commercial banks and equity funds – transactions which are overwhelmingly secret.\(^\text{13}\)

Invisible forms of control over land are becoming increasingly important, such as contract farming, joint ventures, and value chains. Value chain interventions emerged out of the corporate approach to supply chain management and have become ubiquitous in the development sector, with a focus on linking small-scale farmers with “regional and global formal markets” (Seville et al., 2011: 3). As well as adopting corporate tools, the value chain approach is based on the premise that, faced with globalisation, “The most fruitful response is not to debate whether global economic integration should take place at all, but rather to examine how this integration can be managed to produce positive effects for a majority of participants” (Gereffi et al., 2001: 2). While some value chain interventions may bring benefits to the farmers involved, the uncritical application of such an approach and the neglect of other options are not justified by the outcomes in many cases (Wegerif and Martucci, 2018; Tapela, 2008). In other cases there is a lack of credible assessments showing that value chains can achieve their intended development goals (Humphrey and Navas-DAlémán, 2010), while numerous reports, even by proponents of value chains, have found that they are not good at reaching the poorest communities, as they tend to involve farmers who already have more assets and education (Seville et al., 2011; Humphrey and Navas-DAlémán, 2010; Minten et al., 2009). Value chain interventions

\(^\text{12}\) The Land Matrix Initiative was launched by ILC in 2012 as a global observatory of land deals for agricultural production, timber extraction, carbon trading, industry, renewable energy production, conservation, and tourism. See: [https://landmatrix.org](https://landmatrix.org)

\(^\text{13}\) For instance, BankTrack is an international tracking, campaigning, and CSO support organisation targeting private sector commercial banks and the activities they finance. See: [https://www.banktrack.org](https://www.banktrack.org)

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In Eastern Europe and Latin America, the rapid development of new forms of large-scale agricultural production is favouring returns on capital over remuneration for labour, thus increasing inequality.
also tend to overlook the fact that incorporation into global markets can have extremely adverse consequences for farmers (Hickey and Du Toit, 2013; Du Toit, 2004), and at the same time they risk undermining the local and territorial markets that most farmers already sell to and where most food is traded (Wegerif and Martucci, 2018; Kay, 2016a).

The core issue is that these types of arrangement involve actors with very unequal power, which can lead to more dependency and inequality, typically transforming peasants into workers on their own land by subordinating them to “dominant frameworks of global agribusiness and capital accumulation” (Amanor and Chichava, 2016). In Eastern Europe and Latin America, the rapid development of new forms of large-scale agricultural production is favouring returns on capital over remuneration for labour, thus increasing inequality (Cochet and Merlet, 2011; Cochet, 2018). Empirical studies in Latin America (Burgos and Guereña, 2017) and South Africa (Chamberlain and Anseeuw, 2018) have also concluded that small-scale and family farmers tend to be incorporated into agricultural export markets on very unequal terms.

4.3 LAND CONTROL AND POLITICAL POWER

Inequality is self-perpetuating, since it is at the same time a cause and a consequence in a vicious cycle where public policies are shaped in ways that advantage those at the top, at the expense of the rest of society (Stiglitz, 2012). Economic elites use their wealth and political power to influence public policy or directly take up powerful political positions in order to maintain their privileges. In this way, landed elites are in a position to promote policies – in local, national, and international spaces – that will not only protect them and their land and wealth, but also enable further accumulation of wealth and power (Giridharadas, 2018; Pimentel et al., 2018; McKinley, 2017; Guereña, 2016). This happens both at the domestic and global levels.

4.3.1 NATIONAL POLICIES TAILORED TO THE ELITES

The interests of landlords are systematically over-represented in political decision-making bodies. Very often corporate and government elite interests coincide, and it is very difficult in some countries to separate them. A paradigmatic example is the “bancada ruralista” (Parliamentary Agricultural Front (FPA)) in Brazil, which represents the interests of the agri-industrial sector in the National Congress. Landless and land-poor majorities, by contrast, barely have a political voice, so their needs and demands tend to be ignored in policy decision-making and budgets. Women, peasants, and Indigenous and Afro-descendant people have fewer opportunities to influence policies and often face significant risk when they speak up. This failure of democracy reinforces a vicious cycle: redistributive policies are not on the agenda unless there are political representatives or social movements able to drive them (Oxfam Brasil, 2016).
Scotland, which has extreme inequality in land ownership (Glenn et al., 2019; CLS, 2016), is another paradigmatic case of political capture. Elites in Scotland, closely linked to elites in England, have in the past used their influence to defend their interests in the UK Parliament, whereas ordinary Scottish citizens were unable to get attention for their specific concerns, such as unequal land distribution. It was only after Scotland got its own Parliament that government started to take action to address land inequalities.\(^{14}\)

Understanding the political control by economic elites also helps explain why so many governments in Latin America and other regions have prioritised the extractivist model as their main economic engine, despite this being considered by many to be intrinsically unfair, unsustainable, and also inefficient. Annex 3 unpacks this phenomenon in a little more detail.

Policies in the name of national security are commonly enacted to repress any social movement resisting the extractivist agenda and limiting the ability of civil society to confront power. In the struggle for land, land and human rights defenders are increasingly being attacked and killed, with Indigenous peoples especially under attack and women suffering particular forms of sexual violence (Global Witness, 2018). Impunity is more and more a feature of this violence, with only 12% of the murders of land and human rights defenders in 2017 resulting in the arrest of any suspect. In cases where investigations do take place, they tend to be focused only on who carried out the act, while those masterminding the attacks are rarely formally accused (Front Line Defenders, 2019). The legal system is also used as a weapon against human rights and environmental defenders, with judicial harassment attempting to intimidate and force them into silence. Criminalisation of their actions transforms activism into crime and is an effective tool to silence activists, forcing them to devote time, energy, and financial resources to legal defence and also stigmatising and alienating them from support networks (Guereña, 2016).

Corruption often drives, or works hand in hand with, poor administration of territories and natural resources when large-sale projects are undertaken, land re-zoning occurs, or land is expropriated (Arial et al., 2011). This corruption exacerbates land inequality when state lands are appropriated, as in Brazil and Paraguay, or licences granted without due process, as in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras (Guereña, 2016). Women are more vulnerable to land corruption, as they tend to have less access to political power and to information about their land rights and land administration processes, and are less likely to be part of social networks. They also face particular types of extortion, such as demands for sexual favours (Richardson et al., 2018).

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14 Based on an interview with Linsay Chalmers of Community Land Scotland. The Scottish Land Commission was set up in 2016, by an Act of the Scottish Parliament, to address a range of land issues (Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 asp 18).
4.3.2 ENABLING INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND ENVIRONMENT

Neglecting the rights and needs of the majority, most states are engaged in a “race to the bottom” in trying to create an enabling environment to attract investors (Kiai, 2015). Policy measures include deregulating land markets, creating special areas for economic development where national rules do not apply, relaxing environmental protection, granting fiscal privileges and special use concessions without due process, and closing the space for social resistance (Mousseau, 2019; Global Witness, 2018; World Bank, 2017; Martin-Prével and Mousseau, 2016; Kiai, 2015; Willoughby, 2014).

International development institutions have also been very active in setting the conditions to make land investments more attractive. The World Bank, despite claiming to secure farmers’ access to land, has been accused of undermining land rights and increasing land inequality by financing large-scale investments, promoting contract market schemes, and discouraging regulation through its ease of doing business ranking programmes (Martin-Prével and Mousseau, 2016; Geary, 2012). Agricultural “growth corridors” have become one of the prominent vehicles for the World Bank, corporations, and development agencies to apply a range of measures in support of corporate investments and accumulation, often at the expense of local farmers and businesses. Annex 3 explains these “growth corridors” in more detail.

International investment treaties and free trade agreements shield the interests of investors over other considerations, weakening national capacity to regulate food, land, and water sectors (Pérez et al., 2011). In 2017 a Swedish company filed a claim against the Government of Tanzania at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) housed at the World Bank concerning the cancellation of a US$500 million investment involving 20,000 ha of land and the potential eviction of 1,500 local farming families (Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Smaller, 2017; Coleman and Cordes, 2017; ICSID, 2017). Mechanisms of this kind act as a barrier to redistributive policies and legitimise the notion that states can sign away their right to control critical aspects of their own policy environment. For example, such agreements often include clauses limiting the state’s capacity to regulate foreign land ownership or renting (CCSI, 2016; Cotula, 2015), while others force states to compensate companies at market prices in cases of expropriation for land restitution to Indigenous peoples (Tauli-Corpuz, 2015).

As well as creating enabling policy environments for corporate accumulation, states are also handing over public land (including forests and communally occupied land) to private companies for the purposes of tourism, mining, and large-scale commercial agriculture (Andreucci et al., 2017; Noit et al., 2016). Land dispossession in the name of conservation – but often actually for tourism or other business purposes – has gone on historically and continues today with large-scale evictions, especially of Indigenous people (Masih, 2019; Vidal, 2016; PINGO’s Forum, 2013). This is happening despite evidence that Indigenous peoples, from forest dwellers to pastoralists, with rights to their territories, along with other appropriate policies and support for their practices, are the best defenders of the environment and biodiversity (RII, 2016; Pearce, 2016; Fratkin and Mearns, 2003). Inequalities of wealth and power play a role in this situation with alliances between big corporate interests, even from the extractives industry, and powerful conservation organisations and lobby groups (Klein, 2014).
4.4 RESISTANCE AND PERSISTENCE

These processes have not gone unchallenged. Many communities across all main continents have mobilised, sometimes successfully, to directly defend their land and environment from accumulation by the few (Mitchley, 2018; Anderson and Lee, 2010). Many Indigenous peoples and first nations are, despite all the pressures, defending land and value systems that emphasise sharing to meet needs, rather than accumulating, and a mutual, rather than extractive, relationship with land, which is a responsibility for people more than something they have a right to (Black, 2011).

There are social movements that challenge the dominant paradigm with alternative visions, such as food sovereignty, and movements that are directly redistributing land to create greater equality (CLS, 2016; La Via Campesina, 2011a; Branford and Rocha, 2002). Indigenous communities and peasant farmers have sustained socially and ecologically regenerative production and resource utilisation practices that are equitable and maintain autonomy from the corporate system (Regenvanu, 2010; Van der Ploeg, 2008). Sustainable production practices that work with, rather than attempting to dominate, the environment, notably agro-ecology, are being developed and are spreading fast (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Mdee et al., 2018; Holt-Giménez and Altieri, 2013; Rosset et al., 2011; De Schutter, 2010; Francis et al., 2003; Altieri, 2002). New alternative food networks, along with nested and solidarity markets, are being constructed to create a more equal sharing of value from food producers to consumers, amongst other benefits (Hebinck et al., 2015; Schneider et al., 2015; Rakopoulos, 2015; Renting et al., 2003). Historical and traditional food systems and local economies, characterised by high levels of equality, are persisting despite pressures from corporations and their state and NGO allies (Wegerif, 2018; Hebinck et al., 2016; Chitanda, 2015; Regenvanu, 2010; Anderson and Lee, 2010; Abrahams, 2009). All of these are creating a resistance to the concentration of land and power in the food and agricultural sector.

Indigenous communities around the world are getting greater recognition of their collective land rights and in doing so are resisting the commoditisation of their land, even when they do not state it in those terms (Pearce, 2016). Other initiatives, as far apart as Community Land Scotland, the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) in Brazil, and grassroots initiatives in Liberia and Mozambique, are struggling to take privatised land and put it under forms of community management, rather than individual freehold title (CLS, 2016; Branford and Rocha, 2002; Knight et al., 2012). Such initiatives can be learnt from and built on. Securing land under democratic forms of community control increases the potential to use that land to meet social and ecological needs. It is also important to give more attention to developing democratically governed and more equitable financing arrangements that can support a more equal land dispensation, small-scale family farming, and related non-corporate processing and distribution enterprises.

15 More information can be found at these and other websites: https://www.landrightsnow.org; https://viacampesina.org/en; https://oippnet.org
The limits of current development models are increasingly clear, and we need to give renewed attention to other paths of progress. For peasant farmers and Indigenous peoples, it is not a theoretical debate – it is about their reality and defence of a way of life. Through these struggles, some communities are reimagining, in practice, different social and economic paths that need to be better understood, valued, and built on.
OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING LAND AND INEQUALITY

This section explores some of the policy measures to address land and inequality, starting with the broad approach needed to address the fundamental drivers, followed by more specific interventions. This is based on the literature review undertaken for this framing document, interviews with key informants, and experiences on the ground. It is far from being comprehensive, but it aims to feed the debate and frame future research work on land and inequality.

5.1 ADDRESSING THE FUNDAMENTALS

Structural drivers of land inequality need to be addressed, even if they will require long-term processes of change to make a meaningful and sustainable impact. Short-term measures that address aspects of land inequalities should be pursued, especially if they open space for the longer-term changes, but it is important to avoid interventions that reinforce the status quo. Decision-making and interventions to address land inequality also need to be democratised with the meaningful involvement of, amongst others, landless people, the land-poor, small-scale farmers, and Indigenous people, and particularly women within these groups.

As rural transformation unfolds, capital-intensive and extractive sectors are displacing agricultural workers and peasant farmers, with no alternative source of livelihoods in sight. Growth is needed in some countries, but it may also drive inequality and fail to improve the lives of the majority of people. Growth should be the secondary outcome of focusing on meeting people’s needs and aspirations. Otherwise the economy grows, but so do poverty, inequality, and ecological destruction.

Polanyi identified land, labour, and capital as false commodities because, although essential to production, they are not produced in the same way as typical commodities (land is accessed, not made, and money is a fictional commodity) and therefore they do not respond to market forces in the way that commodities are assumed to (Polanyi, 1957). These three factors of production have continued to be central to agrarian debates, and finding innovative ways to deal with them outside a paradigm of their maximum exploitation, so as to sustain production and build greater equity, has to be central to any systemic solution to land and inequality challenges.

It is essential to challenge the dominant modernisation paradigm, including its corporate-driven growth orientation, that informs so much policy-making and programmes that are driving greater land inequality. This requires a rigorous critique and the mobilisation of different actors to question the commoditisation of land and related natural resources, the obsession with growth as the most important outcome, and the drive for ever greater efficiency and more land and labour productivity, the most direct outcomes of which are higher unemployment and agricultural practices that are
destructive of soils and the environment. This modernisation paradigm needs to be replaced with one rooted in the solutions that people on the ground are implementing in their daily lives and that peasant and Indigenous people’s movements are working on in their advocacy and practice. These include food sovereignty, agro-ecology (in its radical forms), traditional economies, territorial markets, symbiotic food systems, and solidarity economy alternatives (Wegerif, 2018; Kay, 2016a; Satgar, 2014; Holt-Giménez and Altieri, 2013; La Via Campesina, 2011b; Regenvanu, 2010; Van der Ploeg, 2008). Central to these solutions are ways of organising production and distribution that work for people, environment, and society and build greater autonomy from corporate systems. The solutions are there, but they need to be further documented, promoted, and increasingly drawn on to shape the mainstream of policy and other decision-making by states and influential institutions.

Central to greater land inequality is commoditising land so that it becomes an object of investment for profit and speculation, with an inevitable path of greater accumulation and inequality. Therefore, it is essential to protect land that is not yet commoditised and, where possible, find ways that privately held land can be de-commoditised.

5.2 LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE AND EXPLORING NEW POLICIES

There is no “one size fits all” approach to tackling land inequality, as the nature of appropriate policies and other interventions depends on country-specific policy and institutional settings. But there are existing experiences to learn from and some potential paths of change. A few of these are elaborated on below.

5.2.1 REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES AND INTEGRATED AGRARIAN REFORM

The most straightforward way to reduce land inequality is by redistributing land. After decades of attention, however, agrarian reform seems to have dropped off the agenda in the wake of neoliberal policies that have placed limits on the role of states, especially in redistribution policies. However, the Rome Declaration on World Food Security, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and more recently the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and other People Working in Rural Areas refer to agrarian reforms as being needed in order to facilitate access to land and limit excessive concentration and control of it. Land reform is also seen by many development experts as an effective means of reducing poverty (Mellor and Malik, 2017; Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014; Simtowe et al., 2013; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987).

16 “Where appropriate, States shall take appropriate measures to carry out agrarian reforms in order to facilitate broad and equitable access to land and other natural resources necessary to ensure that peasants and other people working in rural areas enjoy adequate living conditions, and to limit excessive concentration and control of land, taking into account its social function.” Article 17, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and other People Working in Rural Areas. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/165
East Asian countries have undergone substantial land reforms that have contributed to creating greater land equality and reducing poverty, with a basic model involving increased peasant and small-scale production, the sale of surpluses bringing a level of broad-based accumulation, large multiplier effects that stimulate local non-farm economic activity, and improving health and education services (Jayne et al., 2016; Mellor, 1999; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987).

In Latin America, transforming land tenure structures has proved to be an elusive goal. Even the most revolutionary land reforms – like those in Mexico, Peru, or Nicaragua – have not achieved lasting transformations; neither those based on expanding the agricultural frontier – in Brazil, Paraguay, or Bolivia – nor even less those based on the market, like those in Guatemala and El Salvador after peace accords. Some of these interventions created conflicts among former and new landholders, when the existing land rights of Indigenous peoples were not respected. Ultimately, they failed to bring sustained redistribution, as today land is even more concentrated than in the 1960s (Guereña, 2016). Likewise, land redistribution has faced major challenges in other countries with high levels of inequality, such as South Africa. In general, the lack of comprehensive measures beyond land distribution (access to markets and credit, infrastructure development, appropriate technology, improvements to health and education services), counter-reform policies, privatisation of collective lands, evictions, and corruption in land administration have all undermined land reform processes.

Social services, in particular education and healthcare, are essential to reduce inequalities, alongside land reforms and effective land governance (Kabeer, 2016; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987). They have a big impact on gender inequalities as they relieve, to some extent, the burden of unpaid care work that women still disproportionally carry, thus potentially freeing them to be able to engage in agriculture and other economic or leisure activities (EGM on CSW 62, 2017; FAO, 2010; Razavi, 2003; Elson and Cagatay, 2000).

The political space for direct land redistributive policies is increasingly constrained in many countries, given the dominance of a neoliberal economic agenda (Scoones et al., 2018). Direct actions in the form of land occupations can also drive redistributive land reforms when states have failed. Such direct action is an accessible and practical, but also risky, way of meeting direct needs for isolated and marginalised communities who have no political clout (Wegerif, 2010; Branford and Rocha, 2002). In Paraguay, since the transition to democracy in 1989 the peasant and landless movements have occupied over 500,000 ha of land. Violent evictions and criminalisation are, however, increasingly used by the state and landowners, including tightening of national security laws and more

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than 100 extrajudicial executions from 1989 to 2013 (Guereña and Rojas, 2016). In Brazil, where hundreds of thousands of families have secured land through occupations, the new Bolsonaro administration is seeking to classify invasions of farmland by landless workers’ movements as akin to terrorism, with harsher penalties for perpetrators and more impunity for the killing of social movement leaders and land rights activists.

In synthesis, agrarian reform is probably more necessary than ever, but the socio-economic, demographic, and environmental conditions have fundamentally changed. It is necessary to learn from the past and design land reform policies for the twenty-first century that are able to take on old and new power structures, at local and global levels, that will act against any redistributive effort (Merlet, 2013b).

5.2.2 PROGRESSIVE TAXES

Taxation is a key policy tool, not only to generate revenue but also to influence behaviour and market outcomes. Progressive taxes (those that tax the richest more heavily) on income, wealth, and inheritances contribute to reducing inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Taxes on land may discourage speculation, encourage more effective land use, and reduce the intergenerational transmission of inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2018; Deininger, 2003). Yet many of the world’s most unequal countries have zero or very low inheritance tax rates (for example, just 4% in Brazil) (Alvaredo et al., 2018), showing that there is considerable room for action. Tax collection is, of course, also important to provide the finance that governments need to provide effective services in support of a thriving and more egalitarian agricultural sector and rural society. Land taxes are a commonly used and effective generator of revenue for local government (Deininger, 2003).

Taxing and regulating the extractives industry is essential. Many of the companies investing in land and the extractives sector in Latin America have been found to be registered in tax havens, and sometimes to be hiding the illegal origin of the funds (Borras Jr et al., 2014). Tax havens have been found to be bolstering industries tied to environmental destruction: over the decade from 2000 to 2011, about 70% of foreign capital reached beef- and soy-producing companies in Brazil after being routed through subsidiaries in low- or zero-tax rate jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands (Galaz et al., 2018).

Wealth currently held in tax havens is equivalent to 10% of global GDP, indicating just how essential it is to address tax evasion and avoidance, which requires coordinated international efforts to shut down tax havens and other tax avoidance measures. Greater transparency is essential and it has been suggested, given the global movement of capital, that a global asset register be created (Alvaredo et al., 2018); this needs to include land and property holdings that are also increasingly held by international investors (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2017).

5.2.3 AGRO-ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Managing land and other natural goods in a sustainable and regenerative way is essential for this and future generations. This is an urgent issue for our survival and also an equality issue because, firstly, the nature of land inequality is bound up with the extractive use (abuse) of land and its linked resources that is driving climate change and environmental degradation and, secondly, this destruction is having greater impacts on the most marginalised, driving them further into poverty and reducing their opportunities to improve
their lives (IPCC, 2014; Nyéléni, 2007). Agro-ecological practices create greater autonomy for farmers (as they do not depend on external inputs) and are a strategy for avoiding incorporation into the highly unequal corporate agri-food system (Nyéléni, 2007). They also work well with the scale and nature of most peasant and small-scale farmers (Altieri, 2002). It has been confirmed, from Cuba to Tanzania, that small-scale peasant farmers are the quickest to take up improved agro-ecological practices and that this improves their livelihoods, as well as soil fertility and climate change mitigation (Mdee et al., 2018; Rosset et al., 2011). This also enables them to better adapt to increasingly extreme weather conditions (Rosset et al., 2011). International analysis has also found that agro-ecology could be central to achieving the right to food for all (De Schutter, 2010).

Preserving the world’s forests is essential for our environment and the fight against climate change. It has been found that securing Indigenous people’s tenure rights also brings benefits for forest and natural protection, being a strategy that combines the defence of the environment with the defence of human rights (Pearce, 2016; Ding et al., 2016).

5.2.4 LAND MARKET REGULATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND LAND USE PLANNING

Despite some orthodox economic theories, markets – and land markets in particular – have not worked to create greater equality or more efficient resource utilisation (Borras, 2003). Even the promoters of market-driven land reforms agree that there need to be state interventions to enable reforms for greater equity (Deininger, 2003). With expanding human demands for land, reliance on the market is resulting in environmental destruction and underutilised land resources, alongside landlessness and millions of peasants and rural workers who have insufficient land to produce to their full potential (UN, 2019; FAO and UN-Habitat, 2010; Jayne et al., 2003). Responding to these challenges requires an integrated approach and a high level of planning (UN, 2019).

Land markets can be regulated to prevent excessive concentration or to facilitate smallholder acquisitions with mechanisms such as establishing limits to land property, regulating the terms of land renting or who can buy land, and measures to reduce land fragmentation or to subsidise smallholders. Given the increasing importance of corporate control of land, it is essential to establish limits to this indirect appropriation and concentration in the hands of a few. For example, EU countries such as Poland, Denmark, and Malta have mechanisms to place limits on foreign ownership, with a system of government permits for foreigners to be able to own land. Many countries outside the EU also operate restrictions on foreign ownership – for example, Mexico, Australia, the Philippines, Uganda, Thailand, and Ethiopia. Several states in the USA also restrict foreign ownership of agricultural land, as do some Canadian provinces (Peacock, 2018). These ceilings, however, are not sufficient on their own to stop other forms of land accumulation.

The increasing importance of financial investors and transnational corporations in land deals demands more transparency. It would be a helpful step to demand full transparency of ownership or mandated disclosure of land investments so that corporate structures cannot anonymously own land. It may also be useful to have forms of financial sector transparency to enable communities to identify who is financing companies operating on their land, even if the investor or the bank itself does not control the land asset (Hawkes, forthcoming).
Mechanisms for interventions in land markets to protect the public interest are found in a number of countries. In France, the Sociétés d’Aménagement Foncier et d’Etablissement Rural (SAFER) must be notified of each sale of agricultural land and has two months to approve or reject the transaction. In Germany, the regulatory authority has to approve each sale of land above a certain minimum size, which varies from federal state to state. In Sweden, in sparsely populated regions purchasers of agricultural land need a permit, which in some instances requires that the landowner live on the property. In Hungary, there is an upper limit (300 ha) on the amount of land that a domestic natural person can own, and also in Lithuania (500 ha) (Peacock, 2018).

Also essential for equity goals is how land is used, not only who owns it. As part of good land governance, land use should also be regulated to encourage rational, fair, and efficient use. Land use restrictions can be established in the general interest, in order to prevent the exploitation of land and natural resources beyond their natural limits and for a fair distribution of benefits. This is the purpose of land planning, either by local administrations or community organisations. There is now extensive experience in adopting community land use mapping as a way for communities to document, agree on, and help secure their land rights, as well as to clarify use rights within the community (Knight et al., 2017). Such experiences can be learnt from and built upon.

5.2.5 SECURING WOMEN’S LAND RIGHTS

Given that women are over-represented amongst poorer sections of society, with fewer land rights and less power in decision-making, interventions that strengthen women’s land rights have a wider impact on inequality as well as on poverty. There are clear and implementable steps to improve women’s land rights across land tenure systems, including simply ensuring that women are aware they have rights, insisting on joint titling for couples, allowing individual registration of women’s land rights, and securing women’s role in land-related decision-making. Ensuring equal inheritance rights for women is one of the most important changes and often requires legislative as well as social change interventions. FAO has produced technical guidelines with public policy recommendations for gender equality in land administration (FAO, 2013).

Securing more equal land rights for women involves a holistic approach that deals, at the least, with expanding women’s access and rights to land; ensuring documentation of women’s land rights in their own names; effective involvement of women in land tenure and governance decision-making; and measures that take into account and relieve the burden that women carry for social reproduction. Women’s empowerment and sensitisation of men and religious, political, and opinion leaders are equally important.

Women will only have secure rights to land when they have their rights secured within communities that themselves have secure land rights. Especially in community land settings, it has been found that securing women’s land rights involves measures, including legislation and social change, to explicitly secure women as full and recognised members of communities with equal power in decision-making, and at the same time general measures are needed to secure the community as a whole (RRI, 2017; Giovarelli et al., 2016; Knapman and Sutz, 2015; Daley et al., 2013).
There are resources that can be drawn on to inform actions in collective lands and good practices documented about women’s participation in collective and Indigenous people’s land governance (Larson, 2019; RRI, 2017; ONAMIAP, 2017; Namati, 2016; GI-ESCR, 2015).

**5.2.6 PROTECTING LAND RIGHTS DEFENDERS**

Local activism is essential for rights to be upheld and policies implemented (Coalition for Human Rights in Development, 2019). Land and environmental rights defenders, in particular Indigenous people, are under growing attack (Front Line Defenders, 2019). There has to be a concerted effort to protect defenders, since they play a crucial role in mobilising people and making rights real in practice. Governments must meet their obligations to protect land and environmental defenders and implement the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (ILC, 2018) and the resolution recently passed by the UN Human Rights Council focused on environmental human rights defenders.¹⁸

There must be an end to impunity for crimes against land defenders, women, Indigenous peoples, and local communities. This needs effective mechanisms that protect people from any form of violence and criminalisation and prosecute those responsible. Access to justice must be guaranteed by ensuring the independence and impartiality of judicial officials and the proper investigation, punishment, and reparation of human rights violations committed in contexts of land investments, natural resource extraction, and exploitation (Front Line Defenders, 2019; Global Witness, 2018; ILC, 2018). International investors and institutions, like the World Bank and its offshoot the International Finance Corporation (IFC), have to be held accountable for attacks and killings that are committed in the furtherance of their investment interests (Bretton Woods project, 2018).

**5.2.7 MAKING INVESTORS AND COMPANIES ACCOUNTABLE**

Concerns around land grabbing resulted in the drafting and adoption of the VGGTs.¹⁹ These guidelines add to other existing international instruments such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,²⁰ the UN Principles for Responsible Investment,²¹ the World Bank Principles for Responsible Agriculture Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (RAI),²² and efforts on a proposed UN Treaty on Transnational Corporations.²³

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¹⁹ http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf


²¹ https://www.unglobalcompact.org/take-action/action/responsible-investment


²³ This is a proposed legally binding treaty to control transnational corporations with respect to human rights, give victims of corporate abuses access to justice, and challenge the economic and political power of transnational corporations. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/wgtranscorp/pages/igwgonhc.aspx
These instruments, however, lack strong enforcement tools and in some countries legal frameworks are inadequate to hold corporations accountable. Large-scale investment projects (involving mining, agriculture, energy, and infrastructure) have been found to be linked to rights violations and abuses against individuals and communities, but investors (public and private) are rarely held legally responsible (CIDH, 2015).

There needs to be a stronger formulation of how anti-corruption norms and practices, such as those under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), can specifically acknowledge and incorporate land-related corruption, fraud, and screenings of politically exposed persons (PEPs). Companies and banks need to show what concrete measures they are undertaking to ensure that their activities are lawful and appropriate and to press for a business approach in which community consent and choice are critical. Greater transparency on deals and on finances is essential for accountability. There are also growing calls for legislation that would allow communities to take legal action in the home countries of banks and companies – which is particularly important given that land-related legal rights and human rights violations are most likely to occur in contexts of corruption and weak judiciaries. What has worked to block land deals that communities do not want is community activism from the local level upwards, supported by international allies and sometimes including legal actions (Mitchley, 2018; Associated Press, 2017). Access to information is essential to enable such community-led action.
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND CONVENTIONS

THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGs)

Inequality, including land inequality, is implicitly and explicitly incorporated to the SDGs (UN ESC, 2016). While SDG 10 has no specific targets on land inequality, it is clear that achieving some of the targets and the goal requires addressing land inequality, e.g. Target 10.1 on achieving and sustaining income growth for the bottom 40% of the world's population or Target 10.3 on ensuring equal opportunity and reducing inequalities of outcome. SDG Target 1.4 “aims to ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property” (ibid: 39). This is a clear commitment and mandate for the achievement of greater equality in rights and access to land, property, and related resources. The methodologies that have been developed and are being promoted for monitoring the achievement of this and related Target 5.a can also be drawn on in arguing for more in-depth analysis and monitoring of progress on creating more equal land distribution.

AFRICAN UNION COMMITMENTS

The Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges in Africa, adopted by African Heads of State in 2009, foregrounds land equity, including addressing gender inequalities, by: “Resolving to: 1. ensure that land laws provide for equitable access to land and related resources among all land users including the youth and other landless and vulnerable groups such as displaced persons; 2. strengthen security of land tenure for women which require special attention” (African Union, 2009a: 3).

The Heads of State at the same time endorsed the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa, which notes the challenges of unequal access to land and includes in its statement of “fundamental aspirations” the desire for “Equitable access to land, secure land rights, gender equity…” (African Union, 2009b: 24).

VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF TENURE OF LAND, FISHERIES AND FORESTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY (THE VGGTS)

The VGGTs include “equity and justice” and “gender equality” in their implementing principles. They also have a section on redistributive reforms, noting that “[r] edistributive reforms can facilitate broad and equitable access to land and inclusive rural development” (CFS, 2012: 25). Reasons to undertake redistributive reforms are “for social, economic and environmental reasons” (ibid: 25). The VGGTs are very clear that “[s] tates should ensure that women and girls have equal tenure rights and access to land, fisheries and forests independent of their civil and marital status” (ibid: 5). The VGGTs add to the international guidelines and conventions that identify the need for land equality and redistributive reforms to achieve that. The brief and broad recommendations, accompanied as they are by a number of caveats, are not, however, adequate as a guide for addressing land and inequality; that will need to include far-reaching redistributive reforms. This is not surprising given the VGGTs; focus on land governance, but it does confirm the potential value of further work and potential guidelines focused on addressing land inequalities.
CEDAW General Recommendation Number 34 on the Rights of Rural Women

In recognition of the challenges and importance of rural women’s involvement in decision-making, in 2016 the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) issued General Recommendation No. 34, where it calls on Member States to put into practice measures to end all attitudes, practices, and stereotypes that prevent women from enjoying their rights to land, water, and other natural resources (CEDAW, 2016).

CEDAW considers rural women’s rights to land and natural resources as fundamental human rights. Its General Recommendation Number 34 responds to the evidence that rural women “disproportionately experience poverty and exclusion” and “face systemic discrimination in accessing land and natural resources” due to discriminatory laws (or ineffective implementation of the law) and practices and stereotypes that prevent women from enjoying rights over land, including “with respect to communal lands, which are controlled largely by men” (CEDAW, 2016: 4, 16). This Recommendation urges states to “address the negative and differential impacts of economic policies, including agricultural and general trade liberalization, privatization and commodification of land, water and natural resources” (ibid: 5); to “eliminate discriminatory stereotypes including those that compromise the equal rights of rural women to land, water and other natural resources” (ibid: 8); and to “implement measures to prevent and address threats and attacks against rural women human rights defenders, with particular attention to those engaged on issues related to land and natural resources” (ibid: 8). It can be a powerful mechanism for advancing the rights of women and highlighting violations relating to land and property rights for women, encouraging good state practices and holding states to account when violations occur.

UN Declaration on the Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas

According to this recently adopted UN Declaration, peasants and other people living in rural areas have the right to land, individually or collectively. States must take appropriate measures to remove and prohibit all forms of discrimination relating to the right to land, as well as to provide legal recognition and protection for land tenure rights, including customary land tenure rights not currently protected by law. It also obliges states to incorporate into domestic legislation protections against displacement and, where appropriate, carry out agrarian reforms in order to facilitate broad and equitable access to land and other natural resources and to limit excessive concentration and control of land, taking into account its social function. This provides a global framework for national legislation and policies to better protect the rights of peasants, both women and men, improve livelihoods in rural areas, and take action to implement comprehensive agrarian reform and better protections against land-grabbing. Such interventions will make a big contribution to greater land equality, given the current levels of discrimination against peasants.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

In 2011 the Human Rights Council of the United Nations endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. These confirm the responsibilities of states to “respect, protect and fulfil human rights and fundamental freedoms” and make clear that all businesses, regardless of size or location, also have the responsibility to “respect human rights”. Further, the principles state that there should be effective remedies when such obligations are breached. The human rights that businesses must respect include those in the International Bill of Human Rights and the International Labour Organization’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Respecting these rights requires businesses to avoid negative human rights impacts and to seek to prevent or reduce such impacts resulting from their operations. While these principles create some leverage for holding businesses accountable, there are currently limited means of direct enforcement (BHRRC, 2019; UN, 2011).
ANNEX 2:
MEASURING INEQUALITY APPROACHES, CONSIDERATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS

This annex explains some of the main ways of measuring inequality, along with some of the complexities that arise. Most of the existing measures of inequality relate to the narrow measurement of economic inequality, despite the fact that inequality has wider manifestations, such as in social relations.

GINI COEFFICIENT

A commonly referred to measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which is based on the Lorenz curve. The Gini Coefficient is often referred to in order to illustrate which countries are the most unequal and to track changes in overall inequality.

There are many good explanations of how Gini coefficients are calculated and what they mean (e.g. McKay, 2002). We do not elaborate on or widely use the Gini coefficient in this paper as it is a rather blunt, synthetic instrument that reveals little of the nuance or changing nature of inequalities. This is because it relies on undifferentiated data, in a single index, for entire populations in a particular society, so tells us nothing about changes for particular sectors of society. A result of this is that the same Gini coefficient figure, or value, can be found for countries that have radically different distributions of income and poverty (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Gini has also been questioned for not capturing well the scale of inequality when the distribution is highly concentrated.

For that reason, economists have proposed another measure of income inequality, the Palma index, which is the ratio between the share owned by a given top percentage of the population and a given bottom percentage (Krozer, 2015).

ELEPHANTS AND HOCKEY STICKS

Milanovic developed a graph showing the share of income growth going to different income percentiles of the world’s population that has become known as the “elephant curve”. This has stimulated much debate on the changing composition of wealth and income. It indicates improvements for many of the world’s poor, while the traditional middle classes of the “developed” world stagnated. An alternative analysis of the absolute income going to different percentiles of the population, which has become known as the “hockey stick”, shows far less, if any, change in favour of the poorest (see Figure 1). Both methods of analysis show a dramatically increasing share of income going to the very wealthiest, the top 1% (Lannen et al., 2019).

The Lorenz curve was developed by Max O. Lorenz in 1905 to represent inequality in the distribution of income or wealth, and it can also be used for the distribution of land or other assets. In the case of income distribution, the curve shows for x% of households, what percentage (y%) of the total income they have. A perfectly equal income distribution would be one in which every person has the same income, depicted by the straight line y = x, called the “line of perfect equality”. The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the line of perfect equality and the observed Lorenz curve to the area between the line of perfect equality and the line of perfect inequality. The values of the Gini coefficient range from 0 to 1, and the higher the coefficient the more unequal the distribution is. For more information, see FAO (2006). “Inequality Analysis: The Gini Index”. Analytical Tools, Module 040, December 2006. http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/329/gini_index_040en.pdf
DEVELOPING THE “CONCEPTS” FOR INEQUALITY MEASUREMENT

New ways of looking at inequality are suggested in order to take into account its multi-dimensionality, including the social and political dimensions of inequality. These “concepts”, elaborated below, expand on the work of Milanovic (2011 and 2006).

- **Inequality between people in a country**: Most data and analysis on inequality are done at a country level. Such data have more uniformity than global data that have to draw on different national data sets. The national level is also important as it is the main level at which legislation and policy to address inequality are developed. This typically looks at income percentiles, giving a measure of vertical inequality, and in many countries is also analysed based on gender in a basic form of horizontal analysis of inequality (as defined by Stewart, 2002). In countries with very specific racial divisions (e.g. South Africa and the USA) it is also common to see the horizontal inequality analysis done in terms of race.
- **Inequality between countries based on per capita income or GDP for each country:** The limitation of this approach is that the lack of weighting by population can give a small country with a high level of average income or a large change in average income a disproportionate effect on the overall picture (Milanovic, 2011).

- **Inequality between countries based on per capita income or GDP and weighted for the population of each country:** This considers the different population sizes of countries, but still assumes that all people in a country have the same income. Where there is relative equality within a country and a big difference between countries this can give a more accurate picture of global inequality, but in fact inequality between countries is reducing while inequalities within countries are growing (Milanovic, 2011).

- **Inequality between all people across the world** (regardless of where they are), based on their disposable income and/or assets as identified with household and individual self-reporting surveys (as opposed to the current norm of proxy reporting at household level) and linkable to other socio-economic data on respondents: This builds on Milanovic (2011), with work done by others on how to better measure women’s land rights (IAEG-SDG, 2017; Dancer and Tsikata, 2015). This would be the most accurate approach we can envisage at this time for the measurement of economic inequality. Although the required data are not yet available in most countries, it sets a vision of what can be aimed for.

- **Qualitative, or mixed methods,** measurement of inequalities in multi-dimensional aspects of quality of life and ability to claim rights: This is an underdeveloped area of inequality measurement that can be found emerging in fields such as gender studies and feminist literature that look at issues of governance, women’s empowerment, and social structure and initiatives to measure perceptions of well-being or happiness, tenure security, food security, etc. (IAEG-SDG, 2018; Fioramonti, 2017; Mattes et al., 2016; Dancer and Tsikata, 2015; Coates et al., 2007). This requires further development, but is important as it becomes increasingly clear that narrow quantitative measures of income, wealth, and land rights do not do justice to the fullness of people’s lives and the power relations affecting them, especially for indigenous communities, women, and other marginalised groups. This is needed to counter the risks of narrow and economic indicator-based methods of measurement that channel policy-makers into equally narrow responses.
The above concepts (also in Table 1 below) correspond with the progression in the measurement of global inequality as more data have become available. Groups such as the World Inequality Lab have made important advances over recent years in the measurement of income and wealth inequalities by drawing on and combining data from a range of sources to build a more accurate picture, especially of the incomes of the very richest (Alvaredo et al., 2018). The measurement of wealth (an individual’s holding of assets and liabilities) can theoretically be applied in all of these concepts, but wealth data are less widely available and less reliable than income data at this point. Major constraints remain in being able to obtain accurate global information to be able to implement the more accurate approaches outlined as concepts 4, 5, and 6 above. While concept 4 is now possible in quite a number of countries, the addition, as per concept 5, of self-reporting in household survey methodologies is still a new approach that has only gained prominence in work on the monitoring of the SDGs since their adoption in 2015. This self-reporting is, however, within reach over the coming years and would be an important step forward for the accurate measurement of gender inequalities (including specifically in relation to land) and could create new possibilities for analysis of horizontal inequalities across other groups, as well as improving the accuracy of analysis of vertical inequalities. Concept 6 requires further conceptual and methodological work, but is important to push onto the agenda of debates on the measurement of inequality.

Table 1: Overview of three inequality measurement concepts (building on Milanovic, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept 1</th>
<th>Concept 2</th>
<th>Concept 3</th>
<th>Concept 4</th>
<th>Concept 5</th>
<th>Concept 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of data</strong></td>
<td>National accounts, national household surveys, revenue collection agencies</td>
<td>National accounts, tax data, and population statistics</td>
<td>National accounts, tax data, and population statistics</td>
<td>Household surveys, national accounts, tax data, and other state- and non-state-compiled data sets</td>
<td>Improved household surveys combined with other data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit of observation</strong></td>
<td>Households, only within country</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Country (weighted)</td>
<td>Individual (only seen through household)</td>
<td>Individual and groups (horizontal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare concept</strong></td>
<td>GDP or GNP per capita</td>
<td>GDP or GNP per capita</td>
<td>Per capita income or expenditure</td>
<td>Per capita income or expenditure</td>
<td>Mixed, with more attention to power and ability to claim entitlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within country distribution</strong></td>
<td>Country-focused</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>Included</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within household distribution</strong></td>
<td>Obscured</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Horizontal and/or vertical analysis</strong></td>
<td>Vertical and limited horizontal</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Vertical and limited horizontal</td>
<td>Vertical and limited horizontal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We have added to the Milanovic (2011) presentation of the concepts with concepts 1, 5, and 6 and also added new sources of data, as used in the World Inequality Report 2018 (Alvaredo et al., 2018) and as proposed for the study of gender and other horizontal inequalities. The identification of whether concepts cover vertical and horizontal inequalities is added due to the importance of increasing the monitoring of horizontal inequalities. The implications of looking at horizontal inequalities are that: 1) data need to be collected and analysed by a greater diversity of cultural categories, not just by individuals (Stewart, 2002); and 2) more attention needs to be given to detailed assessment of horizontal inequalities, including the heterogeneous starting points for people (even within the same income groups) and the differentiated impacts of interventions. Such detailed analysis would benefit from qualitative as well as quantitative research to pick up outputs and drivers of change for different groups (Ravallion, 2004; McKay, 2002).

Inequality also needs to be looked at over time. A snapshot at a particular moment is inadequate given that inequality can vary a lot over time (McKay, 2002). This also leads us to an underdeveloped area of inequality analysis, which is the increasingly clear need to take into account impacts on future generations. This understanding is captured in sustainable development debates with the notion that we need to meet “the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland, 1987). This has not yet become common in inequality debates, despite the obvious risk that actions today may create greater inequalities of opportunity and outcomes between the generation that benefits now and the generations still to come, who will have to rely on the same environment and natural resources.

This perspective adds to existing debates on inequality and the environment that have shown how the different environments people live in, sometimes without a choice, have an impact on their lives and opportunities. At the same time, inequalities also have an impact on how different people are able, or not, to cope with environmental pressures (Leach, 2016). The inequality and injustice of this is exacerbated in cases where particular groups are enriching themselves through land and other natural resource use that is destructive to the environment and negatively affects more vulnerable groups (Leach, 2016).
EUROPE

Most member countries of the European Union have quite sophisticated national statistical organisations that gather data on the structure of their agricultural sector on a regular basis. This is available centrally through Eurostat, revealing a picture of increasing land concentration as farm sizes increase (Piet, 2016; Eurostat, 2015) and the number of farms decreases. In 2013 there were 10.8 million agricultural holdings in the 28 countries of the EU, with an average size of 16.1 ha. This was up from the average agricultural holding size of 14.4 ha in 2010. During this period there was a decrease of 11.5% in the number of agricultural holdings as well as a decline of 0.7% in the utilised agricultural area (Eurostat, 2015). The significant decline in the number of agricultural holdings combined with a 7.5% increase in the value of agricultural output and a loss of 2.3 million jobs on farms (19.8%) between 2007 and 2013 (Eurostat, 2015). These figures clearly show a process of increasing concentration of ownership and incomes in the agricultural sector in Europe. There are significant differences between European countries, with the Czech Republic having the largest average farm size of 133 ha, while six countries have average farm sizes of below 10 ha. The EC analysis below compares total agricultural land holding by different farm sizes and reveals more inequality than the average farm size figures.

There are also differences in particular regions within countries. For example, it has been widely claimed that Scotland has some of the most unequal land ownership patterns in Europe, with individual land holdings of up to 100,000 ha and just 432 people owning half the land in the country (Peacock, 2018; CLS, 2016).

“The 66% of all farms with less than 5 ha of agricultural land occupy only 6.2% of the total agricultural land in the EU-28, while the 7% with 50 ha or more cover 68%. This dualism is particularly pronounced in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where some very large corporate farms co-exist with numerous very small family farms”

EC, 2018: 5

The former UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food noted that two-thirds of farms in Europe have disappeared in the last 30 years (De Schutter, 2018). Opening up to cheap food imports has destroyed the livelihoods of farmers in parts of Europe and large corporate land deals have targeted land used by smallholder farmers, especially in Eastern Europe (Nolte et al., 2016). For now, however, the situation remains relatively egalitarian compared with North America and most of Latin America with, for example, average farm sizes of 170 ha in the USA and around 590 ha in Argentina.
### LATIN AMERICA

South America is the region where land is most unequally distributed, with a Gini coefficient for land of 0.85. Central American and Caribbean countries have similarly high levels of inequality with, for example, land Gini coefficients of 0.94 for Barbados and 0.87 for the Bahamas and Panama (FAO, 2019c). This compares badly with other regions, such as Europe (0.57), Africa (0.56), and Asia (0.55) (FAO, 2019c).

This level of land inequality is well illustrated in Figure 1. On the far left of the figure, the darker bar shows that about 18% of land holdings are less than 1 ha in size, and the total amount of land held by this group of the smallest farms is so small that it does not even show on the graph. At the far right, the lighter grey bar shows that the total land in holdings of over 1,000 ha each comprises almost 50% of all the farm land in the country in less than 1% of land holdings.

Based on the most recent agricultural censuses in 16 Latin American countries, a study supported by Oxfam concluded that the top 1% of land holdings controlled more land than the remaining 99%.

These farms belonging to the top 1% have an average size of over 2,000 ha, though in some countries like Argentina the average size of the top 1% of land holdings is over 22,000 ha (considered “mega-farms”). At the other end of the spectrum, 80% of land holdings are small farms but they account for less than 13% of all agricultural land (Guereña, 2016). Analysis of the latest agricultural census in Colombia (2014) compared with previous censuses (1960, 1970, 1984, 1997, 2002) revealed that it has the most unequal land distribution in the region, with the top 1% of the largest holdings controlling more than 80% of the agricultural land and only 704 farms, with an average size of 50,000 ha each, controlling half the national agricultural land. The land controlled by farms of over 500 hectares (0.5% of the total farms) expanded from 5 million ha in 1970 (29% of the total farmland) to 47 million ha in 2014 (68%), while their average size increased from less than 1,000 ha each in 1960 to 5,000 ha in 2014 (Guereña, 2017). Paraguay and Chile also have extremely unequal land distributions, with more than 70% of farmland controlled by the top 1% of farms (Guereña, 2016).

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**Figure 1: Distribution of land by size class/groups in Latin America (hectares)**

Source: from Lowden et al. (2016b: 25)
The area under cultivation has increased in the majority of countries, although this can be accounted for mainly by large farms. In Paraguay, between 1991 and 2008 an additional 7 million ha entered into production, 6 million ha of which was registered in farms of over 1,000 ha, while the area occupied by the smallest farms fell by 16%; in the soy sector, the number of farms grew by just 4%, while the area occupied quadrupled (Guereña, 2016).

**BOX 1: THE EXTRACTIVE (AND NEO-EXTRACTIVE) MODEL FUELS LAND CONCENTRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA**

Despite the need to diversify their productive matrix, Latin American economies have not overcome their dependence on a model based on the massive extraction of natural resources with export purposes. Fossil fuels, minerals, metals, and agricultural and forestry commodities still account for over half of total exports in most of the region’s countries. In cases like Chile and Ecuador, they exceed 80%. Agricultural production is dominated by so-called “flex crops” such as soybean, oil palm and sugarcane, which have expanded across borders at an unprecedented rate in the last two decades. Large-scale monocultures are displacing peasant, indigenous, and Afro-descendant communities, either directly or indirectly by depriving them of their livelihoods. Commercial forestry plantations are booming in Mexico and countries like Chile and Argentina. Livestock is in permanent expansion, with a quarter of all beef consumed worldwide being produced in South America.

The dominance of this model, known as extractivism, influences public policies and deeply affects the rights over land of the most vulnerable groups. Even progressive governments that used to criticise the excessive power and privileges of extractive industries have embraced such activities as pillars of their economic growth under a wave of “neo-extractivism”. This involves greater appropriation by the state of the control and benefits of extractive activities, as well as a bigger role in redistributing the surpluses generated (Gudynas, 2009).

**Source:** Burgos and Guereña (2017)

**BOX 2: LAND AND PEACE IN COLOMBIA**

After years of negotiations, in 2016 the Colombian government signed a Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP guerrilla movement. Its goal is to put an end to the longest armed conflict in American history, which has led to more than 200,000 people being killed and almost seven million internally displaced (OCHA, 2016). Land inequality was at the root of the conflict. Most struggles took place in rural areas and the main protagonists were peasants. More than 8 million ha were dispossessed, by paramilitary and (to a lesser extent) guerrilla groups, from peasants and indigenous and Afro-descendant people forced to flee from their land (GMH, 2013). This is equivalent to the whole area in the country currently dedicated to agriculture.

Unsurprisingly, after the conflict land inequality was even worse. Analysis of the 2014 agricultural census (the first one in 45 years) shows that land concentration has been aggravated to such an extreme that today barely 700 land holdings control half the total agricultural area, while more than two million family units share the other half (Guereña, 2017).

Without addressing this extreme land inequality, it will not be possible to achieve the much needed peace in Colombia. But it is also
necessary for rural development, as this high land concentration is not only unfair but also inefficient and unsustainable (PNUD, 2011).

Land redistribution was one of the first issues addressed in the peace negotiations, and the first chapter in the final agreement is focused on comprehensive rural reform. It calls for “measures to promote suitable use of the land in accordance with its aptitude and to stimulate the formalization, restitution and fair distribution of said land, ensuring the progressive access to farm ownership of those who live there, and especially rural women and the most vulnerable population, regularizing and democratizing ownership and promoting the deconcentration of land, in compliance with its social function”.

To this end, the Peace Agreement establishes four mechanisms: 1) creation of a Land Fund for redistributing 3 million ha of land recovered by the State (illegally acquired or occupied lands, or land that does not meet its social and ecological function); 2) massive formalisation of small and medium rural landholdings; 3) creation of a special agricultural jurisdiction in the legal system; and 4) updating the registry in order to have precise, current information on land tenure.

In total, land redistribution processes are to involve 10 million ha of land over the next 12 years. One of the greatest challenges will be to return land to the victims of dispossession and forced displacement. Both the peace accords and the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law seek to repair this damage, but progress has been very slow. By January 2019, only 332,251 ha had been restituted. With the law set to expire in June 2021, the land restitution process is likely to fall far short of its goal, and the system has been questioned for not providing sufficient guarantees of protection for victims (Amnesty International, 2016).

Another reason for concern is the increasing and systematic violence against social leaders and human rights defenders following the peace agreement. Most of the killings take place in rural areas and are linked to land restitution or to disputes among the criminal groups that seek to take control of the territory after the guerrillas’ withdrawal. Colombia was the most lethal country for human rights defenders in 2018, with 126 of total killings and an alarming increase in the level of violence against human rights defenders (Front Line Defenders, 2019: 7).

AFRICA

Africa has historically, outside the few settler colonies like South Africa and Zimbabwe, been considered to have a fairly equitable “unimodal” agricultural sector (i.e. having essentially one farm structure) (Jayne et al., 2016). This can be seen in a Gini coefficient of 0.56 for land that is slightly more equal than that for Europe and in Figure 2, which shows a distinct difference in sub-Saharan Africa from the Latin American situation (Figure 1). In this figure, over 60% of land holdings are of less than 1 ha in size, but in total they add up to close to 20% of all agricultural land (Lowder et al., 2016b). At the other end of the scale, land holdings of between 20 and 50 ha come to less than 10% of total agricultural land and holdings bigger than that are so negligible that they are almost invisible on the graph. Land holding sizes are falling further in most African countries (Lowder et al., 2016a; Lowder et al., 2016b), especially in land-constrained countries, but in some land-abundant countries they are increasing (Jayne et al., 2014).
Two important trends are now emerging in Africa that pose a risk to the current relatively equitable land status. One is the fast growth of medium-scale farms, which Jayne et al. (2016) consider to be farms of between 5 ha and 100 ha. They argue that these medium-scale farms, often owned by “urban elites” (over 30% of agricultural land is held by urban households in some countries), are fast changing the structure of agriculture and development pathways in many African countries. This risks squeezing out the smallholders who make up the majority of farmers in Africa (Jayne et al., 2016; Jayne et al., 2014). The second trend is that of large-scale land-based investments, especially since 2007/8, which have targeted land in Africa more than in any other continent (Nolte et al., 2016; Anseeuw et al., 2012). With agriculture contributing substantially to economies and livelihoods in many African countries and the relatively equitable starting point based on many small-scale land holdings, these large land deals could have a significant impact on land inequality in Africa and on people’s livelihoods. This can be seen in the example of Tanzania. Combining data on Tanzania compiled by Lowder et al. (2016a) from LSMS Household Surveys, shown in Table 1, with data on large land deals (those above 200 ha in size) from the Land Matrix (Land Matrix, 2019), as shown in Table 2, indicates the potential impact of these large land deals.
### Table 1: Farmland distribution among household farms in Tanzania in 2013, based on LSMS surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size ha</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Area operated, ha</th>
<th>Share of households</th>
<th>Area operated, share</th>
<th>Average size, ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td>2,451,115</td>
<td>1,270,104</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2</td>
<td>1,730,862</td>
<td>2,380,369</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–5</td>
<td>1,880,628</td>
<td>5,848,818</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–10</td>
<td>368,973</td>
<td>2,503,873</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>6.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–20</td>
<td>105,913</td>
<td>1,442,112</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>13.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–50</td>
<td>46,584</td>
<td>1,260,933</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>27.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–100</td>
<td>3,995</td>
<td>293,497</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>73.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–200</td>
<td>3,781</td>
<td>491,928</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>130.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6,591,851</td>
<td>15,491,634</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** This is based on Table 7 in Lowder et al. (2016a: 16). In this version we have added a decimal place to show a little more accurately the proportions. We have also added average farm (agricultural holding) size.

### Table 2: Farmland distribution among household farms in Tanzania in 2013, based on LSMS surveys with addition of data from the Land Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size ha</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Area operated, ha</th>
<th>Share of households</th>
<th>Area operated, share</th>
<th>Average size, ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td>2,451,115</td>
<td>1,270,104</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–2</td>
<td>1,730,862</td>
<td>2,380,369</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–5</td>
<td>1,880,628</td>
<td>5,848,818</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>3.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>5–10</td>
<td>368,973</td>
<td>2,503,873</td>
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<td>16.1%</td>
<td>6.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–20</td>
<td>105,913</td>
<td>1,442,112</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>13.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–50</td>
<td>46,584</td>
<td>1,260,933</td>
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<td>50–100</td>
<td>3,995</td>
<td>293,497</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–200</td>
<td>3,781</td>
<td>491,928</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>130.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;200</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31,627</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1,054.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6,591,881</td>
<td>15,523,261</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** This builds on Table 1 with the addition of data the authors have worked with from the Land Matrix (Land Matrix, 2019) on the number of land deals and the amount of land involved in these deals that is under production in Tanzania. Taking the total land involved in these land deals (197,664 ha, excluding abandoned projects) would give a picture of even greater inequality. We assume for this purpose that the Land Matrix deals are creating new farms (which most claim), but in practice they involve a combination of using virgin land and taking over existing operations.
The comparison of the two tables shows that adding the Land Matrix data has made little difference to the proportions of agricultural land operated by most of the land size classes, changing by only 0.1% of the area operated by a few of the land size classes and not changing the average farm size at all (at least to within two decimal places). Yet the second table is dramatically different in terms of absolute inequality, with the average farm sizes for the very largest holdings out of all proportion to most others. This only includes land reported by the Land Matrix to be under operation. The figure for land subject to these land deals is much higher, indicating the potential for even larger impacts as these investments go into operation. The impacts for local communities where these land deals have occurred are equally dramatic. It is important to keep in mind that large-scale land investors also target high-value land with access to water, infrastructure, and markets, just as smallholder farmers do, and in Tanzania there have been widespread reports of evictions and other negative impacts for small-scale farmers and pastoralists arising from some of these large land investments (Bluwstein et al., 2018; PINGO’s Forum, 2013; Chachage and Baha, 2010; ActionAid, 2015). What also emerges is the potential shift from an essentially “unimodal” agricultural sector to one which is “bimodal” (having two distinct and very different farm structures), with far-reaching consequences if the number of these large land deals grows.

**BOX 3: AGRICULTURAL GROWTH CORRIDORS IN AFRICA**

Agricultural growth corridors have emerged over the past years and have been endorsed by the G8 as a vehicle for the promotion of agriculture, especially in Africa. They combine state and corporate investments in large territories deemed to be of high agricultural potential, with the focus on commercialisation and the introduction of large-scale agri-business alongside the involvement of smallholders as suppliers to corporate value chains. Growth corridors are combined with other interventions having similar aims, such as the Enabling the Business of Agriculture (EBA) initiative, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and the promotion of large public-private partnerships (PPPs) (World Bank, 2017; Willoughby, 2014; Martin-Prével and Mousseau, 2016). Commitments from governments include the provision of infrastructure, amending policies to make them more investor-friendly, and ensuring land availability. These measures include enabling the control of seeds by large corporations, the importation of large amounts of fertiliser, and the privatisation of public and state land, preferably by auction to the highest bidders (Mousseau, 2019; World Bank, 2017; Martin-Prével and Mousseau, 2016).

The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT) in Tanzania and the ProSAVANA Programme in Mozambique are two well-known examples. SAGCOT was launched with great fanfare by Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete at the 2010 World Economic Forum on Africa (Sulle and Hall, 2013). The Investment Blueprint published in 2011 spoke of mobilising US$3.4 billion over 20 years, with over US$2 billion of that from private investors (SAGCOT, 2011). The initiative had an array of powerful supporters from international development agencies,
banks, and some of the largest corporations in the world, including the World Bank, USAID, FAO, Unilever, Monsanto, Yara, and Syngenta, to name just a few. The plans envisaged using public (including donor) money to leverage corporate investments in farming units, including sugar plantations and ranches of 10,000 ha or more each. ProSAVANA had similar ambitions, although interestingly with more South–South investment from Brazil and Japan.

In both cases the level of both public and private investment, as well as the implementation and the outputs, have fallen far short of what was originally planned (SAGCOT, 2016; Ikegami, 2015). Despite the lack of progress, there have still been evictions (some of them large and violent) of pastoralists and small-scale farmers in these “growth corridors” and linked to the investment plans (PINGO’s Forum, 2013; Hall et al., 2015). One of the largest planned investments (US$500 million by a Swedish company) linked to SAGCOT has resulted in the Government of Tanzania being sued at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) after the government cancelled the deal. The cancellation was in part due to the threat of eviction of 1,500 Tanzanian farmers (Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Smaller, 2017; Coleman and Cordes, 2017). In addition to problems of evictions, it has been found that small-scale local farmers who are involved tend to be incorporated into outgrower schemes and modes of high external input agriculture that are not appropriate to their needs, increase their dependence on the corporations, and undermine their livelihoods (Amanor and Chichava, 2016; West, 2017; Willoughby, 2014).

In addition to the direct, largely negative, impacts for small-scale farmers and local communities, the growth corridors combine with processes of social differentiation and other interventions, including in mining and conservation, to drive “accumulation by dispossession” (Bluwstein et al., 2018). With state and donor support, the “growth corridors” are increasing inequality by expanding corporate influence over policy-making and public funds; creating greater inequality in land holding through privatising land, evictions, and loss of land rights for indigenous communities and small-scale farmers; and promoting models of farming and market links that increase profits for corporations but benefit very few others, as they exclude the poorest and tend to incorporate smallholder farmers on adverse terms (Mousseau, 2019; Ikegami, 2015; Bluwstein et al., 2018; Amanor and Chichava, 2016; Willoughby, 2014).

South Africa deserves a particular mention as the most unequal country in the world and an outlier in terms of the African context. South Africa experienced massive forced removals from the land of the Indigenous black population under colonial and apartheid regimes. This was accompanied by measures that built a large-scale commercial farming sector in white hands that remains largely intact (DRDLR, 2017; Plaatje, 2004; Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2018; O’Laughlin et al., 2013; Lahiff, 2008; Wegerif et al., 2005; Platzky and Walker, 1985). There could be lessons in the country’s experience for other African countries that appear to be moving towards its agricultural bimodal structure, with a small number of large commercial farms controlling the majority of agricultural land and millions of small-scale farming families either landless or extremely land-poor.
BOX 4: SOUTH AFRICA’S TRANSITION AND THE FAILURE TO ERADICATE ECONOMIC APARTHEID

The African National Congress (ANC), which has ruled South Africa since liberation in 1994, facilitated a transition that has left the old white wealth intact and has grown a small black elite to join them in the boardrooms (McKinley, 2017; Bond et al., 2014). This ruling elite has failed to address land and other inequalities and has presided over increasing inequality in the country, with the wealthiest 1% of the population doubling their share of national income from around 10% at the time of liberation in 1994 to over 20% of national income today (Alvaredo et al., 2018). At the same time, the concentration of ownership in commercial agriculture has become even greater as little land has been redistributed (DRDLR, 2015), over a million farm residents have been evicted (Wegerif et al., 2005), and the number of commercial farms has consolidated, going from around 60,000 in 1994 to only 35,000 in 2015 (DAFF, 2016; Hall and Cousins, 2015). Although there are questions about the accuracy of available data, a picture emerges of how in the first 21 years of democracy in South Africa inequality has increased dramatically in the already unequal farming sector. Average farm sizes in the commercial sector increased by over 60% from 1,400 ha in 1993 to over 2,300 ha in 2015, and the proportion of the population owning the bulk of productive commercial farm land dropped from around 0.15% in 1994 to around 0.065% in 2015.²⁸

ASIA

Average farms sizes in Asia have been declining and for a number of Asian countries are now below 2 ha, with 70–80% of land holdings in the region being less than 2 ha in size. Lowder et al. (2016b: 25) came up with a distribution of land holdings for South Asia (Figure 3) that is remarkably similar to what they found for sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2). They found that there were insufficient data available to do a similar modelling for East Asia.

In recent decades there has been an increase in corporate investment in agriculture, including in large-scale farming, that is seen as bringing a new risk to small-scale farmers and recreating land inequality in parts of Asia (ILC Asia, 2016; Nolte et al., 2016). A prime example is the growth in the palm oil industry, with an increase in large plantations, as well as more recently a trend toward outgrower schemes that keep small-scale farmers on their land but undermine their autonomy and functional control of their land (Lowder et al., 2016b; Nolte et al., 2016).

China is the only country in Asia where sufficient data were available for the World Inequality Report to be able to show changing trends in the value of agricultural land as part of the total stock of all wealth (Figure 4). This shows how, as the economy has diversified, the share of value in agricultural land has declined, from about 50% in the late 1970s to less than 10% today (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Other asset classes have grown, including the largely urban housing stock. This does not take away from the importance of agricultural land to those who depend on it, but it does show clear trends in the overall composition of wealth.

In 2015, the value of national wealth was equivalent to 710% of national income, i.e. it was worth 7.1 years of national income. The value of total housing wealth was 246% of national income.


Source: from Alvaredo et al. (2018: 182)
NORTH AMERICA

There is a high concentration of agricultural land holding across North America, with average farm sizes of 315 ha in Canada and 170 ha in the USA (EC, 2018). These average farm sizes have also been increasing (Lowder et al., 2016b). Despite this high concentration of ownership, relatively smaller farms still play an important role. In the USA farm size is generally measured by the value of sales, rather than by land size. The 2007 agricultural census found that 91% of all farms were in the category it defined as small, i.e. having annual sales of below US$250,000. The same census found that the number of these smaller farms had increased while the number of farms with sales of above US$500,000 a year also grew, perhaps indicating an increasingly bimodal farm structure (HLPE, 2013).
There is a problematic dynamic involved where the most urbanised and wealthier countries, such as in Europe and Latin America, have more recent and reliable agricultural census data when compared with the more rural and largely agricultural countries. Part of this contradiction could be due to the fact that carrying out an agricultural census is easier in more urbanised and wealthier countries where the number of farms is smaller, because the sector is smaller (especially relative to the total size of the country's economy), there are fewer agricultural holdings due to the larger average farm sizes, and the country has more resources with which to do the census. In short, carrying out a census of agriculture is a far more daunting task for the countries with fewer resources to pay for it, but with more need for the data.

There is a general concern that the very largest land holdings, and with them the extremes of inequality, can be missed even in a full census. For example, the extreme inequalities in Scotland do not show up in European Commission information on farm structures. This could be because the most wealthy under-report their land holdings, just as they have a tendency to under-report their other wealth (Alvaredo et al., 2018). Where one landowner has multiple land holdings – a phenomenon increasing with financialisation (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2017) – these are often not connected, thus hiding the level of concentration in land ownership (Guereña, 2016). Some large estates, such as those used for recreational purposes (e.g. hiking, hunting, and game watching) may also not be considered agricultural land and thus not make it into agricultural surveys. The largest land holdings can also disappear into the averages, as seen in Table 2 on Tanzania in Annex 3, which included substantial information on large land deals but with no impact on the average farm size. It is notable that the country found to have the greatest land inequality in Latin America, Colombia, has also carried out one of the most thorough agricultural surveys, significantly covering all land in the country and managing to pick up precise information even on the 704 largest land holders (Guereña, 2017). Such thorough agricultural censuses should be encouraged in all countries and may well reveal greater levels of inequality.

To understand what the censuses tell us – and what they do not – some definitions and methodological aspects should be taken into consideration:

- **The statistical unit is the agricultural land holding**: An agricultural unit may be made up of one or more smallholdings or rural properties, located in one or more territorial or administrative divisions, as long as all the holdings share the same means of production such as the labour power, machinery, or draught animals used for the farming. Generally this is land that is used for some form of agricultural production, including livestock keeping. Some countries have minimum sizes of land that they consider as an agricultural holding (e.g. 0.2 ha in Bangladesh) while others have no limit (Lowder et al., 2016b).

- **The information is recorded by land holding and not by person**: One person may own or manage more than one holding. Therefore, the tenure concentration of rural property is probably greater than what can be understood based on agricultural census data.
- **Land differences in quality are not measured**, in terms of location, access to water, soil fertility or other key factors that influence productivity. If all these factors were included, land inequality would be much greater.

- **Gender differences are still missing in most censuses**, despite the guidelines issued by FAO to overcome the notion of only one producer and to use a separate module to register activities performed by women and the land owned by them, as well as livestock and productive assets (FAO, 2019d).

- **Censuses do not quantify the landless peasant population**: Rural households without land are not entered in agricultural censuses. If it were possible to do so, the inequality in land distribution revealed would be much higher.

- **Land holdings may be in forms of tenure other than ownership, including communal lands**: There is a percentage of land – in some cases very relevant – that is rented, in usufruct, or under communal or other form of tenure. This is why the term “land holdings”, rather than “property”, is used when discussing land distribution.

- **Census results do not differentiate between public and private lands**: As there is no census variable that identifies whether the land holding is public or private, it is not possible based on census data to separate land belonging to the state from other land.

- **There are differences between the methods and criteria used in different countries**: FAO, through the World Programme for the Census of Agriculture (FAO, 2019d), is working to bring uniformity to agricultural censuses internationally, but there are still important differences between them. The setting of minimum land holding sizes, as mentioned above, various. This is important as it can affect not only the size and number of farms counted, but also the agricultural population that is considered in the analysis. Some censuses include forestry land and others do not. Some focus more on the land actually in use when counting land sizes, while others consider ownership. Such factors require caution when making comparisons between countries.
## Annex 5:
### Actors and Data Resources on Land and Inequality

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td><a href="http://www.agter.asso.fr">www.agter.asso.fr</a></td>
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<td>LAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The International System for Agricultural Science and Technology (AGRIS) is a multilingual bibliographic database that connects users directly to a rich collection of research and worldwide technical information on food and agriculture. Maintained by FAO, AGRIS has been serving users from developed and developing countries through facilitating access to knowledge in agriculture, science, and technology since 1975.

The International Association for Improving the Governance of Land, Water and Natural Resources (AGTER) was created in 2005 and aims at conceiving new ways of managing land, water, and natural resources – ways that are better adapted to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. It promotes reflection and learning in order to help civil society members and other actors concerned to be informed and to create and implement proposals that address challenges in natural resource management. It provides an online library with analytical reports on land issues and policies, including land reform.

Since 1996, Amazon Watch has partnered with indigenous and environmental organisations in campaigning for the rights of indigenous peoples in the Amazon Basin, corporate accountability, and the preservation of the Amazon’s rainforest.

BASE Investigaciones Sociales (Social Research) conducts research on the social, political, and economic situation in Paraguay, focused on the rural world and peasants’ rights. It manages an observatory on land, agri-businesses, and human rights.

The Peruvian Centre for Social Studies (Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales), through its observatory on land and rights, monitors the land rights of small farmers in Peru, in particular peasant communities and Indigenous peoples in the Amazon. It also implements advocacy actions and denounces rights violations.

The Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) is managed by the Universidad Nacional de La Plata, in partnership with the World Bank’s Poverty and Equity Group. This database includes statistics on poverty and other distributional and social variables from all Latin American and some Caribbean countries, based on microdata from household surveys.
The Centre for Research and Promotion of Peasants (Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado) was founded in 1976 and focuses on developing capacities, research, advocacy, and policy analysis on agrarian and rural development issues. It works with indigenous and peasants' organizations, releases reports on social, political, and productive issues, and manages an observatory to monitor the situation of the rights of indigenous and peasant communities.

The Centre for Research and Popular Education (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular) focuses its research on conflicts, human rights, policy, poverty, rural development, and social movements. It works on strengthening institutional networks and the capacity development of grassroots organisations and social movement leaders. It also maintains a data base of relevant information to support this work.

Since 1984, the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Program (managed by USAID) has provided technical assistance to more than 400 surveys in over 90 countries, advancing global understanding of health and population trends in developing countries. In the mid-2000s a question on ownership of agricultural land was included in some surveys. The question is as follows: Does any member of this household own any agricultural land? And if so: How many hectares of agricultural land do members of this household own? The data are available on a central database.

Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union and is based in Luxembourg. Its mission is to provide high-quality statistics for Europe. It includes themed information on agriculture, forestry, and fisheries with land and agriculture information.

The FAO Gender and Land Rights Database (GLRD) provides statistics on land tenure and use by women. The data are shown in an interactive map and are also available in graph and table formats.

FAOSTAT provides free access to food and agriculture data for over 245 countries and territories and covers all FAO regional groupings. Its data are provided by member states. This includes data on land use and land cover, as well as on agricultural production.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Website</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Forest Watch</td>
<td><a href="https://www.globalforestwatch.org/">https://www.globalforestwatch.org/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Huairou Commission</td>
<td><a href="https://huairou.org/">https://huairou.org/</a></td>
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</table>

FIAN International was founded in 1986 to advocate for the realisation of the right to adequate food and nutrition. FIAN consists of national sections and individual members in over 50 countries around the world. Its mission is to expose violations of people’s right to food and oppressive practices that prevent people from feeding themselves, also gender discrimination and other forms of exclusion.

Established in 1997 by the World Resources Institute, Global Forest Watch, together with the University of Maryland, has developed an interactive online platform to monitor forests worldwide and tree cover losses by applying satellite technology. It issues deforestation alerts in areas such as the Amazon Basin.

The mission of this “think-and-do-tank” is to enable prosperity by advancing learning and practice to achieve land tenure security and the efficient, inclusive, and sustainable use of land and natural resources under the paradigms of participation and accountability. Its four programmes are: 1) Prindex (to develop an indicator of citizens’ perception of the security of property rights); 2) the Administration Program (to provide technical assistance in land administration and land tenure projects); 3) the Center for Community Land Trust Innovation Program, which promotes strategies for community-led development on community-owned land; and 4) the Community-Based Forest Tenure Program, an assessment framework for forest tenure for the World Bank, and an initiative to quantify the benefits of forest tenure reform.

A coalition of grassroots women leaders and their organisations, established in 1995 to empower grassroots women leaders to strengthen their community development practices and to transform public policies at local, national, regional, and global levels. One of the themes for advocacy is land and housing, with a focus on ensuring land tenure security for all women through the SDGs, working with local partners to develop and apply practical tools.

The Income Distribution Database (IDD) is a database managed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to benchmark and monitor income inequality and poverty across countries. It offers data on levels and trends in Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers, average and median household disposable incomes, relative poverty rates and poverty gaps before and after taxes and transfers, etc. Due to the increasing importance of income inequality and poverty issues in policy discussion, the database is now updated annually.
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Imaflora</strong></th>
<th><a href="http://www.imafloira.org/">http://www.imafloira.org/</a></th>
<th>Brazil</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Institute of Agricultural and Forest Management and Certification (Instituto de Manejo e Certificação Florestal e Agrícola, Imaflora) is an NGO founded in 1995. It is currently developing a national atlas on land use and land tenure. The online platform makes available original and secondary data on the agricultural sector, gathering information on land use, agricultural suitability, distribution, production and productivity of crops in time series, as well as other environmental and social information relevant to rural development and conservation of natural resources.</td>
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<th><strong>InSight Crime</strong></th>
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<th>LAC</th>
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<tr>
<td>This foundation studies organised crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. It issues reports, analysis, and investigation into the situation in the region and focus countries, and about the measures taken by states. It has launched the Observatory for Organized Crime in Colombia, and has also published a number of research reports related to land and crime.</td>
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<th><strong>IPRDS</strong></th>
<th><a href="https://www.ipdrs.org/">https://www.ipdrs.org/</a></th>
<th>South America</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Institute for Rural Development in South America (Instituto para el Desarrollo Rural de Sudamérica, IPRDS) has since 2009 promoted synergies and action on rural development in the region centred on peasant and Indigenous communities. It carries out research, advocacy, and communication on various issues, including land rights. It has recently published a regional report on the status of access to land and territory in South America.</td>
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<th>Global</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Global Platform of Indigenous and Community Lands (LandMark) is an online interactive global platform that provides maps and other critical information on lands that are collectively held and used by Indigenous peoples and local communities. The global platform is designed to help Indigenous peoples and communities protect their land rights and secure tenure over their lands. LandMark provides several categories of data to show the land tenure situation for Indigenous peoples and communities, as well as potential pressures on their lands, changes in land cover over time, and their contributions to protecting the environment. As of January 2019, the land maps on LandMark cover 12.4% of the world's land, out of an estimated 50% or more that is held by Indigenous peoples and communities globally.</td>
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<th><strong>Land Matrix</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Launched in 2012 and managed by ILC, the Land Matrix Initiative it is a global observatory and open tool, collecting and visualising information about large-scale land acquisitions around the world. Its goal is to promote transparency and accountability on land deals.</td>
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<th><strong>Land Portal Foundation</strong></th>
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<th>Global</th>
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<tr>
<td>A not-for-profit organisation based in the Netherlands and set up in 2009, the Land Portal is a partnership project dedicated to supporting the efforts of the rural poor to gain equitable access to land by addressing the fragmentation of information resources on land. Through a variety of initiatives and partnerships, it works to create better information for land governance through a platform based on open data technologies. It works to improve documentation, mapping, and monitoring of land governance issues through the provision of a widely used platform which includes structured information, tools, and services.</td>
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</table>
Landesa's work consists of research on land issues, advocacy, policy design, and monitoring the implementation of changes in land policies. It manages the Center for Women Land Rights and the Responsible Investments in Property and Land Resource Platform, offering guidance for companies, governments, and communities to achieve socially responsible investments in agricultural land. The project is funded by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) Land Governance for Economic Development (LEGEND) Programme.

The Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) is a diagnostic tool managed by the World Bank, containing a set of 27 indicators to monitor good practice in land administration.

The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is a cross-national data centre located in Luxembourg, which serves a global community of researchers, educators, and policy-makers.

LIS acquires data sets with income, wealth, employment, and demographic data from many high- and middle-income countries, harmonises them to enable cross-national comparisons, and makes them publicly available in two databases, the Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS) and the Luxembourg Wealth Study Database (LWS).

The Lakner-Milanovic World Panel Income Distribution (LM-WPID) is a database containing a balanced and unbalanced panel of country decile groups covering the 20-year period 1988–2008, expressed in a common currency and prices (2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars derived from the 2005 International Comparison Project). The database allows comparisons of average incomes by decile both across time and across countries.

The Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) is a research project that was initiated in 1980 and collects data from household surveys. It is a response to a perceived need for policy-relevant data that would allow policy-makers to move beyond simply measuring rates of unemployment, poverty, and healthcare use, for example, to understanding the determinants of these observed social sector outcomes. Most of the surveys include agriculture and land information. Some are part of the LSMS-ISA (Integrated Surveys of Agriculture) programme, which has an extensive module on agriculture.

Supported by the IPRDS, its target is to document 1,000 cases of good practices in land access, control, and production, highlighting alternative ways that indigenous and peasant communities manage their land. The goal is to raise awareness in public opinion among urban and rural citizens about the importance of seeing Indigenous and family farming as an inclusive, dynamic, effective, and successful option.
PovcalNet  
Global

Developed by the World Bank to give people access to the poverty data it uses.

Prindex  
https://www.prindex.net/  
Global

Managed by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Prindex is a global data set that measures perceptions of property security (through surveys). By December 2018 it had covered 33 countries, and the target is to cover over 100 countries by the end of 2019.

RRI  
https://rightsandresources.org/es/  
Global

The Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) is a global coalition of 13 partners and over 150 international, regional, and community organisations advancing forest tenure, policy, and market reforms. RRI works on research, advocacy, and convening strategic actors to catalyse change on the ground. It is coordinated by the Rights and Resources Group, a non-profit organisation based in Washington, DC.

SIPAE  
http://sipoe.com/  
Ecuador

The Research System on Agrarian Issues in Ecuador (Sistema de Investigación de la problemática agraria del Ecuador, SIPAE) is a cooperative effort among universities, NGOs, and social organisations to promote research and elaborate proposals for the rural world and the agrarian sector in Ecuador.

Stockholm University  
http://www.stockholmresilience.org/  
Amazon Basin

This ongoing research project by the Stockholm Resilience Centre explores the relationship between financial markets and sustainability. It recently produced a report on tax havens and deforestation in the Amazon Basin.

SWIID  
https://fsolt.org/swiid/  
Global

The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), managed by the University of Iowa, currently incorporates comparable Gini coefficients of disposable and market income inequality for 192 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the present; it also includes information on absolute and relative redistribution.

WIID  
https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid-world-income-inequality-database  
Global

The World Income Inequality Database (WIID), managed by the United Nations and housed at UNU-WIDER, presents information on income inequality for developed, developing, and transition countries. It provides the most comprehensive set of income inequality statistics available and can be downloaded free of cost.
**World Programme for the Census of Agriculture**


Global

The FAO World Programme for the Census of Agriculture provides support and guidance to countries to carry out national agricultural censuses. Data collected provide a snapshot of the state of a country’s agricultural sector, including the size of holdings, land tenure, land use, area harvested, irrigation, livestock, labour and other agricultural inputs. This information is vital in agricultural planning and policy-making, research and development, and monitoring the impact of agriculture on the environment.

**WRM**

https://wrm.org.uy/

Global

The World Rainforest Movement (WRM) is an international initiative, based in Uruguay, set up in 1986 in response to the ongoing destruction of forests in the global South and excessive consumption of tropical timber products in the global North. It aims to contribute to struggles, reflections, and political actions of forest-dependent peoples, indigenous peoples, peasants, and other communities in the global South.
ANNEX 6: KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED

- **Patience Akumu**
  Oxfam, Uganda. Research and Policy Coordinator.

- **Sandra Apaza Lanyi**
  ILC. Responsible for communications and knowledge management in Latin America and the Caribbean.

- **Bernard Baha**
  Tanzania Land Alliance. Coordinator.

- **Oscar Bazoberry**
  Instituto para el Desarrollo Rural en Sudamérica IPDRS. General Coordinator.

- **Stephanie Burgos**
  Oxfam America. Associate Director for Latin America, land rights, trade, responsible for global land and inequality work in Oxfam.

- **Zulema Burneo**
  ILC. Regional Coordinator for Latin America and the Caribbean.

- **Barbara Codispoti**
  Oxfam Novib, Land Policy Advisor and Global Land Programme Lead and Oxfam representative for ILC.

- **Linsay Chalmers**
  Community Land Scotland. Development Manager.

- **Luis Estévez Bauluz**
  University of Bonn. Fellow with the World Inequality Lab/World Inequality Database.

- **Gustavo P. Ferroni**
  Oxfam, Brasil. Senior Policy and Advocacy Advisor.

- **Luis Fernando Guedes Pinto**
  Instituto de Manejo e Certificação Florestal e Agrícola IMAFLORA, Brazil.

- **Deborah Itriago**
  Independent researcher, specialist on social inequality.

- **Michel Merlet**
  AGTER. Director, International Association for improving the governance of land, water, and natural resources AGTER.

- **Mtandazo Ndlovu**
  Oxfam South Africa. Governance Manager.

- **Jonathan Ochom**
  Oxfam, Uganda. Land Rights Coordinator.

- **Roel Ravanera**
  Xavier Science Foundation, Philippines. Executive Director.
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The **ILC Land Inequality Research Initiative** is steered by an informal reference group, composed of experts in the field of land and wider inequalities. Members of the reference group are meant to provide guidance and expertise throughout the process and include the following organisations: